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Abstract 
In this thesis current questions regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets are studied 
addressing different topics of interest in two main directions: market power and competition policy on 
electricity wholesale markets, and network investments and incentive regulation. The former is studied based 
on the case of the German electricity market with respect to ex-post market power analysis and ex-ante 
remedy development. First an optimization model is designed to obtain the competitive benchmark which 
can be compared to the observed market outcomes between 2004 and 2006. In a second step the horizontal 
breaking up of dominant firms (divestiture) is simulated applying equilibrium techniques (the classical 
Cournot approach and the Supply Function Equilibrium approach). The later issue of transmission capacity 
investment is addressed by highlighting the complexity of network investments in electricity markets and by 
analyzing a regulatory mechanism with a two part tariff approach. The technical characteristics of power 
flows are combined with economic criteria and tested for different network settings. 
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1 Introduction 
 
“We will make electricity so cheap that only the rich will burn candles…” 
credited to Thomas Edison 
 
In the early days of electricity markets in the late 19th century of America’s fledgling electricity 
industry, entrepreneurs Thomas Edison, Samuel Insull and George Westinghouse competed to 
electrify homes and businesses. The price of electricity was set by the number of light bulbs or rooms, 
not actual usage. Standards had yet to be established for alternating or direct current transmission 
(Nikola Tesla – alternating – vs. Edison – direct – is known as the “war of currents”), and existing 
technology limited distribution to short distances. The history of the industry shows that many small 
utilities with overlapping distribution lines and inefficiencies lead to high costs (Stoft, 2002, p. 6), and 
while it took years, the industry gradually transformed. Those early competitive markets were replaced 
by monopolized and regulated markets in the course of the 20th century based on the natural monopoly 
character of electricity transmission and distribution as well as economies of scale in generation via 
large steam turbine systems. In the late 1980s and during the 1990s the monopoly status quo in the US 
was disrupted by growing interest in the new, liberalized models of major electricity markets in the 
UK, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and Europe.  
The changeover instigated much debate over the best methods to design, operate, regulate, and analyze 
the new markets. The dominance of engineering analysis during the regulated era soon broadened to 
incorporate economics and engineering-economics studies. In reviewing a multitude of issues, this 
thesis has chosen to focus upon three topics of great interest to researchers and policy-makers alike: 
market power, competition policy, and incentive regulation. The topics are analyzed using 
mathematical modeling techniques to obtain insights that in turn may contribute to future discussion. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the restructuring processes in 
electricity markets around the world in the last decades. It sets out the general framework of the thesis 
and the modeling approaches used for analysis. Chapter 3 examines the first topic, market power, 
using Germany’s electricity market as the base case. Given the present structure of two dominant firms 
and four oligopolists owning about 80% of generation capacity, the issue is whether the price increases 
observed in the last years are based solely on increasing fuel prices. The price setting is simulated 
using an optimization model to obtain a competitive benchmark that can be compared to the observed 
market outcomes. The results for 2004 until 2006 suggest that a large percentage of the prices lie 
above the modeled competitive level. A robustness test indicates that this divergence cannot be 
explained only by the simplifying model assumptions. 
Chapter 4 presents the second topic, competition policy. Can a truly competitive environment emerge 
without proper, pro-active regulatory policy? Breaking up Germany’s vertically-integrated dominant 
firms is one possible solution. Applying equilibrium techniques (the classical Cournot approach and 
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the Supply Function Equilibrium approach), divestiture scenarios for the market are simulated. The 
results indicate that although Germany’s is among the “less” concentrated markets in Europe, 
requiring divestiture of the two dominant incumbents can produce significant welfare gains and price 
reductions. 
Chapter 5 focuses on incentive regulation, specifically the development of incentives to foster 
investment in transmission. Most liberalized electricity markets face increasing network congestion 
due to changes in the generation structure, increased demand and increasing trade. Since electricity 
networks are natural monopolies, market mechanisms are unsuited to provide investment incentives 
and thus a proper regulatory framework is required. Based on the technical characteristics of power 
flows, the chapter highlights the problems when deriving cost estimates in transmission. A two-part 
tariff approach to incentivize transmission companies is tested within a meshed network environment. 
The problem is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. The results 
indicate that the mechanism is suited for electricity networks, leads to welfare enhancing investments, 
and holds promise for real-world application. The thesis concludes with a summary and suggestions 
for further research in Chapter 6.  
 2
2 Review of Liberalization and Modeling in Electricity Markets 
2.1 Introduction 
In the old days of vertically integrated, monopolistic supply, most modeling focused on technical 
processes and network calculations. However, this changed drastically in the last two decades as 
markets were opened for competition and economic modeling methods became applicable. In addition 
the reform process induced the need for tools to analyze the new markets from different perspectives. 
Governments, policy-makers, and regulators all need robust analyses to judge the implementation and 
effectiveness of new market rules. Competition authorities have to analyze the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions. Market operators need dependable software to run the systems. Companies need forecasts 
and investment analysis. And last but not least scientist rely on modeling techniques to analyze the 
market performance ex-post, understand market processes, and further develop the market given the 
future challenges of electricity markets world wide. 
The literature that examines various aspects of electricity markets has expanded significantly to 
address research questions throughout electricity’s value chain. The focus of this review lies on 
aspects of competitiveness and regulation in generation and transmission markets and market design 
whereas distribution and retail are not pursued in detail.  
In Section 2.2 a review on the liberalization process of electricity markets around the world including 
the main motivation, the actual processes, and lessons learned is provided highlighting the current 
framework of competitive electricity markets to be assessed. In section 2.3 an overview about current 
modeling trends regarding liberalized electricity markets is provided. A particular focus is on market 
design and market performance. The review does not go into detail on related issues including the 
growing debate about environmental aspects, or aspects on the retail side, i.e. smart metering and 
demand response, nor does it discuss the issue of actual operations from a technical point of view. The 
modeling techniques are first structured according to the underlying mathematical principles. 
Afterwards, a taxonomy of research topics analyzed with modeling approaches is presented including 
market power, investment analysis, price forecasts, network modeling, and market design. I do not 
discuss the mathematical formulation of the different methods in detail, but rather intend to provide an 
overview of the applied techniques. 
A comprehensive literature survey on the specific topics of each Chapter is provided in Chapter 3 
(market power), Chapter 4 (competition policy and strategic company behavior), and Chapter 5 
(network investments) respectively. 
 
2.2 Liberalization of Electricity Markets 
Electricity markets around the world were for a long time either formed by vertically-integrated, state-
owned companies, or private firms subject to governmental regulation that were often monopolies 
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within their supply area.  Following Shioshansi (2006a) the prime justifications for regulatory 
intervention are: 
 Significant economies of scale and scope that favor large integrated utilities 
 The natural monopoly character of electricity transport 
 Segments of the electricity value chain that are regarded as indivisible 
 The belief that private investment will not occur without long-term hedging. 
Despite the assumed advantages, this market paradigm had many shortcomings, including: classical 
regulatory problems, e.g., the risk of over-investments and regulatory capture; little or no customer 
choice; price disparities; and an absence of incentives and technological innovation. It was not until 
the 1990s that this paradigm was rejected in favor of market-based approaches.1 By the end of the 
century liberalization processes had been initiated in about 50 countries (Pollitt, 1999) although the 
process slowed after the dramatic failure of the California market in 2000-2001. 
The change to free markets is based on several economic and policy motivations that differ strongly 
from country to country (Shioshansi, 2006a). Whereas developed countries hope to overcome the 
inefficiencies inherent in large, regulated companies, developing countries often initialize 
liberalization because governments lack money for necessary investments.2 In addition the 
technological advancement of gas-fired turbines, in particular highly efficient combined cycle 
turbines, have broken the dominance of coal and nuclear plants and significantly lowered barriers to 
entry for private investors in generation. 
The process of restructuring and liberalization is not a synonym for the same set of policies and 
measurements throughout the world. Several approaches and measurements have been taken. 
Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger (2006) distinguish: 
 Restructuring: reorganizing the roles of market participants (including regulators and 
institutions), not necessarily a “deregulation” of the market, 
 Liberalization: synonym of restructuring with the aim to obtain competitive (sub)markets, 
 Corporatization: make state-owned institutions act like private ones, 
 Privatization: selling state-owned assets to private stakeholders, 
 Deregulation: removing or reducing of sector specific regulation, however, a misnomer as 
competitive markets still need some regulation. 
According to Jamasb and Politt (2005) successful liberalization generally requires: sector 
restructuring, implementation of competitive wholesale markets and retail supply, incentive regulation 
of the grid, independent regulation, and privatization. A successful liberalization thus requires a proper 
initial restructuring, a large share of government initiative, and political and regulatory endurance to 
overcome the drawbacks. 
                                                     
1 Sioshansi (2006b) also defines four phases of liberalization: 1; problems in existing system; 2; what is broke and how to fix 
it; 3. implementation of new market rules; 4. ongoing adjustment of reforms. 
2 Further motivations include political campaigns (Newbery, 2000), public debt (e.g., in Victoria, Australia), the growing 
complexity of regulation, and a need for more decentralized decision-making processes. 
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2.2.1 UK and Norway: First Movers 
2.2.1.1 UK3 
The British electricity market has been state-owned since its nationalization in 1947. The Central 
Electricity Generation Board (CEGB) possessed the monopoly on generation and transmission, 
distribution was divided into twelve Area Boards, and the Scottish market consisted of two vertically 
integrated companies. The sector was subject to governmental cost-plus regulation. The coal industry 
was also state-owned and sold 75% of its output to national generators. Thus the UK power plant fleet 
was largely focused on coal (Newbery, 2005a). 
With the third election victory of the Thatcher government in 1987 the privatization of the industry 
appeared on the political agenda. The end results were an ambitious privatization process and the 
breakup of the CEGB (see Green, 2006). With the passage of the Electricity Act of 1989 a 
fundamental step was taken to transform the nationalized industry into a competitive market. The 
CEGB was split into four companies of which three were sold to private stakeholders: one grid 
company (National Grid) and two generators (National Power und PowerGen). The larger share of 
generation (about 60%, 40 plants with 30 GW capacity) went to National Power, leaving the 
remainder for PowerGen (40%, 23 plants with 20 GW capacity). Initially it was planned that the 
twelve British nuclear plants would be privatized with National Power hoping that the resulting 
company structure would be economically viable. However, this idea was abolished and the nuclear 
power plants remain state-controlled as Nuclear Electric. 
The twelve Area Boards were reorganized into twelve Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) that 
jointly owned National Grid. The market was opened stepwise with the aim of full supplier choice for 
all consumers in 1998. The price-cap regulation of network tariffs as well as price regulation of non-
eligible customers was transferred to the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER, later OFGEM). 
Competition in the wholesale market was expected to be spurred by the mandatory pool that defined 
clearing prices via supply bids and demand forecasts by National Grid. 
In the first years prices increased slightly and there was a significant entry of new market participants 
into gas-fired power plants (aka Dash for Gas) (Figure 2.1). This entry was supported via long-term 
contracts for gas and electricity. RECs were allowed to offer Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) to 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and in return could obtain property rights. This allowed the 
RECs to reduce their dependence on the two large suppliers. The PPAs in turn allowed the IPPs to 
sign long-term take-or-pay natural gas contracts. The entry support led to a significant capacity 
increase in natural gas-fired plants: within a few months 5 GW of new capacity had been contracted by 
IPPs and another 5 GW by the two incumbents.  
In 1993 OFFER decided that the latest price developments meant a decoupling of fuel and electricity 
prices and consequently introduced a price monitoring as well as a divestiture of generation capacities 
                                                     
3 This case study is based on Newbery (2005a), Stubbs and Macatangay (2002), Thomas (2004). 
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to increase competition (see Section 4.2.2.1 for details). In 1996 the state-owned nuclear plants were 
partly privatized (the older Magnox-reactors remained state-owned).   
With the phase-out of the take-over protection for the RECs in 1995 a number of mergers and 
acquisitions took place that led to a rearrangement of the initially introduced separation between 
generation and supply.4 Until 2002 all regional suppliers were acquired by other companies, and today 
the supply market is controlled by six vertically integrated suppliers while the generation segment is 
relatively competitive (Figure 2.2). 
Another step in the reform process was the abolishment of the old pool model which was replaced by 
New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) in 2001. Within NETA four voluntary, overlapping 
market segments exist: a bilateral market for long-term transactions, a forward market for standardized 
products, a spot market, and a reserve market. The main difference to the pool lies in the 
responsibilities of the system operators that have been reduced to network security leaving unit 
commitment and dispatch to the market participants. In 2005 the trading arrangements were extended 
to include the Scottish market. Thus with the „British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangements“ (BETTA) the whole British island is coordinated by one wholesale market. 
 
Figure 2.1: Generation capacities in Great Britain 
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4 From 2000 on all suppliers had to fully unbundle their network operations. 
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Figure 2.2: Generation in Great Britain 
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2.2.1.2 Norway and the Nordic Market5 
The Norwegian market was the second to be fully liberalized in Europe. In 1990 the Norwegian 
Parliament approved the reform of the electricity market which was implemented in January 1991. The 
main motivations for the new energy market legislation were the need for cost savings and efficiency, 
price discrimination across consumer groups, regional price differences, and overinvestment. The core 
element of the reform was a decentralized free trade approach. The restructuring included a separation 
of the transmission system from the state-owned Statkraft into a new state-owned company, Statnett, 
while the remaining generation facilities were reorganized but remained with Statkraft. Other reforms 
included the introduction of a common carrier approach and grid access for third parties, retail 
opening, and the establishment of voluntary wholesale markets. Contrary to the UK, Norway had a 
spot market before liberalization in order to allow better management of the country’s large hydro 
generation capacities (market for occasional power). The liberalized spot market Nordpool (operated 
by a subsidiary of Statnett) was, more or less, just the market for occasional power opened for market 
participants. Finally, markets for long-term transactions were also established. 
Unlike the UK, public ownership of Statkraft was maintained and thus a large share of generation 
facilities, about 30% of total production. The Norwegian approach aimed at introducing competition 
via structural competition and ownership concerns were considered a minor issue. Generation and 
                                                     
5 This case study is based on Amundsen and Bergman (2006), Amundsen and Bergman (2007), Friedholfsson and Tangeras 
(2008), Johnson (2003), and Midttun and Thomas (1998). 
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supply were not split. The first phase of the market, 1991-1993, was characterized by low prices, a 
competitive market, and surplus supply. Similar to the British experience after liberalization, however, 
market power concerns gained ground as prices increased (Johnsen et al., 1999). 
The other Nordic countries integrated their electricity sectors into the common Nordic market: Sweden 
joined in 1996, Finland in 1998, Western Denmark in 1999, and Eastern Denmark in 2000. All 
countries established state-owned system operators to manage the grid and balance supply and 
demand. The voluntary wholesale market Nordpool is jointly owned by the Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs) of the participating countries. Due to the coupling of several national markets no 
company has a dominant position although most of the large players are dominant in their home 
market (Table 2.1). The Nordic market was the first to introduce a combination of energy and 
transmission capacity auctioning. In case of a cross-border congestion signal by a TSO the bids in the 
market are allocated to several congestion areas pre-defined by country borders (in the case of 
Norway, up to four congestion areas). A different price is defined for each area. Transmission from 
one area to any other is priced with the difference of the area prices. Congestion within one area is 
managed via counter trading and re-dispatching of power plants. The resulting congestion rent is split 
between the TSOs. 
The first major test of the Nordic market took place in 2002-2003 when unexpectedly dry weather 
reduced the available hydro generation, the major energy source in Scandinavia. Producers started to 
restrict supply in fall 2002 due to low reservoir levels and prices soon rose to three times the normal 
level. They remained high during 2003 before gradually normalizing. Although consumer prices also 
increased, politicians did not abolish liberalization or intervene in market processes. The high 
wholesale prices translated into higher retail prices and thus also to a slight demand reduction 
(particularly in Norway, less so in Sweden) that eventually helped to control the crisis. Post-crisis 
some researchers consider the event as proof of flawed markets, but others see it as a sign of market 
maturity (Newbery, 2005b). 
 
Table 2.1: Generation structure in the Nordic countries (2004) 
Company Production 
[TWh] 
Production share  
[%] 
Home country 
Vattenfall 70.5 18.6 Sweden 
Fortum 50.7 13.4 Finland 
Statkraft 34.3 9.1 Norway 
Sydkraft (now E.ON Sverige) 34.0 9.0 Sweden 
Pohjolan Voima 17.7 4.7 Finland 
Teollisuuden Voima 15.9 4.2 Finland 
Elsam (now DONG Energy) 14.6 3.9 Denmark 
E2 (now DONG Energy) 10.8 2.8 Denmark 
Others 130.5 34.4  
Total 379.0 100  
Source: Amundsen and Bergman (2007) 
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2.2.2 Continental Europe 
Spurred by the liberalization in the UK and Scandinavia the European Commission (EC) undertook a 
reorganization of its electricity policy that resulted in the proposal of a liberalized, market-based, 
Europe-wide electricity market (Internal Electricity Market, or IEM). However, “Europe” is not a 
single entity with a central government to establish and administer new market arrangements. 
Therefore, the liberalization of continental Europe’s markets can be summarized as a top-down 
approach in which the EC develops a road map for liberalization and monitors the process (Section 
2.2.2.1), and the national governments choose how to implement its directives (Section 2.2.2.2). This 
political arrangement frequently obstructs the outcomes desired by the EC which is then forced to 
pursue new proposals. 
2.2.2.1 The European Directives6 
In the pre-liberalized world the EC regarded electricity not as a good but a service of economic 
interest. Thus it was not subject to the EU Treaties of Rome (1957) and Maastrich (1993) requiring 
open markets within the European Union. With the liberalization in UK and Scandinavia this view 
changed, especially after the European Court of Justice ruled that electricity is indeed a good (Meeus 
et al., 2005).  
The process of liberalization began with the Electricity Directive 96/92/EC which was implemented in 
1996 and had to be adopted by each country by February 1999.7 This first directive, aimed at a gradual 
market opening, included: 
 The introduction of “eligible customers” which could freely choose their supplier (at least 1/3 
of the market in 2003) 
 Three possible third-party access (TPA) models:  
 - negotiated TPA 
 - regulated TPA 
 - single-buyer model 
 Administrative unbundling of network activities, generation, and supply. 
The EC did not address privatization, which was left to the national governments to resolve, since the 
utility sector in member states ranged from state-owned monopolies to regulated private firms. 
The outcome of Electricity Directive 96/92/EC was unsatisfactory and a second directive was 
proposed at the European Council in Stockholm in 2001, which was later formalized as Directive 
2003/54/EC. It reduced freedom of choice and shortened the deadlines to encourage convergence 
among the member states:  
                                                     
6 This case study is based on Green (2006), Jamasb and Politt (2005), Meuss et al. (2005), Moselle (2008), Newbery (2002), 
and Percebois (2008). 
7 A large body of institutions also became involved: Directorate-General of the EC developing and implementing European 
policies (DGTREN, DG Competition, DG Environment), the Florence forum, the Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER), the European Regulators’ Group for electricity and gas (ERGEG), voluntary European associations (generators: 
Eurelectric, consumers: IFIEC, traders: EFET), and TSOs  and their boards (UCTE, Nordel, ETSO). 
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 Eligible customers: all non-household customers free to chose from July 1, 2004; and all 
consumers free from July 1, 2007, 
 Grid access: only regulated TPA permitted and a regulator required 
 Unbundling: requiring legal unbundling for transmission after July 1, 2004, and for 
distribution after July 1, 2007. 
The second directive ruled out the single buyer model and negotiated TPA, and required full market 
opening till July 2007 which aimed at largely increasing competition on electricity markets. However, 
declared market opening does not by definition mean effective competition. A particular focus was 
also put on the role of the regulator as a key market institution. The EC’s second directive required the 
establishment of a regulator (if not already in place) and regulatory independence (see Larsen et al., 
2006, on that issue). The second directive, only partially fulfilled in 2007, remains incomplete in 2009. 
A particular concern of the IEM development is the insufficient cross border capacity and the partly 
inefficient allocation mechanism. Starting with the liberalization process the Trans-European Energy 
Networks Program (TEN-E) was initiated. Since the first directive did not address the issue of cross 
border trade, to provide a framework and to establish more consistent trading, Regulation 1228/2003 
was issued together with Directive 2003/54/EC. The regulation included a compensation mechanism 
for cross border electricity flows and harmonized cross border transmission charges and capacity 
allocation.  
TEN-E together with Regulation 1228/2003 builds a framework for the cross border development. 
TEN-E, lists bottlenecks in need of upgrading, provides co-financing of feasibility studies, and to a 
small extent, co-financing of the actual grid investment. Following Regulation 1228/2003, revenues 
from capacity allocations are to be used for: (1) guaranteeing the availability of capacity; (2) network 
investments; or (3) reducing network tariffs. Regulators are often biased to take the latter option and 
reduce short-term tariffs (Meuss et al., 2005). The market-based allocation of interconnection capacity 
required by the regulation is now gradually being implemented which should lead to a full or partial 
coupling of national markets via implicit energy auctions (e.g., 2006, with France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands). 
The EC issues yearly benchmark reports on the status of liberalization. The fourth report in 2005 
concluded that although states were moving in the right direction, some were rather slow in doing so, 
and eight received a warning from the EC. The 2005 report also found that the market-based allocation 
of cross-border capacities should have been in place in 2004 but that 13 of the 25 most-congested 
connections had none (Meuss et al., 2005).  
The EC’s 2007 benchmarking report concluded that despite encouraging improvements, particularly in 
cross-border coordination, major barriers to achieving a single IEM still existed. EC legislation was 
insufficiently implemented; regulators were not empowered enough to encourage implementation of 
legal requirements; the industry needed to implement without compromise; and regulated energy 
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prices were not resolved. The EC addressed the shortcomings in a third legislative package issued in 
September 2007: 
 Unbundling: 
 - ownership unbundling: the preferred option by the Commission (Torrit, 2008), 
 - Independent System Operator (ISO): this option is included after France, Germany, 
         and seven other member states have opposed the full unbundling in July 2007. 
 Regulators: 
 - harmonizing and strengthening the powers and duties of regulators, 
 - ensuring independence, 
 - mandating a co-operation between regulators. 
 Creation of an European agency for the coordination of energy regulators (with limited 
powers, focused on cross-border issues), 
 Establishment of an European Network for TSOs: 
 - to develop harmonized standards regarding grid access, 
 - to ensure coordination of operation, 
 - to coordinate and plan network investments. 
The third package fosters the integration and coordination between TSOs and regulators that has so far 
been voluntary. The slow progress of those voluntary approaches (e.g. the development of an Inter-
TSO compensation mechanism for transit flows) and the slow regional integration of national markets 
were one reason for the formal adoption of the issue in the package. Only time will tell whether these 
problems can be resolved. Additionally, the relationship between the EU’s ambitious environmental 
goals and the EC’s market goals is of concern. Table 2.2 shows that Europe’s desire for a single 
competitive market with many players, lower prices, and appropriate regulation is unfulfilled.  
 
Table 2.2: Major electricity companies in continental Europe 
Company EDF 
France 
SUEZ 
Belgium 
EON 
Germany 
RWE 
Germany 
ENEL 
Italy 
ENDESA 
Spain 
IBERDROLA
Spain 
Sales in 2006 
[bn €] 
59 45 69 42 39 21 12 
Capacity  
[GW] 
131 48 54 43 46 39 38 
Market share 
Origin 
84% 75% 38% 30% 43% 44% 31% 
Market share  
EU 
24% 5% 14% 11% 10% 6% 4% 
Main 
subsidiaries 
- London 
Electricity 
- EnBW 
- Edison 
- GDF - PowerGen 
- Ruhrgas 
- NPower 
- Thyssengas 
- Endesa  - Scottish Power 
Source: Percebois (2008) 
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2.2.2.2 The National Implementation 
As discussed above, the EC’s first directive failed to define a consistent program of implementation 
and subsequent legislative proposals and directives did not produce convergence among member states 
and a single IEM. Although the Commission has set guidelines in which way liberalization of the 
national markets shall proceed, it left a lot of issues open for the national governments to define. The 
directives make no recommendation or requirement regarding the actual wholesale market design. 
Thus either the national governments set up a market architecture (e.g. the mandatory pool in Spain) or 
left it to the industry to develop proper markets. Consequently, most of the trade transactions in the 
EU take place bilaterally and in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Due to the intransparancy of those 
trades and the associated high transactions costs power exchanges were created due to private and 
partly public initiatives in most member states that provide reference prices and a standardized and 
anonymous trading platform. Furthermore, the topic of horizontal concentration has not been 
addressed and due to pre-liberalization structures the market concentration remained high in most 
member states. In addition, cross border mergers and acquisitions lead to a concentration process 
within Europe (Table 2.2).  
Following, a brief review of the restructuring process in the important member states highlights the 
approaches national governments have taken to implement the directives.8 Table 2.3 at the end of this 
section lists the key indicators for all member states.  
 
Germany9 
According to Germany’s energy law of 1935 the country’s electricity market was a private sector 
under state supervision. The federal Energy Industry Act of 1998 implemented the EC’s first directive 
by requiring a non-discriminatory TPA and separate accounting sheets for companies but no real 
unbundling. German consumers were free to choose a supplier right from the start. Germany chose not 
to implement a regulator, basically allowing the market to self-regulate with an option of ex-post 
control by the government. This unsuccessful attempt to implement a TPA was abolished after the 
EC’s second directive. Germany had to established an independent regulator via the federal Energy 
Act of 2005 which created the “Bundesnetzagentur” and transformed the negotiated TPA to a 
regulated TPA.10 The 2005 law also required vertically integrated firms to unbundle. 
The liberalization approach of the first phase increased the likelihood of cross-subsidies between the 
monopoly service and the competitive segments. Brunekreeft (2002) argues that the very low price 
level at the start of liberalization can be caused by vertical integrated firms keeping competitors out of 
the market via cross-subsidies. This may also explain why most of the new independent suppliers that 
entered the market in the first liberalization phase have vanished rapidly. The low prices together with 
                                                     
8 The EC’s benchmarking report of 2006 gives an in-depth country analysis of the implementation of its second directive (see 
EC, 2007a). 
9 This case study is based on Heck (2006). 
10 Companies with fewer than 100,000 customers can still be regulated by state agencies. 
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excess capacity also contribute to the low market entry of new generation beside subsidized renewable 
energies in the post-liberalization years. In 2000 exchange trading started in Leipzig and Frankfurt and 
was finally merged 2002 in the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig which now provides the 
reference price for the German market. However, a large fraction of trades still takes place in bilateral 
and OTC transactions. 
The German authorities’ lack of concern about market power culminated in the allowance for the 
EON-Ruhrgas merger that combined the largest vertically integrated electricity and natural gas 
companies in Germany. Furthermore, Germany has four control areas which leads to inefficient 
doubling of network services particularly in the balancing markets (see Brunekreeft and Twelemann, 
2005; and Riedel and Weigt, 2007). The balkanization within the country hampers efficient cross-
border trade since there is no single platform for transaction to and from Germany. The EC considers 
Germany’s high vertical and horizontal concentration and the prevailing cross-border congestion as 
the major barriers to new entry (EC, 2007a).  
 
France11 
Europe’s second-largest electricity market is characterized by the dominant position of Electricité de 
France (EDF) of which the state holds a 90% share. EDF was a vertically integrated state-owned 
monopoly prior to the onset of market liberalization, and has never been privatized or split into several 
companies to foster competition. With the liberalization process in 2000 the regulator (CRE) was 
established which controls prices and investments. Network operation was transferred to RTE but the 
ownership remained with EDF. Legal unbundling took place under the EDF holding. 
New generators tend to emerge slowly in a scenario with low-priced nuclear capacity and a dominant 
utility. To increase market competition a group of traders, generators, and grid companies formed the 
French energy exchange Powernext which associated in 2006 with the Belgian and Dutch exchanges 
in a trilateral market coupling.  
The EC has criticized France. EDF’s dominance combined with a retail policy to provide low, 
regulated tariffs in addition to competitive tariffs, make entry for new participants very difficult. In 
fact, the EC does not expect France to become competitive in the near future (EC, 2007a). 
 
Benelux12 
Until 1998 the Dutch electricity market was characterized by four large suppliers and 23 local 
distributers. The suppliers coordinated via the jointly operated company SEP to provide 80% of 
generation. All companies were regulated on a regional level. The liberalization process already 
underway before the first directive anticipated most of the changes demanded by the EC (Osterhuis, 
2001). The federal Electricity Act of 1998 transformed the first directive into national law including 
                                                     
11 This case study is based on Glachant (2004), and IEA (2004). 
12 This case study is based on London Economics (2004), Moselle et al. (2006), Osterhuis (2001), van Damme (2005), and 
Van Roy (2001). 
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legal unbundling, a regulated TPA, gradual opening of retail markets until 2004, and a regulator (DTe) 
which applied price cap regulation of network tariffs.  
The initial plan was to merge the four suppliers and SEP into one supplier that could compete in the 
European electricity market. However, due to different expectations of the four suppliers the merger 
idea was abandoned. Transmission assets remained with SEP and system operation was transferred to 
TenneT which is a state-owned company. Wholesale trade takes place in bilateral transactions and 
after 1999 on the energy exchange APX which TenneT purchased in 2001. On the generation side 
several mergers and acquisitions characterize the post-liberalization phase. The EC regards the Dutch 
market as one of the most liberalized in the EU. 
The Belgian market was and is dominated by the private, vertically integrated company, Electrabel 
(now owned by GDF Suez), which controlled about 90% of generation and 80% of supply in the pre-
liberalized market. In 1999 the first directed was transformed to national law that opted for a regulated 
market system without splitting the generation segment. Retail competition was introduced slowly, i.e.  
since 2003 consumers in Flanders were free to choose their supplier whereas Wallonia and Brussels 
opened up in 2007. Transmission service is tendered by the government for 20 years and is currently 
controlled by Elia. Due to the dominance of Electrabel and the resulting low liquidity of the Belgian 
wholesale market most transactions took place in bilateral trades.  
The Benelux markets initialized a coupling to increase the efficiency of international trades: in 
November 2006 the Belgian energy exchange Belpex was established that is coupled with the Dutch 
APX and the French Powernext. Similar to Nordpool the three markets are cleared as a single entity in 
cases of unhindered cross-border flows, but are split up in cases of congestion. With the introduction 
of this trilateral market coupling price convergence sharply increased (De Jonghe et al., 2008). 
 
Italy13 
The Italian electricity sector, like the UK and France, was virtually controlled by one state-owned 
company (ENEL) since 1963. Starting with the Bersanie decree of 1999 that codified the first directive 
into national law ENEL was broken but not completely transferred to private hands, since the 
government retained a 60% share. Nevertheless, the Bersanie decree introduced competition in 
generation and (partially) retail, and separation of network activities by transferring all segments of the 
value chain to separate companies under ENEL SpA as the financial holding company. 
In the generation segment ENEL was restricted to a maximum share of 50% and thus had to divest 15 
GW: three of its generation companies had to be sold by 2003. The market was first split into a market 
for eligible customers and a market for all other customers. This market splitting was transitional, due 
to the deadlines mandated in the second directive. In 2001 a pool wholesale market opened which was 
“semi-compulsory” and supported by bilateral transactions. The new wholesale market included day-
                                                     
13 This case study is based on Ferrari and Giulietti (2005). 
 14
ahead, congestion, reserve, and balancing segments. A zonal system was used to address congestion 
problems. 
The network ownership was with ENEL Terna and network operation was transferred to GRTN (now 
GSE) in 1999 which guaranteed open access to the network according to the regulatory specifications 
of AEEG. Insufficient cross-border capacities limit the competitiveness of the Italian market which 
depends heavily on imports to meet demand. Congestion has increased significantly in recent years. 
The Marzano decree of 2002 simplified administrative barriers for new generation investments which 
indeed are taking place, but it will take some time to show the effects on the tight supply/demand 
situation. The Marzano decree also made GRTN the owner of the transmission grid to foster network 
investment incentives. The failure of Italy’s grid in 2003 is partly a result of problems that have not 
been properly addressed during liberalization (Ferrari and Giulietti, 2005). 
The Italian government’s large share of ENEL hinders the development of competition since political 
interference too often constrains market developments. Despite such problems, the EC regards the 
Italian market as an attractive one, with the incumbent’s dominant position and network congestion as 
the major issues needing resolution (EC, 2007a). 
 
Spain14 
In 1994 Spain passed the Spanish Electricity Sector Act (LOSEN) to reform the regulatory framework 
of its market and thus initiated at least some restructuring prior to the EC’s first directive. However, 
actual implementation was delayed and in 1997 the Spanish Electricity Power Act implemented the 
first directive which opened the generation and retail markets to competition (with a gradual opening 
of the consumer market), guaranteed grid access, and legal unbundling. The Comisión Nacional del 
Sistema Eléctrico (CNSE) which had already been created with LOSEN was delegated as sector 
regulator. 
The wholesale market was re-organized as a sequence including a uniform-priced day-ahead, several 
intra-day, and an ancillary market operated by Compañía Operadora del Mercado de Electricidad 
(OMEL). Participation is voluntary. However, consumers pay a capacity charge in addition to the 
energy price which is only re-assigned to market participants. This mechanism has discouraged 
extensive bilateral trading. 
The pre-liberalized electricity sector consisted of a mixture of public and private companies. After 
several mergers the fragmented structure was replaced by two dominant companies (Endesa and 
Iberdrola) controlling about 80% of generation and retail. This high concentration bears a risk of 
market power abuse. However, via “Competition Transition Costs” payments15 stranded costs were 
supposed to be recovered during a transition period and on the other hand market power mitigation 
was ensured (Newbery, 2005b) that kept prices down even during the shortage in winter 2000/2001. 
                                                     
14 This case study is based on Crampes and Fabra (2004). 
15 A variant of contracts for differences (CfD). 
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The Spanish market provides an attractive environment for independent generators because the limited 
interconnection capacity to the lower-priced French grid restrains the high electricity prices. 
Furthermore natural gas is available via LNG imports. During the last several years new CCGT plants 
came online. Gas Natural, benefiting from its activity in the gas market, has been an active new entrant 
in the generation market.  
Accompanying the Spanish liberalization the international electricity exchange was opened for market 
participants. However, the limited available capacities restrict the competitive potential of cross-border 
trade. Several projects to increase capacity between France and Spain have been delayed or 
abandoned. In 2001 the Portuguese and Spanish governments agreed to create a single Iberian 
Electricity Market (Mibel). It actually started in July 2007 with two divisions managing the derivate 
market (OMIP, Portuguese division) and the day-ahead and intraday market (OMEL, Spanish 
division). Both divisions are expected to merge into one Iberian Market Operator (OMI). The markets 
are managed with respect to transmission constraints. Thus in cases of congestions the single market is 
split into submarkets after Nordpool or the trilateral coupling of France, Belgium and the Netherlands 
(Capelo at al., 2008). 
 
Table 2.3: Indicators of the liberalization of the IEM, 2005 
Unbundling Country 
Trans. Dist. 
Market 
Model 
Balancing Capacity 
Top 3 
Retail 
Top 3 
Austria leg. leg. Bilateral market 75% 67% 
Belgium leg. leg. Bilateral regulated 95% 90% 
France leg. man. Bilateral market 95% 88% 
Germany leg. acc. Bilateral market 70% 50% 
Italy own. leg. Bilateral reg/TSO 75% 35% 
Netherlands own. leg. Bilateral market 80% 88% 
Portugal own. acc. Bilateral regulated 80% 99% 
Spain own. leg. Pool market 80% 85% 
UK own. leg. Bilateral market 40% 60% 
Denmark leg. leg. Hybrid market 67% 
Finland own. acc. Hybrid market 30% 
Norway own. leg./acc. Hybrid market 70% 
Sweden own. leg. Hybrid market 
40% 
44% 
Source: Green et al. (2006) 
 
2.2.3 United States16 
The liberalization in the US has a major similarity with the European one: due to the absence of a 
centrally planned restructuring process liberalization in the US is characterized by diverging national 
                                                     
16 This case study is based on Joskow (2005, 2006), Newbery (2005b). 
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processes.17 Today the US is a mixture of liberalized states, states under traditional regulation, and 
states in delayed transition (see Figure 2.3). 
The pre-liberalized US electricity market was characterized by a large number of private vertically 
integrated utilities which were primarily state-regulated. The large number of small utilities and 
operating control areas as well as state regulation limited investment in transmission capacity across 
regions. The US relied largely on state initiatives supported by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) to promote national liberalization. In 
essence restructuring consisted of a transmission policy defined by FERC and DOE that opened 
networks to competition and state-level restructuring of wholesale and retail markets. 
The US has three synchronized AC network areas which are divided into ten Regional Reliability 
Councils. These are further divided into 24 sub-regional reliability organizations. Following the 
northeast blackout in 1965 the reliability organizations and the North American Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC) were created to develop voluntary operating reliability criteria and coordination of 
long-term planning. However, NERC lacked the authority to set investment incentives. The roles of 
the councils, NERC and the reliability rules have not been adopted within the liberalization process 
which is one reason why there is an increase in transmission congestion in the US. The blackout of 
2003, however, forced the federal government to prioritize grid planning. 
Pre-liberalization, transmission pricing was state-regulated and most utilities provided “voluntary” 
transmission service for neighboring utilities which were regulated by FERC but the commission had 
no authority to require utilities to allow grid access to third parties.18 The federal Energy Policy Act of 
1992 removed legal barriers with respect to ownership restrictions (discussed below) and expanded 
FERC’s authority to demand that utilities provide transmission service. With the state restructuring 
initiative in California FERC realized that transmission access needed to adapt to a completely new 
market setting and thus ordered two major rules in 1996. Order 888 requires transmission owners to 
provide third parties grid access at cost-based prices. FERC also issued a weak form of separation by 
restricting contracts between TSOs and affiliated companies. Order 889 required utilities that are 
involved in interstate transactions to participate in an Open Access Sametime Information System 
(OASIS) which provides necessary information for transmission customers. It also requires utilities to 
functionally separate transmission and unregulated wholesale functions.  
The initiative for these two rules took place before many states began to consider major restructuring. 
The development of competitive wholesale markets and the consequent need for transparent system 
operations impelled FERC to issue Order 2000, in December 1999. The goal is a regional transmission 
platform that supports competitive wholesale markets and:  
 Transfers system operation to independent operating entities (Regional Transmission 
Organizations, RTOs) 
                                                     
17 Furthermore, the US and EU15 electricity market are also of similar extend with about 600-700 GW and both markets are 
split into three synchronized areas (Newbery, 2005b). 
18 The Federal Power Act of 1935 gave FERC jurisdiction over prices and terms of interstate transmission services. 
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 Increases the regional scope of network operations 
 Assigns responsibilities for maintaining short-term reliability to the independent entities 
 Defines RTOs’ minimum functions. 
All TSOs within the jurisdiction of the FERC had to join one RTO which in principal meant to expand 
the ISO models established in the northeast (New England, New York, PJM) to the rest of the US. It 
also reflected FERC’s missing authority to demand ownership restructuring since the transmission 
assets would remain with the TSOs.  
The timing of Order 2000 shortly before the meltdown of the California wholesale electricity market 
was crucial given the demanding requirements. The general slowdown of the liberalization process 
also slowed reforming the transmission system. Thus Order 2000 did not lead to a complete 
transformation to RTOs. Frustrated with the implementation FERC issued a proposal for a Standard 
Market Design (SMD) in 2002. SMD required that ISOs would operate locationally priced wholesale 
markets; complete unbundling of transmission service; regional transmission planning; market 
monitoring; and resource requirements. SMD immediately faced strong opposition particularly in 
southern and western states and FERC soon retreated to focus instead on improving Order 2000.  
The second aspect of liberalization in the US is the restructuring of wholesale and retail markets, 
mostly upon state initiative. It was initiated in 1978 with the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act 
(PURPA) that allowed independent generation investments and until the mid 1990s 60 GW of new 
capacity (about 10% of the US generation capacity) joined the market (mainly in the Northeast, 
California, and Texas). FERC also issued regulations to ease the administrative barriers for IPPs. 
Beginning in 1998 with New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and California state 
restructuring began to foster wholesale and retail competition which enabled new generators to enter 
the market. 
After 1996 about 100 GW of generation capacity had been divested, another 100 GW transferred to 
unregulated companies (see also Ishii and Yan, 2007; and Bushnell et al., 2005), and between 1999 
and 2004, 200 GW of new capacity had been constructed of which 80% was unregulated. However, 
many merchant investors have encountered financial difficulties and the quantity of new capacity is 
declining. The restructured markets face a gap between what generators earn and what they need to 
recover their fixed costs. This is partly due to the inadequate wholesale market design including very 
low price caps19 and out-of-market actions by the RTOs for reliability reasons. There is an ongoing 
debate about developing adequate wholesale markets for capacity investment (e.g., see Cramton and 
Stoft, 2005). 
Retail competition was introduced in some states, mostly those with the highest regulated retail prices 
in 1996. The monthly utility bill shows a regulated component (network services) and a competitive 
component (generation and supply). Incumbents were generally required to continue to offer a 
regulated “default service”. Overall the switching numbers of household consumers have been low, 
                                                     
19 And similar measurements taken to mitigate market power. 
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with the exception of Texas and New York (Sioshansi, 2008). Only large industrial consumers have 
really exploited to the opportunities to switch suppliers. Some market critics fault state regulators for 
complicated rules that the average consumer finds difficult to understand, and failing to penalize 
marketers who neglect to inform consumers of the costs of switching. 
Absent national guidelines, the states took different paths. California adopted a pool-based system, 
divested incumbent generation, and introduced an ISO. However, the market design was so flawed 
that it finally broke down in 2000-2001 (e.g., see Blumstein et al., 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; and 
Kumkar, 2002). In the northeast ISO-based markets with locational prices gradually developed. PJM 
started operating in 1998 and New England opened in 1999. In PJM vertical integration between 
retailers and generators remained (see Mansur, 2003) while in New England divestiture of generation 
assets from vertical integrated utilities occurred. However, many retailers then signed long-term 
supply contracts with the firms to which they divested. Texas adopted a system like NETA in the UK 
that relied heavily on bilateral transactions; only part of the state is ISO-adminstered (Adib and 
Zarnikau, 2006).  
Following the California crisis and the eastern blackout in 2003, restructuring efforts in many states 
were suspended or cancelled even as the northeast and Texas continued to move forward. In summary, 
the US is a patchwork of fully liberalized markets, hybrids, and no liberalization at all (Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3: Status of restructuring in the US 
 
Source: Sioshansi (2008) 
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2.2.4 Other Countries 
The first country to introduce a market reform was Chile in 1982. However, the motivation for reforms 
in developing countries is often the need to increase capital for infrastructure maintenance and 
expansion. Between 1990 and 1999 private investments occurred in about 75 developing countries, 
amounting to 160 bn €, with the majority in the generation segment (Jamasb, 2006).  
The restructuring processes generally followed the sequence of regulation, restructuring, and 
privatization. Beside those key elements many developing countries have specific structural issues. 
Often developing countries have small electricity systems20 that may favor approaches like the single 
buyer model. Often, political and institutional settings are unstable, enforcement of property rights and 
judicial independence is scarce or non-existent, and corruption, nepotism and opportunism make 
effective restructuring more complicated than in developed countries. Resources for specialized 
regulators and agencies may also be scare given the limited budgets. International development 
organization can play an important role in supporting the institutional settings and in promoting 
renewable energies.21 Table 2.4 summarizes the restructuring processes in several developing 
countries. Victor and Heller (2007), Jamasb (2006), and Jamasb et al. (2005) provide an overview 
about the restructuring process in developing countries. 
The restructuring process also did not stop before former centrally planned economies like Russia or 
still more or less centrally organized ones like China. The later emerged from a totally state-owned 
monopoly towards a more competitive setting but is still within the process (Xu and Chen, 2006). The 
Chinese electricity sector was until 1985 a state monopoly combining government and business 
function. In 1985 the government encouraged entry of new investors into the market but did not 
change the management system or the vertical integration. In 1997 structural problems in the industry 
led to a separation of government and business functions and some pilot competition projects. Finally 
in 2002 an electricity reform was initiated to break the monopoly structure and introduce competition 
to improve efficiency and lower costs. The State Power Corporation is split into two grid operators 
and five generators and a regulator supervises the market. Nevertheless, up to now only the generation 
segment is partly restructured. The establishment of wholesale markets, retail competition and open 
grid access are still in process (Xu and Chen, 2006). 
Russia, as the fourth largest electricity producer in the world (behind the US, China, and Japan), had a 
transformation process underway in the 1990s when the Soviet Union fell apart and the centralized 
industry was opened for privatization. However, the electricity sector faced serious problems, 
including needed investments into infrastructure, cross-subsidies, and too-low, regulated tariffs. 
Although the implementation of a reform in 2001 retained strong regional elements, the goal was to 
attract foreign investment by introducing competition upstream and downstream, regulated grid 
access, and a stable regulatory environment (Engoian, 2006). In the first phase (2001-2005) a system 
                                                     
20 About 60 developing countries have a system with less than 150 MW peak (Jamasb, 2006). 
21 Many developing countries have a high potential for renewable energy sources, but are still depending on energy imports. 
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operator and a dispatch center were established. However, much remains to be accomplished, such as 
the independence of the regulator which appears unlikely within the country’s political framework. 
The potential benefits of improved performance of liberalized electricity markets has also motivated 
other developed countries. Soon after the liberalizations in England and Norway, the Australian states 
Victoria (in 1994) and New South Wales (in 1996) set up pools, and New Zealand began its wholesale 
electricity market in 1996 (Al-Sunaidy and Green, 2006). Japan opened its electricity market to 
independent producers in 1995 due to high electricity prices and is slowly approaching restructuring 
(Asano, 2006). In Canada, Alberta and Ontario introduced competition. However, Ontario rescinded 
some of its liberalization due to public pressure following price increases.  
With the extension of the European Union East and South-East Europe are on the way to liberalized 
electricity markets (Pollitt, 2009). Finally, Turkey has initiated restructuring (in 2001) and although 
the market structure has not changed dramatically, the process is still ongoing (Erdogan et al., 2008; 
Bagdadiohlu and Odyakmaz, 2009). Israel is proceeding with restructuring program in the years ahead 
(Tishler et al., 2008).  
 
Table 2.4: Electricity liberalization in developing countries 
Network 
arrangements Country Liberalization 
Capacity
Top 3 
Trans Dist 
Argentina 
1992: restructuring, wholesale competition and IPPs 
1992/93: privatization 
30% rTPA rTPA 
Brazil 
1995: partial restructuring 
1999: wholesale competition and IPPs 
40% rTPA rTPA 
Chile  
1982: restructuring 
1985: privatization 
1997: IPPs 
67% nTPA nTPA 
Colombia 
1995: restructuring and wholesale competition 
1996/97: privatization and IPPs 
50% rTPA rTPA 
Peru 
1994: restructuring 
1995-99: privatization, wholesale competition, and IPPs 
100% rTPA rTPA 
Bolivia 
1995: restructuring 
1996: wholesale competition 
2000: IPPs 
70% rTPA rTPA 
El Salvador 
1994/95: IPPs (pre-reform) 
1998: restructuring 
1998/99: privatization, wholesale competition 
83% rTPA rTPA 
Panama 
1998: restructuring and privatization 
2002: wholesale competition 
82% rTPA rTPA 
Pakistan 
1996/97: IPPs 
2000: restructuring 
95% SB SB 
Thailand 
1995: privatization 
1996: IPPs 
100% SB SB 
Malaysia 
1995: IPPs 
1997: restructuring 
62% SB SB 
Indonesia 
1996/97: IPPs 
2003: restructuring 
100% SB SB 
Source: Jamasb (2006) 
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Table 2.5: Electricity liberalization in developed countries 
Retail opening Country Liberalization Unbundling Regulation 
Started Full 
Australia 
1994: Electricity Industry Act of 
Victoria 
own. price cap 1994 n.a. 
Canada 
1998: Ontario, Energy 
Competition Act 
own. cost-based 1996 n.a. 
Czech Republic 2000: Energy Act leg. price cap 2002 2006 
Greece 1999: Electricity Law leg. cost-based 2001 2007 
Hungary 2001: Electric Power Act leg. price cap 2003 2007 
Ireland 1999: Electric Regulation Act leg. price cap 2000 2005 
Japan 
1995: Amendments to Electric 
Utility Law 
acc. cost-based 2000 - 
Korea 
2000: Act on Promotion of 
Restructuring of the Electric 
Power Industry 
leg. cost-based - - 
Mexico IPPs allowed none n/a - - 
New Zealand 
1992: Energy Ac and Companies 
Act 
own. ex post 1993 1994 
Poland 1997: Energy Act man. cost-based 1998 2005 
Slovakia 1998: Law on Energy leg. price cap 2002 2005 
Turkey 2001: Energy Market Law leg. revenue cap 2002 2011 
Source: Al-Sunaidy and Green (2006) 
 
2.2.5 Lessons Learned 
As is evident from the review above, electricity markets around the world are in various stages of 
liberalization. In general, reforms to create a new institutional arrangement that is able to provide long-
term benefits have not been achieved everywhere. The question for policy-makers is whether 
liberalization was (and is) worth the effort. Peerbocus (2007) reviews empirical studies that assess the 
reforms in electricity markets. One problem of estimating the potential benefits is the design of a 
proper counterfactual benchmark that represents the state of the world if restructuring would not have 
occurred. The cost-benefit studies undertaken show that there are significant potential benefits to 
market liberalization. However, if the reforms are not properly implemented there is great risk of 
significant potential costs from market failures as evidenced by the California crisis. A further concern 
is who benefits from the efficiency gains: Newbery and Pollit (1997) show that the restructuring of the 
British electricity market leads to significant benefits of which the majority is allocated to producers. 
By contrast Littlechild (2007) estimates that the gains are shared about equally between producers and 
consumers. 
Given the experiences of the last two decades it is clear that there is no standard formula to ensure a 
successful outcome, and that in the end variations of well-functioning market designs are possible. 
Joskow (2008) lists desirable features which he calls the “textbook model”. The textbook model shows 
that restructuring is indeed a demanding task for governments to implement: 
 Privatization of state-owned monopolies 
 Vertical separation of competitive and regulated segments 
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 Horizontal restructuring of the generation segment 
 Implementation of a single independent system operator for the network 
 Creation of voluntary public wholesale markets 
 Active demand side institutions 
 Efficient grid access and capacity allocation 
 Unbundling of retail tariffs 
 Creation of independent regulatory agencies and establishment of market monitoring 
 Transition mechanisms. 
Not all markets have implemented these key elements, yet they are functioning quite well, e.g., the 
Nordic market has no full privatization. Every set of reforms must fit the underlying market 
characteristics (see Woo et al., 2003) and different approaches must also reflect the political 
understanding of the reform process. Thus Newbery (2002) sees deregulation in the US as a relaxation 
of regulatory price control recognizing a high probability of market power whereas the EU approach 
introduces wholesale markets assuming that they will be naturally competitive.  
Percebois (2008) shows that liberalization does not go hand in hand with price reduction and that some 
consumers may bear a net loss of surplus due to price convergence. Joskow (2008) also summarizes 
further lessons learned from international experiences and hints at ongoing discussions and unresolved 
problems: 
 The textbook model provides a sound guideline for reforms and a departure is likely to lead to 
performance problems 
 Energy markets should be integrated with allocation of transmission capacity (locational 
pricing approach) 
 Market power should be dealt with by ex-ante structural methods 
 Network regulation of transmission and distribution is important but often neglected 
 Well-functioning transmission investment framework remains a challenge 
 Resource adequacy is an ongoing issue  
 Retail market design and default service conditions are important for successful retail 
programs 
 Vertical (re)integration of generation and supply is likely to be efficient, but has inherent 
market power problems 
 Demand response in spot markets needs more attention 
 Deregulation is an ongoing process (“reform of reforms”) 
 Strong political commitment is necessary for a successful transformation. 
Sioshansi (2006a, b) and Sioshansi (2008) summarize the points to be clarified in future research. 
They emphasize the resource adequacy problem and whether capacity markets are needed for 
generators to recover their fixed costs and provide adequate signals for investments (e.g., see Cramton 
and Stoft, 2005; and Adib et al., 2008). Still unresolved is the question of vertical integration of 
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generation and supply. On the one hand it provides a hedge for generators to manage price volatilities 
(Chao et al., 2008), but it reduces market liquidity and may increase market power abuse. The problem 
of resource adequacy also translates into transmission and distribution although in this case a proper 
incentive regulatory approach is needed (see Chapter 5). 
Sioshansi (2006b) sees diverging developments in the role of the regulator: the purpose can either be 
to provide a level playing field for market participants and monitor the market (an approach most 
markets have taken), or as a central agency to set concrete rules and steps to follow (an approach in 
some countries that has produced disappointing liberalization results). Other topics of future 
development include the progress of market integration, ways to promote and integrate demand 
response in the wholesale markets, promotion of renewables and the question of  centralized versus 
decentralized markets, and finally the ongoing climate change debate and its impact on electricity 
markets. 
What will the future structure of electricity markets look like? Will there be full liberalization, limiting 
regulation to networks and monitoring tasks, or will it swing back to integration and strong regulation 
of all segments? Following Correlje and de Vries (2008) the end result may be hybridized structures.22 
Hybrid markets generally fall into three categories: 
 Liberalized markets that are not fully privatized 
 Privatized markets that are not fully liberalized 
 Markets where the regulator intervenes in the key decisions of market players. 
Although these types of markets were initially considered to represent transition stages it appears that 
they may become permanent in some countries, due to slowing progress, lack of political will, more 
pressing economic problems within a country, and so on. Whether this is a serious problem is still a 
matter of debate. 
 
2.3 Modeling of Electricity Markets 
Modeling electricity markets has accelerated in recent years because of the growing need for more 
sophisticated methodologies. Higher computational speeds now allow quicker and more complex 
simulations to be performed. Prior to liberalization operational models were applied for cost-based or 
pure technical analyses, but they were inadequate for understanding the emerging market structures. 
As the former centralized planning approach shifted to a more decentralized focus, cost-based 
approaches were replaced by profit maximization, and ex-post regulation was transformed to ex-ante 
benchmarking. A growing number of interest groups and stakeholders, including former monopolized 
or regulated firms, new entrants, new system and market operators, regulators and governmental 
agencies, and researchers and academics welcomed the new analytical tools. 
                                                     
22 Following Sioshansi (2008) the word „hybrid“ may be a bad choice as the worst instead of the best elements of regulation 
and competition may be combined. 
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In the context of market economics, research can draw upon a large body of economic modeling 
theory and application. However, the specific characteristics of electricity (e.g., non-storability, 
inelastic demand) present a challenge to apply those principals and derive robust model results. 
Furthermore, market outcomes are influenced by electro-technical, thermodynamic, and mechanical 
restrictions that require a combination of economic and technical modeling. 
The wide array of interest groups and the underlying characteristics are reasons for the large variety of 
model techniques applied to different aspects of electricity markets. Several studies that provide an 
overview of the modeling approaches used for electricity markets (see Nanduri and Das, 2009; 
Ventosa et al., 2005; Day et al., 2002; Kahn, 1998; and Smeers, 1997) attempt to classify them 
according to some arbitrary criteria based on mathematical characteristics or on application 
orientation. The sections below classify the market models according to model structure and discuss 
their applications. This review of electricity market models is intended to provide a rough guideline of 
the recent developments that have been addressed by modeling approaches. 
2.3.1 Classification of Model Types 
Following Ventosa et al. (2005) electricity market models can be classified according to their structure 
into three types: optimization, equilibrium, and simulation models. These can be further categorized 
according to the market environment assumed: perfect or imperfect competition. Figure 2.4 is a 
schematic of this classification. 
Optimization models maximize or minimize a specific objective which is typically a single firm’s 
profit subject to technical or economic constraints. If one assumes perfect competition the market price 
is an exogenous variable while under imperfect competition the firm can influence market prices. One 
can also examine the entire market via welfare maximization or cost-minimizing approaches. To 
analyze a market with several players, particularly an imperfect market setting, an equilibrium model 
is best since it can combine different players’ market behaviors. Strategic behavior can be defined 
ranging from classic Betrand and Cournot competition to the mathematically more demanding Supply 
Function Equilibrium (SFE) model. 
Simulation models can be applied if the considered problem becomes too complex to apply a formal 
equilibrium model. They typically represent market agents via specific assumptions and rules and thus 
allow a wide array of strategic behaviors and market representations.  
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Figure 2.4: Classification of model types 
optimization models equilibrium models simulation models 
(e.g. agent based)
single firm 
profit 
maximization
market analysis/ 
perfect 
competition
prices 
exogenous/
perfect 
competition
prices 
endogenous/
imperfect 
competition
imperfect 
competition
Bertrand
Cournot
Stackelberg
Conjectural 
Variations
SFE
Collusion
 
Source: Following Ventosa et al. (2005), Day et al. (2002), and Smeers (1997) 
 
2.3.1.1 Optimization Models 
The main advantage of optimization models is the availability of optimization algorithms that allow 
large-scale models with a multitude of technical or economic restrictions. However, the focus on a 
single objective value reduces the complexity these models can obtain with respect to market behavior. 
The simplest form of an optimization model is profit maximization under fixed deterministic market 
prices which resembles perfect competition. This problem can generally be expressed as a linear 
program (LP) or mixed integer linear program (MILP). The model type can be improved by 
introducing uncertainty of the price e.g., via a distribution function. This method bears similarities to 
risk management methods and thus allows analyses of risk hedging methods. On a single-firm level 
the next family of model types includes the possibilities to influence the market price assuming the 
supply of its competitors as given (leader-in-price model). Again, the model type can be differentiated 
in deterministic and stochastic models depending on the representation of the demand function 
(Ventosa et al., 2005). 
Another branch of optimization models addresses whole markets by maximizing the total welfare 
given the supply and demand functions, or by cost minimization given a fixed demand level. The 
obtained price and quantity results are numerically identical to a competitive equilibrium setting. 
However, the formulation via a welfare maximizing or cost-minimizing social planer does not include 
the single firm’s profit decisions or trader activities. Hence it represents a completely different type of 
market representation in economic terms. The advantage of an optimization formulation lies in the 
simplicity of adding additional constraints (power flow calculations, network constraints, etc.) which 
would otherwise need a complete reformulation of an equilibrium model. Furthermore, mixed integer 
formulation can be addressed in an optimization framework but presents a large obstacle in 
equilibrium analyses. 
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2.3.1.2 Equilibrium Models 
Equilibrium models simultaneously satisfy each of the considered market participants’ first order 
conditions of their profit maximization (Karush–Kuhn–Tucker/KKT conditions) and the market 
clearing condition equaling supply and demand. The KKTs and market clearing define a mixed 
complementarity problem (MCP) or can be formulated as variational inequalities. The solution to an 
equilibrium problem (if it exists) satisfies the Nash equilibrium condition that no market participant 
wants to alter its decision unilaterally (see Day et al., 2002).  
The advantage of equilibrium models compared to optimization models is the capability to address 
several market participants’ profit maximization simultaneously. Thus insights can be gained about the 
impact of strategic behaviors on market outcomes. The main drawback is that they require convex 
optimization problems for the players to guarantee that the KKT conditions define an optimal solution 
and the existence of a market equilibrium. The convexity assumption is incorrect for many specific 
problems in electricity markets, e.g., the unit commitment process (requiring binary decisions), or AC 
power flow dispatch. Therefore equilibrium models generally make strong assumption to keep their 
problems convex. Similar to optimization models the solver algorithms for equilibrium models are 
capable of handling large datasets and thus allow the application of strategic market models to large-
scale approximations of real markets. 
The strategic interactions of competitors within the market can take several forms following the 
concepts of game theory and industrial organization. Day et al. (2002) differentiate six types (see 
Figure 2.4):  
 Betrand Strategy (gaming in prices): the decision variable is the price offered by the firm 
 Cournot Strategy (gaming in quantities): the decision variable is the supply by the firm given a 
demand function 
 Collusion: the principal idea is a maximization of joint profits of the colluding firms; the 
concrete collusion design with possible side payments and penalties can vary 
 Stackelberg: a “leader” is defined that correctly accounts for the reaction of “followers” that 
do not consider how their reactions affect the leader’s decisions, 
 Conjectural Variations: the reaction of competing firms to a firm’s own decisions is 
anticipated via functional relations,23 
 SFE: firms compete by bidding complete supply functions instead of a single supply. 
In addition to imperfect markets, equilibrium problems can also be applied to analyze a perfect 
competitive market by assuming that prices are fixed and the firms are profit maximizers. 
                                                     
23 General Conjectural Variations assume that the output of other firms depends on one’s own output decision and include 
Cournot, Collusion, and Competition as special cases. Conjectured Supply Functions assume that the output of rivals is 
anticipated to respond to the price. They can be seen as a generalization of the Stackelberg setting and superficially resemble 
the SFE (see Day et al., 2002, p. 599). 
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2.3.1.3 Simulation Models 
The complexity of electricity markets often requires simplifications to obtain a solution within a 
equilibrium framework. Simulation models provide a flexible setting for market analysis when formal 
equilibrium approaches are no longer feasible. Agent-based models have emerged as a preferred tool 
for dynamic market analyses. Static equilibrium approaches typically neglect the fact that market 
participants base their decisions on historic information which accumulates over the market processes. 
Agent-based approaches can overcome these drawbacks and provide a compromise between fully 
flexible linguistic models and restrictive analytical models (Richiardi, 2003).  
The main feature of agent-based modeling is that market participants are modeled as computational 
agents that are goal-oriented and adaptive. Following Tesfatsion (2002) the procedure is as follows: (i) 
define a research question to resolve, (ii) construct an economy with an initial agent population, (iii) 
define the agents’ attributes and the structural and institutional framework, (iv) let the economy evolve 
over time, and (v) analyze and evaluate the simulation results. 
Tesfatsion (2006) divides four strands of agent-based research: 1. the empirical or descriptive strand 
analyzing why and how global regularities result from agents’ interactions; 2. the normative strand 
using agent-based models for market design analyses; 3. the theory generation; and 4. improving the 
models. The majority of electricity-related papers are focused on the market design analysis.  
Weidlich and Veit (2008) provide a review and critical assessment of agent-based electricity market 
models. Their comparison shows these similarities and differences of applied agent-based approaches: 
 Majority of models neglect transmission constraints 
 Majority of models assumes demand side as fixed 
 Agents’ learning task is mostly set to profit-maximizing bids 
 The learning representation and modeling of behavior follow no trend 
 Majority of studies focus on market power and market mechanisms. 
Weidlich and Veit (2008) also note that agents’ learning behavior differs in most models; usage of one 
specific learning algorithm is seldom clearly justified; and most papers miss an empirical model 
validation. Another open question is the interpretation of results. Generally the simulation is run for a 
specific number of iterations and the last ones are aggregated as model outcome. The flexibility of 
agent-based approaches is a large drawback since the heterogeneity limits the comparability. 
Nevertheless, they represent an interesting opportunity for modeling complex market structures which 
make them well suited for electricity markets. 
2.3.1.4 Other Model Types 
In addition to these classifications combinations of several types are possible. A maximization 
program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) requires a single objective to be optimized (e.g., a 
single firm profit) that is subject to some form of equilibrium (e.g., the locational price formulation of 
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an ISO). This approach can be used to obtain a Stackelberg game solution. However, the 
computational ability to solve those models is still limited (see Chapter 5 for an application).  
If the single objective is replaced by more objective functions that are maximized simultaneously, one 
has an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). This model type is, in principle, 
fitted to represent the complex nature of market interactions without the limiting restrictions of 
Stackelberg games to define a leader. However, the computational capacities for EPECs are very 
restricted and further progress on the algorithm side is necessary to enable applications to electricity 
markets.  
Additional mathematical methods are applied to transform the demanding MPEC and EPEC 
approaches into “simpler” problems that can be solved with the existing algorithms. Gabriel and 
Leuthold (2009) present an approach to solve two-stage Stackelberg games based on disjunctive 
constraints and linearization which in the end leads to a replacement of the MPEC by a MILP, thus 
allowing the inclusion of binary problem types like unit commitment. Other methods include 
Lagrangian relaxation to decompose large-scale problems into smaller sub-problems. 
With the increasing attention on environmental and cross-sectoral issues, general equilibrium (CGE) 
models can be used to analyze electricity markets and simultaneously assess the impact on the 
economy as a whole (e.g., see Wing, 2006, and Böhringer, 1998).  
2.3.2 Application of Models in Electricity Markets 
Although most research questions can be analyzed with each of the types described above, several 
modeling techniques are more suited for one topic than another which is largely defined by the 
necessary technical detail level required (which often makes equilibrium approaches obsolete) and the 
desired degree of market competition and company behavior (which favors equilibrium approaches). 
Following a structuring of research topics analyzed with modeling techniques as well as a snapshot on 
applied studies is presented. Further topics not mentioned in detail include the improvement of 
modeling approaches, comparison of models, and technically oriented models. The structuring of these 
research fields is arbitrary. Researchers have invented a variety of structural taxonomies, for example, 
Ventosa et al. (2005) present structuring models according to the degree of competition, time scope of 
the model, uncertainty modeling, interperiod links, transmission constraints, generation system 
representation, and market modeling. Hobbs (2007) distinguishes large-scale models for grid operation 
and planning that apply numerical solutions; very small models for gaining insights within policy 
debates by applying easily-tracked structures; and “in-between” models for forecasting and impact 
analyses of policies. Based on an evaluation of energy model research in 2006, Hobbs (2007) also 
reviews the need to develop modeling capabilities that are presently unavailable.  
2.3.2.1 Market Power in Wholesale Markets 
Unfortunately, most liberalized electricity market are dominated by a few large suppliers and market 
power remains a permanent concern (see Chapter 3). Since static approaches like the Herfindahl-
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Hirschman Index (HHI) or other concentration measures are insufficient to capture the dynamic nature 
of electricity markets, modeling approaches have been widely used to assess market power and all 
model types have been applied in this critical area of research. Optimization models are typically 
limited to reproduce the perfect competitive prices and quantities; nevertheless the definition of a 
competitive benchmark via these models provides an estimation of price markups if compared to 
observed market outcomes (e.g., see Joskow and Kahn, 2002, for California; Wolfram, 1999, for the 
UK; and Weigt and Hirschhausen, 2008, for Germany). Many studies applying more complex methods 
also employ the marginal cost benchmark to classify their results. 
Equilibrium models make it possible to model strategic company behaviors and thus reproduce 
observed market outcomes as well as estimate future outcomes. Cournot-type models are commonly 
used to model strategic competition in electricity markets (e.g., see Kahn, 1998; Bushnell et al., 1999; 
and Ellersdorfer, 2005). Due to the short-term inelastic demand the obtained prices are typically too 
high. Therefore, further restrictions, i.e. forward contracts, are introduced to bring prices down (see 
Bushnell et al., 2008). Other types of strategic interactions that overcome the price shortcoming of 
Cournot models are also used (e.g., SFE in Green and Newbery, 1992).  
Simulation models also allow different strategic behaviors and furthermore present a framework to test 
consequence of market power along several market segments. Weidlich and Veit (2008) conclude in 
their survey that a large share of agent-based models deals with market power issues under different 
market structures and mechanisms e.g. the comparison of pay-as-bid and uniform priced auctions. 
2.3.2.2 Investments in Generation Capacities 
Pre-liberalization, markets were typically subject to cost-plus regulatory schemes, investment 
decisions bore low risk, and cost coverage was of little concern. The post-liberalization environment 
requires far more complex investment analyses to account for the uncertainties and price impacts of 
each investment. Investment research can be divided into two streams: the actual investment decision 
from the firm or market viewpoint, given uncertain future returns and changing market environments, 
and the interaction of investments and market prices under strategic company behaviors. 
The simplest way to determine the profitability of investment decisions is to conduct a net present 
value analysis taking into account several future scenarios. Here, the model focuses more on the actual 
future price forecast (discussion follows in the next section), whereas the investment decision can be 
handled with an optimization approach. The so-called real options approach (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 
uses techniques applied in finance, such as tree approaches (e.g., Tseng, 2001) and Monte-Carlo 
simulation techniques (e.g., Roques, 2006); Ronn (2002) provides examples and case studies for real 
options approaches in electricity. Other research examines specific investment questions (e.g., 
Auerswald and Leuthold, 2009, commodity price uncertainty; Ishii and Yan, 2004, regulatory 
uncertainty; Bøckman et al., 2008, hydro generation). Also deriving from the financial sector are 
analyses based on the mean-variance portfolio theory that account for the revenue-risk distribution of 
different generation assets (e.g., Roques et al., 2008). 
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The question of investment and strategic behavior can be addressed, e.g., with two-stage equilibrium 
approaches. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that assuming Cournot competition of the first stage 
(investment) and Betrand competition on the second (wholesale) leads to an overall Cournot outcome. 
Murphy and Smeers (2005) provide an in-depth discussion of algorithmic issues arising from different 
market structure assumptions on this issue. Zoettl (2008) studies the types of generation capacities in 
which strategic firms invest. He concludes that under imperfect competition firms have strong 
incentives to invest in capacities with low marginal costs, while at the same time the total capacities 
chosen are too low from a welfare point of view. Uncertainty of future developments generally leads 
to a slowing down of investment decision while strategic behaviors may increase investments due to 
entry deterrence. However, a full theoretical treatment is not yet available (Smeers, 1997). 
2.3.2.3 Price Forecasting 
Price forecasting plays a major role in decision processes like trading and investments and is crucial to 
the performance of profit-oriented firms. Future prices are influenced by factors including basic 
market characteristics, uncertainties, strategic behaviors (both the firm’s and its competitors), and 
temporal effects. Consequently, an equally wide array of modeling techniques and empirical 
approaches can be applied. Aggarwal et al. (2009) review price forecasting in deregulated electricity 
markets, and distinguish three trends of price forecasting models: game theory, time series, and 
simulation models (Figure 2.5). 
Game theory models are based on the equilibrium concept and thus are applied if strategic interactions 
are explicitly modeled. Simulation models can reproduce the complex nature of markets, but require 
detailed system operation data to produce robust forecasts. Thus, time series models are an alternative 
since they focus on past behavior and do not require detailed market structure data. Aggarwal et al. 
(2009) further classify time series models into parsimonious stochastic models which are inspired by 
financial literature and include methods like autoregressive and moving average models; regression or 
causal models where the future price is modeled as a function of some exogenous variables; and 
artificial intelligence models that map input-output relations without exploring the underlying prices. 
The latter can further be divided into artificial neural network-based models and data-mining models. 
Price forecasting is normally aimed at either determining the average price, peak prices, or the price 
profile for a specific period for the day-ahead market in the relatively short term. Other market 
segments are still largely neglected (Aggarwal et al., 2009).  
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Figure 2.5: Classification of price forecasting models 
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2.3.2.4 Network Modeling 
Modeling networks and power flows is in itself a purely technical task. Sophisticated engineering tools 
and commercial programs exist to derive specific operational figures, but in an economic context these 
models are generally too detailed because their focus is the actual power delivered. Therefore, for 
economic modeling purposes power flow calculation is often approximated, or for a large part of 
research, neglected. 
When network constraints must be considered, the most common model approach is the DC load flow 
model (DCLF) that approximates the full AC load flow by neglecting reactive parts (Stigler and 
Todem, 2005). Overbye et al. (2004) compare the DCLF approach with a full AC-model to determine 
the impact of neglecting reactive power issues. They conclude that the results are close to the full AC 
formulation. However, the difference can become significant in cases of high reactive and low real 
power flows. The main advantage of DCLF is its applicability to large-scale problems with many 
capacity constraints and agents (Day et al., 2002). 
Including the network can be seen as an (sometimes necessary) add-on to electricity market modeling 
that increases the scope of the model, but not necessarily the research focus. For example, a plant 
investment decision can be analyzed within a network framework if significant congestion may alter 
prices in regions (e.g., Smeers, 2006), price forecasts need to account for network constraints if 
resembling a locationally priced market, or market power can be analyzed with and without an 
underlying network formulation depending on the market clearing process to be simulated. Hobbs 
(2001) analyzes the impact of arbitrageurs in a Cournot market setting with network constraints. 
Neuhoff et al. (2007) show the complexity of deriving robust results of strategic models with an 
underlying network calculation. Bautista et al. (2007) show that the introduction of reactive power 
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increases the strategic space for market participants, and thus the results differ from a simple DC 
approximation. However, they are unable to classify the extent to which simplified assumptions 
provide misleading market results. 
Purely network-related research topics center upon market design questions (see next section) or 
oftentimes have a large technical focus, e.g., voltage support. Of particular concern are the necessary 
grid extensions most electricity markets require due to increased demand, an increase or change in 
generation capacities, or existing bottlenecks (e.g., at cross-borders). Leuthold et al. (2009) address the 
possible costs of a welfare optimal extension of the European network with respect to wind 
integration. Other studies look at national extension plans (e.g., DENA, 2005, for Germany; 
Hondebrink et al., 2004, for the Netherlands; or Haidvogel, 2002, for Austria). A special issue of the 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (2007) addresses the research problems pertaining to 
“Transmission Investment, Pricing, and Construction.” Latorre et al. (2003) provide a review and 
classification of models on transmission expansion planning. 
2.3.2.5 Market Architecture 
Optimal market design and the comparison of outcomes from different designs is another research 
concern. As is evident from the liberalization processes presented in Section 2.2 there is no perfect 
decentralized market architecture, and as a result, all model types are utilized. Research on market 
design can be divided into three streams: the design of a specific market segment; the interaction of 
company behavior on different market segments; and the institutional setting and regulatory impacts. 
Regarding market segment analysis discussions are ongoing about the revenue adequacy of wholesale 
markets and the question of capacity markets (e.g., Gribik et al., 2007); the design of ancillary services 
and reserve markets (e.g., Glachant and Saguan, 2007); network operation and congestion 
management (Christie et al., 2000); cross-border auction design (e.g., Leuthold and Todem, 2007); 
pricing mechanisms (Bin et al., 2004); and demand side response (e.g., Holland and Mansur, 2006). 
Since firms tend to be involved in more than one segment of the electricity value chain, the concern 
about strategic interactions across market segments is also subject to modeling analyses. Focusing on 
strategic interactions, equilibrium approaches are applicable. Possible interactions include the 
relationship between forward and spot markets (basic concept for Cournot competition developed by 
Allaz and Villa, 1993); interactions between markets for reserve capacities and spot markets 
(Wieschhaus and Weigt, 2008); transmission allocation and market power (Gilbert et al., 2004); and 
investment in generation and network facilities (Rious et al., 2008). 
The complexity of the interactions between several market segments require flexible simulation 
models. Following Weidlich and Veit (2008) a large share of agent-based models focuses on market 
power and market mechanisms analyses, including vertical integration and market power (Rupérez 
Micola et al., 2006) and dynamics between forward and spot markets (Veit et al., 2006). 
The more general question is how best to design the institutional setting and analyze the potential 
impacts of the regulatory framework on market participants. There is an ongoing debate about the 
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welfare optimal way to enhance transmission investment either by regulation or merchant approaches 
(see Chapter 5). Chao and Peck (1998) analyze the possibilities to design an incentive scheme for 
system operators to obtain welfare optimal reliability. A consistent inter-TSO compensation is still 
unsolved in the EU (Dietrich et al, 2008). Environmental aspects and their implementation within the 
market architecture have gained attention, including the interaction of emissions trading and electricity 
prices (Rathmann, 2007); interaction of renewable support and wholesale prices (Weigt, 2009); the 
design of the European Emission Trading scheme (Böhringer et al, 2005); and the interactions of 
emissions trading and renewable support mechanisms (Abrell and Weigt, 2008).  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed electricity market liberalization and the application of various modeling 
techniques. Starting in the 1990s with the UK, electricity markets around the world have been (and 
still are) restructured, transforming the former monopolized sector into partially decentralized 
competitive market segments. International experiences show that this process is neither 
straightforward nor riskless. Nevertheless, the lessons learned to date from successful and even less 
successful liberalization attempts can be used to shape future markets as well as to provide guidelines 
for countries that are at the beginning stages. 
In the wake of liberalization a large and differentiated body of modeling techniques and approaches 
has developed that aims to understand the process, help market participants to cope with the new 
market environment, and in the end to improve the market architecture that ensures a stable, 
competitive, and sustainable electricity market.  
The complexity of the commodity electricity and the different market structures and architectures 
around the world are reflected in the modeling approaches applied, ranging from “simple” 
optimization approaches over equilibrium concepts to simulation models and the large range of 
analyzed topics.  
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3 Competition in Liberalized Electricity Markets: The Case of 
Germany 
3.1 Introduction 
As most liberalized electricity markets around the world are successors of former monopolistic 
markets market power is a significant issue to be addressed in research and policy. Germany is no 
exception: The German electricity market has undergone significant changes in the last decade, yet the 
scientific discussion about the appropriate market design is still in its infancy. Since the first EU 
liberalization directive 96/92/EC was promulgated, Germany has taken almost a decade to address 
critical issues such as network tariff regulation and market monitoring. Since 2006, the newly 
established regulator (“Bundesnetzagentur”) has published cost-based revisions of transmission and 
distribution network tariffs, and is considering alternative instruments of congestion management, 
cross-border trading, and incentive regulation.  
The political discussion has begun to focus on the generation sector, especially since average spot 
prices at the EEX rose by almost 150% from 2002 to 2006; prices declined again in early 2007 but 
rose once more in winter 2007/2008. A price increase is no proof of malfunctioning markets or market 
power abuse; during the same period fuel prices rose significantly and the European emissions 
allowance trading scheme was implemented. On the other hand, the oligopolistic structure of 
Germany’s generation market particularly lends itself to abuse, with a duopoly controlling over 55% 
of market share, and the largest four firms owning almost 85% (Bundeskartellamt, 2006). 
In this Chapter the level of competition in Germany’s wholesale electricity market is analyzed, by 
comparing the observed prices with estimated market clearing prices under the hypothesis of perfect 
competition. Subsequent a brief theoretical introduction to the issue of market power in electricity 
markets is provided followed by a survey of international experiences with market power analysis 
(Section 3.2). Afterwards the German electricity market and the most recent studies on market power 
and competition are presented (section 3.3). In order to test the competitiveness of the German market 
two different test cases are analyzed in Section 3.4: First, the period from 2004 to 2005 is examined 
using a benchmark supply curve; second, the complete price formation in 2006 is analyzed applying a 
extensive welfare optimizing model. I conclude that market power is an influential feature of 
Germany’s electricity markets, and should be addressed by more competition-oriented market 
design.24 
3.2 Theory of Market Power in Electricity Markets 
Market power is usually defined as “the ability to alter profitably prices away from competitive levels” 
(Mass-Collell, et al., 1995, p. 383). Contrary to “normal” markets such as mineral water, today’s 
                                                     
24 The Chapter draws on Hirschhausen, Weigt, and Zachmann (2007).  
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electricity markets are prone to market power issues because electricity cannot be stored; its demand is 
inelastic; and vertical integration exists between generation and transmission (for a survey, see 
Twomey et al. 2004). Empirical evidence shows that market power concerns are present in almost all 
electricity markets around the world. 
Economic theory suggests that market prices depend on (i) the form of competition (quantity 
competition, price competition, strategic behavior, etc.) and (ii) the number of competitors in a given 
market. The reference benchmark case (competitive equilibrium) corresponds to the equilibrium 
between demand and supply, given by the “real” marginal cost curves of the producers. 
In this context, the question about short- vs. long-term marginal costs is important. Short-term 
marginal costs are the relevant benchmark as long as the capacities are fixed; thus, only fuel costs, 
costs of CO2-emission allowances, and variable operation expenditures represent marginal costs. In 
that situation, the competitive price will be determined by the short-run marginal costs of the last 
producer dispatched.25 On the other hand, long-run marginal costs include investment costs as the 
capacity decision is assumed to be a variable in the long run, too.  
According to Stoft (2002, p. 321) market power in electricity markets can be analyzed in three levels:  
1. Strategic exercising of market power, 
2. Effects on quantities and prices, and 
3. Implications of market power on the distribution of rents, allocation, and social 
  welfare. 
 
1. In principle, two possibilities exist to exercise market power: physical withholding of 
generation (voluntary non-availability of specific generation assets) or financial withholding (bidding 
above marginal costs). Both strategies can be considered as equivalent; ex-post, it is difficult to 
determine whether the withholding was physical or financial. Physical withholding is more difficult to 
detect as a variety of technical restrictions can lead to a decreased generation capacity. Either type of 
withholding leads to a new equilibrium between demand and supply at a higher price level and lower 
quantities. Figure 3.1 shows the case of physical withholding in which a fraction of the available 
power plants is taken out of the market thus leading to a shift of the supply curve to the left. In case of 
financial withholding the “production” supply curve remains stable, however the “bidden” supply 
curve moves upwards leading to similar price/quantity distortions as in the quantity withheld case.  
2. The exercise of market power leads to four price/quantity – effects (Figure 3.1). The first is the 
quantity withheld (qW – qM) which represents the amount of plant capacity taken out of the market 
(physical withholding) or priced excessively (financial withholding) by strategic players, thus shifting 
the supply curve to the left and upward, respectively. A new intersection between supply and demand 
occurs, leading to a higher price level. The difference between these two is the price distortion  
                                                     
25 Stoft (2002, p. 129) shows that short-run marginal cost, including opportunity cost of capacity constraints, are sufficient to 
cover variable and fixed costs; he also provides an overview of the issue. 
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(pM - p*). As demand for electricity is inelastic, the quantity difference between the competitive and 
the distorted market equilibrium (q* - qM) is generally lower than the quantity withheld, the quantity 
distortion. In the case of a completely inelastic demand the market quantity does not reduce at all due 
to market power abuse. The difference between the distorted price and the marginal generation costs at 
the reduced quantity (pM - pW) corresponds to the price markup on competitive supply. This measure is 
also applied to obtain the Lerner Index by setting it into relation with the market price. 26 
3. Beside the price and quantity changes the exercise of market power also has two effects on 
welfare allocation and distribution. In quantitative terms, the redistribution of consumer rent to 
producer rent plays the most important role. Due to the higher market price a larger fraction of the 
welfare is allocated to producers at the expense of consumers. In addition to the welfare transfer there 
also is a deadweight welfare loss: because of the reduced availability of plants, demand is not satisfied 
although the marginal willingness to pay is above marginal generation costs under competitive 
conditions. Producers also loose a portion of their welfare from the less efficient generation employed 
in their withholding strategies. The transfer of rent from consumers to producers over compensates 
this loss, making strategic bidding profitable. Figure 3.2.1 depicts the physical withholding case in 
which the bidden supply curve is altered by changing the available power plants. Beside the transfer 
and loss of consumer rent this strategy also inherits a significant loss of producer rent as the altered 
plant dispatch leads to an inefficient utilization of the power plant fleet. In case of a financial 
withholding (Figure 3.2.2) the welfare deadweight loss reduces to a triangle as the supply curve is 
altered by bidding above marginal costs whereas the producing power plants are not changed and 
consequently the loss of producer rent is only driven by the demand reduction. 
 
Figure 3.1: Strategy of physical withholding 
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26 The Lerner Index (L) is defined as the mark-up on marginal cost (MC) given a market price (P): L = (P-MC)/P (Stoft, 
2002, p.339) 
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Figure 3.2.1: Welfare transfer due to market power, physical withholding 
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Figure 3.2.2: Welfare transfer due to market power, financial withholding 
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3.3 International Experiences with Market Power in Electricity Markets 
At the time of monopolistic, oftentimes vertically integrated electricity companies, there was neither 
room nor need for any market power analysis. The restructuring of the US and the British market have 
opened the way to rigorous market power analysis. Thus Wolfram (1999) was among the first to apply 
a competitive benchmark analysis to the electricity market of England and Wales. Wolfram finds 
significant markups during the observed period covering 18 months in 1992, 1993 and 1994, although 
the generators were not taking full advantage of the inelastic demand as oligopoly models predict. 
Borenstein at al. (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) use the competitive benchmark approach to 
analyze the Californian market. Both find that in summer 2000 observed prices differ from the 
competitive benchmark price levels which can not be explained by load, imports, gas prices or  
 38
NOx-allowance prices. Mansur (2001) undertakes an analysis of the PJM market calculating a 
demand-weighted Lerner index of 0.293, which indicates significant market power abuse. 
Beside the benchmarking approach a wide variety of studies have been conducted to analyze market 
power concerns. Green and Newbery (1992) applied a SFE model to simulate the British electricity 
market after the first liberalization period. They show that the dominant duopoly has significant 
market power possibilities which could be greatly reduced if five equally large firms would compete 
within the wholesale market. Sweeting (2007) analyzes the bidding behavior in the British market for 
long term periods. He shows that in the beginning of the liberalized market the participants did not 
utilize their large market power potentials whereas at the end of the 1990s due to structural changes 
the much lesser potential was fully utilized. Furthermore, the companies may even have applied 
collusive strategies. Side payments by the Pool were also subject to criticism. Newbery (1995) shows 
that capacity payments provide high incentives for large firms to withhold generation units. However, 
Green (2004) does not find evidence that this strategy was applied by the companies.  
The market crisis in California was also subject to several market power analyses. Wolak (2003b) 
investigates the residual demand companies were facing between 1998 and 2000 and shows that in 
2000 incentives for market power abuse were significantly higher than in the former years. Thus a 
coordinated behavior of the market participants was not necessary to explain the observed price spikes. 
Kim and Knittel (2006) analyze the price-cost margins by estimating the first order conditions within a 
conjectural variations framework. They show that in the specific setting of the California electricity 
market the results of this method are not reliable. Kolstad and Wolak (2003) analyze the interaction 
between the NOx emission market and electricity prices. They show that NOx-allowance prices were 
used by suppliers during 2000 to enhance their ability to exercise market power in the California 
electricity market. 
Market power analyses have also been conducted for various other countries: e.g. Zhou et al. (2009) 
analyzes capacity withholding in China, Lise et al. (2008) analyze the impact of dry weather and 
transmission capacity in Europe, Lise et al. (2006) develop a game theoretic model of Northwest 
Europe, Hu et al. (2005) analyze bidding pattern in Australia, and Ahn and Niemeyer (2007) model 
market power in the Korean electricity market. 
A drawback of competitive benchmark analysis is the necessary simplification when estimating the 
supply curve. As electricity markets are highly complex while available information is generally spare, 
models have to make assumptions that may influence the outcome. Typically the simulation is static 
neglecting start up and shut down costs or minimum load constraints. Missing information about plant 
outages may add to the error. Also, in general, the grid is not considered as part of the market. Thus 
network congestion which can lead to market prices above marginal costs is not considered. The 
simplifications can lead to a general underestimation of marginal costs. Harvey and Hogan (2002) 
undertake a sensitivity test of competitive benchmark analysis, by reproducing the results and 
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estimating the impact of varying assumptions. They conclude that the differences obtained by the 
simulation can come from the real-world constraints omitted from the model. 
3.4 Market Power Concerns in the German Electricity Market 
3.4.1 Market Structure 
As described in Section 2.2.2.2 the German electricity market was liberalized relatively late and key 
elements like a robust network regulation were missing for a long period. The wholesale electricity 
market of Germany was and still is dominated by four companies owning about 85% of conventional 
power plant capacity (Figure 3.3). The German Cartel Office assumed a dominant duopoly consisting 
of E.ON and RWE owning about 60% of generation (Bundeskartellamt, 2006). The generation park is 
characterized by large percentages of nuclear, lignite and hard coal capacities, significant capacities 
for natural gas-fired plants and an increasing share of wind capacities. In 2007 the total available 
generation capacity reached about 140 GW for a total production of 640 TWh (Table 3.1). Inland 
consumption was about 540 TWh and exports about 60 TWh (BMWI, 2008a). 
The structure of the German generation portfolio bears incentives for the four large suppliers to abuse 
their market shares. Nuclear plants are solely owned by the four oligopolist which obtain  
– together with large scale lignite and coal fired base load plants – a high profit margin due to their 
low fuel costs. As the oligopolists also own more expensive mid and peak load units gaming during 
high price times can become profitable: reducing the output of more expensive plants to drive market 
prices and in return obtain a large revenue via base load units. 
 
Figure 3.2: Market share by generator excluding renewable energy sources beside hydro, 
2005/06 
33%
24%
14%
13%
16%
RWE E.ON EnBW Vattenfall Other
Source: RWE (2006), E.ON (2005, 2006), Vattenfall (2005), EnBW (2005) 
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Table 3.1: German power plant capacities and gross generation, 2007 
Plant type Capacity [GW] /  [%] Generation [TWh] / [%] 
Nuclear 21.3 / 16% 141 / 22% 
Lignite 22.5 / 16% 156 / 24% 
Coal 29.3 / 21% 145 / 23% 
Natural Gas 21.3 / 16% 74.5 / 12% 
Oil 5.4 / 4% 8 / 1% 
Hydro 10.1 / 7% 27.5 / 4% 
Wind 22.2 / 16% 39.5 / 6% 
Other 5.3 / 4% 45.5 / 7% 
Total 137.5 GW 636 TWh 
Source: BMWI (2008b) 
 
3.4.2 Market Architecture and Development 
The market architecture of the German electricity market includes: 
 a long-term market: electricity producers sell their production up to several years in 
advance, and consumers can secure their supplies; there is active trading with financial 
products (options, futures) and physical contracts (forwards), 
 a spot market: physical and financial trading occurs in a classical day ahead market, 
 an intraday market: since fall 2006 electricity can also be traded shortly before actual 
delivery, 
 a balancing market for physical supplies: producers can bid positive or negative 
balancing capacity. 
These market segments are embedded in a so called “common carrier” system in which all market 
participants (generators, suppliers, consumers, and traders) are allowed to trade with one another and 
only network access is regulated. Thus contrary to a pool system like in the first liberalization stage in 
the UK or most US markets bilateral transactions and power exchanges coexist in Germany. The EEX 
trades supplies for specific time periods, such as four-hour blocks or single hours. Trading takes place 
in so-called one-shot auctions: suppliers and consumers bid individual supply and demand functions 
which are then aggregated. At present, there is no mechanism to determine whether supply functions 
correspond to real-time prices or whether the bidding is affected by market power.27 In addition to 
electricity generators, traders are also active. Therefore the supply curve does not necessarily 
correspond to the marginal cost curve of electricity generators; it may also represent rents from trading 
activities. However, if one assumes a competitive trading market, the supply curve is only marginally 
different from the cost curves bid by the generators. 
                                                     
27 Such mechanisms are now in place in the California electricity market (Market Surveillance Committee). In the aftermath 
of the Western Market Crisis of 2000-2001, the US Congress expanded the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s market 
monitoring functions and enforcement; in January 2007, FERC dedicated a Webpage to the subject: http://ferc.gov/market-
oversight/market-oversight.asp 
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Besides trading at the EEX there exists a large fraction of OTC transactions. These can take e.g. the 
form of bilateral contracts and agreements or independent trading platforms. In 2007 more than 1,100 
TWh were traded forward at the EEX and about 125 TWh electricity were traded via the spot market 
(23% of consumption). Although only a quarter of energy is actually traded in the EEX spot market it 
represents the only available indicator for price developments and thus has an impact on all other 
transactions.  
Figure 3.4 shows the price developments of base (0am-12pm) and peak (8am-8pm) prices during the 
last years. Since the onset of trading on the EEX, prices have continuously increased till 2006. During 
2006 a more volatile price development emerged and prices declined again in early 2007. However, 
during the fall and winter of 2007 the price level rose again to values above 50 €/MWh. The average 
price in 2006 was with 57 €/MWh about 150% higher than in 2002. Figure 3.5 shows the price 
development for EU emission allowances (EUA) since the beginning of trading. After reaching a level 
between 20 and 30 €/EUA in the first year, the over allocation of allowances lead to a sharp price 
decrease in spring 2006 continuing to a steady decline of prices towards 0 € until the end of the first 
trading period. 
 
Figure 3.3: Price development at the EEX, 2002-2007 
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Figure 3.4: EUA price development, 2005-2007 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
09.03.05
09.06.05
09.09.05
09.12.05
09.03.06
09.06.06
09.09.06
09.12.06
09.03.07
09.06.07
09.09.07
09.12.07
€/
E
U
A
 
Source: EEX 
3.4.3 Market Power Concerns 
Given the oligopolistic market structure and the price developments over the last years, the question 
arises whether the observed market outcomes represent competitive behavior or whether market power 
is applied. Müsgens (2006) is the first to simulate a comprehensive marginal cost model of the 
German market for the period of June 2000 to June 2003. He uses a linear optimization model to 
estimate the competitive market prices. Starting in 2000 the observed and modeled market prices 
coincided until fall 2001, followed by a break leading to a divergence between them that lasted until 
the end of the observation period. He assumes that strategic company behavior and learning effects 
were the main reasons for the observed differences. Next, Ellersdorfer (2005) uses a two-period 
Cournot model to study the impact of long-term contracts on the oligopolistic model. A competitive 
benchmark used as well also shows that a significant difference between modeled and observed 
market prices existed. 
Schwarz and Lang (2006) analyze German electricity prices by estimating the impact of fundamental 
price components such as fuel price development and allowance prices. They find that from 2000 until 
2005, rising fuel prices and in 2005, allowance prices were the major price influencers. However, 
starting in 2003, the impact of market power increased and therefore influenced prices.  
The Sector Inquiry issued by the EC (2007b) adds a political view to the market power debate. Most 
of its conclusions are applicable to Germany: wholesale markets show a high degree of supplier 
concentration, vertical integration is a dominant factor in many markets, international trade is 
insufficient to provide pressure on domestic producers, there is a high degree of intransparency, price 
formation on electricity markets is complex, and consumers have little confidence in the 
competitiveness of these markets. Based on the Sector Inquiry, London Economics carried out an in-
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depth analysis using real-world data and confirmed that the German wholesale electricity market faced 
mark-ups of up to 50% in the past few years (London Economics, 2007). Furthermore an analysis of 
earned revenues revealed that the two largest German companies would have earned 7 bn. € from 2003 
till 2005 which is considered sufficient for covering investment and start-up costs. 
Other studies of Germany’s competitiveness employe strategic or econometric approaches. Zachmann 
(2007) compares the German and British electricity markets using Markov Switching, concluding that 
the British market had a closer relation to marginal costs . Zachmann and Hirschhausen (2008) test the 
impact of emission allowance pricing on electricity wholesale prices in Germany. Based on an error 
correction model and an autoregressive distributed lag model they find that the price for emission 
allowances is passed through asymmetrically: allowance price increases are translated into electricity 
price increases more rapidly than decreases.  
However, the impact of market power on price formation is not unilaterally accepted. General 
electricity market analyses of Germany with respect to market power are presented by Weber and 
Vogel (2007) and Ockenfels (2007a). These and other authors agree that the lack of full information in 
the empirical model approaches is viewed as a source of unreliability. Due to a steep merit order close 
to peak capacity, the impacts of incorrect availability or price assumptions can produce large, absolute 
errors. In addition the non-linear complexity of electricity markets with many external impact factors 
(wind speed, temperature, and technical restrictions) contribute to the difficulty of designing a fully 
realistic model. Swider et al. (2007) show these issues exemplary for existing model approaches and 
specific time periods. Like Harvey and Hogan (2002) they show that every model has some level of 
uncertainty and thus will produce a range of possible outcomes.  
Melzian and Ehlers (2007) study the pricing mechanism at the EEX, and conclude that the structure of 
the German market makes EEX prices an improper benchmark. They argue that since price formation 
at the EEX is mainly driven by missing or excess capacity of forward contracts, the price cannot be 
considered as system marginal price. Ehlers and Erdmann (2007) also analyze the EEX pricing 
formation and concluded that the traded volumes and supply and demand curves do not allow a 
significant price manipulation. However, assuming that EEX prices act as the benchmark for most 
bilateral and long-term trades in Germany’s electricity market as it is the only transparent price 
available, the EEX still represent a form of equilibrium market clearing price. 
The problem of fixed cost covering and short-term marginal costs has been addressed by Müller 
(2007) and Ockenfels (2007b). Müller simulates a simplified electricity market with base, mid and 
peak load units to estimate the revenues each plant type earns in a competitive market based on short-
term marginal costs. He concludes that in an optimal market segmentation with respect to installed 
capacity, even base load plants will not cover their fixed costs. Ockenfels (2007b) argues that under 
competitive conditions, market prices above marginal costs are possible and necessary to cover fixed 
costs. Whenever demand exceeds available capacities, the market price is set according to consumers’ 
willingness to pay. Due to the low elasticity in electricity markets this can lead to significant mark-ups 
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on marginal costs. As the German electricity market was subject to overcapacities this situation did not 
prevail in 2006.  
 
3.5 A Competitive Benchmark Model of German Electricity Prices 
One of the main questions of estimating market power abuse is the “right” approximation of 
competitive levels. The model approach to define this level is referred as competitive benchmark. 
Technically more complex approaches like Cournot or SFE often use the competitive benchmark as a 
starting point or additional information to classify the model results.28 The main aim of the 
benchmarking approach is to estimate a competitive supply function in terms of marginal costs. In a 
fully competitive market no player can influence the clearing price; thus the simulated supply function 
in combination with a given demand level yields the competitive benchmark. This is mainly done by 
collecting data on the generation facilities and calculating marginal costs for each plant. Arranging the 
plants according to increasing marginal costs yields the competitive supply curve. The difference 
between simulated and observed market prices allows to quantify the extent of market power.  
Stoft (2002, p. 129) shows that marginal cost pricing suffices to cover the capital cost of investment, 
because price spikes will occur in case of shortages. An in-depth discussion of the issue is provided by 
Hogan (2007) and Cramton and Stoft (2006). Marginal costs should set the competitive prices when 
the market is characterized by overcapacity. The current German electricity market was subject to 
overcapacities in the hour of peak load in 2006. In addition capacites are reserved for balancing 
purposes and a large fraction of renewable capacities is not available on demand due to the stochastic 
nature of wind and sun.29 Given this framework a short-run marginal cost approach based on fuel and 
operation cost is used to estimate the competitive benchmark for the German market. 
In a first approach a “simple” cost benchmark for reference days is estimated and compared to the 
observed prices at the EEX between 2004 and 2005. The limited nature of this model is based on the 
non-availability of hourly demand data for the Germany before 2006. The study is a continuation of 
the analysis carried out by Müsgens (2006) until 2003 and follows the paper by Schwarz and Lang 
(2006) who also cover the observation period. The analysis is based on Hirschhausen and Weigt 
(2007a). This first approach is extended in a second step and a comprehensive welfare maximizing 
model is used for the whole year 2006 on hourly basis (Weigt and Hirschhausen, 2008). 
                                                     
28 For a comprehensive overview about different approaches of measuring and modeling market power see Twomey et al. 
(2004). 
29 In 2006, overall public available conventional capacity was 103 GW, with a system peak load of 86.2 GW. At this peak, 
the market had surplus capacities of 8.4 GW in addition to 7.9 GW system reserves and an export surplus of 2.1 GW (VDN, 
2006). 
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3.5.1 A Stylized Analysis of 2004-2005 
3.5.1.1 Methodology and Data 
In order to derive a market price for electricity in Germany a single wholesale market is assumed in 
which demand and supply are traded. OTC transactions as well as the impact of forward contracts are 
neglected. I assume that trading is a competitive activity, so that market power is exercised by the 
generators only, and neglect markups by traders and arbitrageurs. The competitive price level is 
defined by the intersection of the supply and the demand curve. The latter is assumed to be price 
inelastic (Figure 3.6) and shifting over time. Publicly available demand information for the period 
from 2004 till 2005 on hourly basis is only provided for selected days (3rd Wednesdays of a month) by 
the UCTE. Thus the analysis is limited to those days. Further impacts on the actual demand level are 
not considered in the model. Particularly the missing impact of exports and imports may bias the 
obtained results. If Germany is exporting electricity the price level may be higher than modeled as a 
fraction of local generation is supplying foreign demand shifting the merit order to the left. On the 
other hand in the case of imports the merit order may be shifted to the right due to additional 
generation capacities from foreign suppliers. As Germany is on average an exporter the estimated 
price level is likely to be underestimated. 
The competitive supply curve (“merit order”) is derived by estimating the available generation 
capacities and the corresponding marginal costs based on the underlying fuel prices. The total 
generation capacity in Germany during the observation period is about 120 GW (VDN, 2005). The 
basic plant list is obtained from VGE (2005, 2006) and adjusted to account for seasonal availability 
according to Hoster (1996) with the highest level of availability in winter months.30 Since the analysis 
is based on single hours the generalization can lead to divergences in specific cases, such as a plant 
outage of a large coal block.  
Renewable energies play an increasing role in Germany’s energy supply. As they are not dispatch-able 
like conventional generation units they are included into the demand estimation (Figure 3.6). Demand 
is reduced by calculating the hourly wind input for the analyzed days. Other renewable sources like 
solar and bio mass are neglected due to the relatively small installed capacities. Wind capacities range 
from about 15 GW in 2004 to 18 GW in 2005. As the energy input of wind plants is determined by 
wind speed the actual output varies accordingly. Thus, historic wind speed information from the 
German Weather Agency (Deutsche Wetterdienst, DWD) is used to estimate the wind energy input. 
Therefore Germany is split up in seven zones (North Sea coast line, Baltic Sea coast line, western 
Germany, eastern Germany, low mountain range, southern Germany). Using the logarithmic height 
correlation (Hau, 2003) the wind speeds in an average turbine height of 60m can be calculated: 
 
                                                     
30 December, January and February are considered as winter months; June, July and August as summer months; the 
remaining months as transition period. 
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with νH wind speed in H (60m) 
 νref wind speed in reference height Href (10m) 
 zo surface roughness (0,2) 
 
Using an average wind turbine characteristic the calculated wind speeds can be transformed into an 
energy output. The actual wind capacities on regional basis are obtained from the German Wind 
Energy Institute (DEWI, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2005a, 2005b).  
Marginal costs for electricity generation are mainly based on fuel prices. Therefore fuel type and plant 
efficiency are estimated. To derive the efficiency of each plant, the age is used as a proxy: for coal, 
lignite, oil/gas fired steam plants, CCGT plants and gas turbines, the link between age and efficiency 
is taken from Schröter (2004). Nuclear plants are assumed to have an average efficiency of 33% 
(Müller, 2001) and hydro plants have 100% efficiency. Pump storage plants have a chronologically 
staggered efficiency according to Müller (2001).31 
Fuel prices for imported oil and gas on a monthly basis and quarterly plant coal prices are obtained 
from Bafa (2006). For nuclear plants fuel costs of 3 €/MWh are assumed leading to generation costs of 
9 €/MWh.32 As there exists no global market for lignite extraction costs of 1.76 €/GJ are used as 
presented in the high price scenario in Schneider (1998); this figure over- rather than underestimates 
the real costs. Hydro plants are assumed to have no fuel costs. Pump storage plants are assumed to 
store water during off peak hours and are available during peak hours. Thus the off peak price at the 
EEX is considered as “fuel price” and the generation costs are calculated using the plants efficiency. 
Hydro and pump storage plants act as price takers like every other plant. In addition to fuel costs an 
uplift payment for variable operating expenses is used for each plant type (EWI, 2005). Coal plants 
have addition expenses of 2 €/MWh, nuclear plants 3 €/MWh and gas fired plants 0.5 €/MWh. Hydro 
plants are assumed to have operating expenses of 1 €/MWh. Start up costs as well as ramping costs are 
not considered. 
With the introduction of the emission allowance trading scheme in 2005 an additional cost element has 
to be considered: allowance prices can be taken into account as opportunity costs of production. 
Therefore the plant specific CO2-emissions are calculated based on efficiency and plant type 
                                                     
31 Pump storage plants build before 1950 have 60% efficiency, before 1960 65%, before 1970 70%, before 1975 75% and 
plants built afterwards have 82% efficiency. If there was no information about the year of construction, 1980 is assumed to be 
the relevant date. 
32 Nuclear is not the marginal supplier in the relevant periods, so that the estimate of its marginal costs does not change the 
results. 
 47
according to Gampe (2004). These emissions are valued with the average allowance price of the 
analyzed month and added to the fuel and operation costs. 
 
Figure 3.5: Estimating the competitive price level in electricity markets 
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Source: Own representation 
 
3.5.1.2 Results 
Comparing the marginal cost estimates with the market prices for the period from 2004 till 2005 (a 
total of 24 days) shows that the prices exceed the cost estimates consistently. In particular, mark-ups 
occur during peak hours, whereas in off-peak the prices more or less correspond to the cost estimates. 
Hence the further analysis is focused on the mid and peak load periods (8am-8pm). 
For the year 2004, the average Lerner index is 0.21. The analyzed days show the highest margin in a 
range between 80 to 90% of daily peak load with Lerner indices of more than 0.4. This corresponds to 
the results of Schwarz und Lang (2006). The September day is an example of the unexpected price 
development (Figure 3.7): the highest mark-ups are observable during mid term while they drop 
slightly near the days peak load. The results also show that startup costs seem to have a significant 
impact on market decision for base load plants. Especially in the summer days market prices during 
off peak hours are below the modeled competitive prices. This seems to hold true whenever the load 
level drops below 50 GW. This effect can be explained by the necessary time and costs of shutting 
down a base load plant during the night and restarting it the next morning. Plant owners seem to 
prevent this procedure by bidding below marginal costs and therefore secure that their plant is running 
all the time. Thus the modeled supply curve may have to be shifted to the right reducing the simulated 
market clearing prices. 
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Figure 3.6: Results for September 15, 2004 
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With the introduction of emission allowances in 2005 the situation changed. The clear situation of 
2004 with a general positive mark-up during peak times is replaced by unsteady results with positive 
and negative mark-ups.33 The situation in 2005 can be separated into three different segments: In the 
first half of 2005 (January till May) the analysis shows a similar pattern as in 2004 with negative 
Lerner Indices during off peak and positive indices during peak hours. The main difference is the 
increased price level of the supply curve due to the opportunity costs of CO2-emissions. Thus the 
calculated Lerner indices are smaller compared to the same period in 2004.  
The situation changes noticeable during the following months (June to October). The average Lerner 
index drops to -0.13 and even during peak hours negative mark-ups can be observed. Neglecting the 
opportunity costs for emission allowances yields that the observed market prices are still above the 
fuel and operation expenses. Thus the market participants seemed to be uncertain whether to fully 
include the allowance prices or not. In November and December 2005 the Lerner indices are 
throughout positive during peak hours and the average values indicate a significant mark-up 
comparable to the situation in 2004. Figure 3.8 summarizes the obtained Lerner indices for 2004 and 
2005 during mid- and peak-load hours. 
 
                                                     
33 A full presentation of all obtained price curves is presented in Appendix I. 
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Figure 3.7: Lerner indices, 2004 and 2005, mid and peak load period (8am-8pm) 
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3.5.1.3 Discussion 
As Harvey and Hogan (2002) have shown, benchmarking analyses are sensitive to the underlying 
dataset as well as simplifications and assumptions. Thus a sensitivity analysis is needed to verify the 
obtained results. As the presented model is based on publicly available data, some key information 
may be missing to explain the observed differences. In the presented case the absence of reliable data 
on the imports and exports is a major drawback of the model. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted to examine the shifts in demand or in plant availability that would be required to obtain a 
fully competitive solution. The obtained values show how far the supply curve has to be shifted to 
intersect with demand in order to obtain the observed market results at the EEX. Thus if these values 
are relatively high, the basic conclusion is valid while only little differences would suggest missing 
information as explanation. As the main focus lies on market power abuse again only peak hours have 
been considered. 
For 2004 the sensitive analysis yields an average gap of about 9 GW. Thus the simulated supply curve 
would have to be shifted to the left by 9 GW or the demand level was 9 GW higher than assumed.34 
Only July shows relatively low differences of 3 GW that are most likely due to the model assumptions. 
However, other months (e.g. May and September) show average difference of about 15 GW with 
maximum divergences of more than 19 GW (Figure 3.9). These errors are most likely not solely 
                                                     
34 Given that the demand values are more likely to be smaller than assumed as imported energy and smaller renewable energy 
sources have not been considered the value indicates a possible overestimation of available plants. 
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explainable by data issues and suggest that strategic behavior by market participants might have 
played a role. 
In 2005 the situation follows the same three patterns as the Lerner indices described above. In the first 
half the capacity gap is comparable to the situation in 2004 with average values of about 10 GW. 
However, in the summer months this situation reverses completely and the gap becomes negative. This 
indicates that either the plant availability is overestimated (e.g. due to a heat wave) or the actual 
demand level is below the modeled one. The situation returns to the old trend in November and 
December. 
Figure 3.9 shows the average and maximum differences between the real supply and the (hypothetical) 
market-clearing supply. Except for the summer of 2005 these differences are significantly high, with 
values of more than 10 GW on average. This shows the general robustness test to be valid: 
underestimation of load and overestimation of generation capacity in a height of more than 10 to 
15 GW is relatively unlikely for a large fraction of observations. 
 
Figure 3.8: Sensitivity analysis, withheld capacity in 2004 and 2005 
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3.5.2 Price Formation in 2006 
3.5.2.1 Methodology 
Similar to the previous analysis the aim of the 2006 model is to derive estimates for the “real” 
marginal costs which are then compared with the prices at Germany’s wholesale electricity market 
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EEX. However, starting with 2006 hourly demand data for Germany is provided by the UCTE as well 
as hourly wind input values by the four German TSOs. This dataset allows a more sophisticated 
approach to estimate the competitive price level by applying a costs minimizing model to satisfy the 
German demand subject to technical characteristics of electricity generation: 
   
pt
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pt
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costsmin  objective  (3.2) 
where ctp are the marginal generation costs of plant p in hour t, g
t
p is the actual output of that plant in 
hour t, and startuptp are the occurring start-up costs in case the plant has to go online. The considered 
overall timeframe is 2006 divided into 12 model runs, one for each one month. The output of a plant is 
restricted by lower and upper boundaries due to the thermal capabilities of the generation process: 
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with gp
max as maximal available power output, gp
min as minimal necessary generation output to operate 
a plant, and ontp as the binary condition variable stating if a plant is online (1) or offline (0). The 
resulting start-up costs are calculated as a cost block in the hour the plant goes online: 
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where sctp  are the start-up fuel cost necessary to heat up the power plant p. These are mainly driven by 
fuel prices which vary for the time t. If a plant remains on- or offline the condition difference 
 is zero and thus there are no costs. In case of a shut-down the difference becomes -1 but 
the actual output g
)( 1 tp
t
p onon
t
p of the plant p in t is zero. Only in case of a start-up the condition difference is 1 
and the output is positive resulting in a positive start-up cost block. According to the type of plant, 
start-up can take a few minutes (small gas turbines) up to several days (nuclear) thus a constraint on 
the plants condition variables is introduced following Takriti et al. (1998): 
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with lp as the required start-up time of a plant p. In case a plant goes offline in t the left hand side of 
equation 3.5 becomes 1. In order to fulfill the inequality the condition variables of the following τ 
hours have to remain 0 thus restricting the start-up possibilities of the plant.  
As the model is an ex-post analysis, demand d in hour t is known and has to be satisfied: 
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with PSPtup as stored energy in pump storage facilities in t and PSP
t
down withdrawn energy from that 
facilities in t. In order to satisfy the demand in electricity markets the only possibility beside power 
generation is to use pump storage facilities. The storage process is considered as additional demand, 
increasing the necessary power generation, whereas the withdrawal is equal to conventional generation 
increasing the energy output. Typically pump storage facilities use cheap generation during nighttimes 
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to fill their storage and use the stored water during peak times to allow for a better control of the 
transmission grid. Network constraints are not considered and thus losses are not taken into account. 
The pump storage process is an inter-temporal condition: 
t1t *75,0 storage
t
down
t
upstorage PSPPSPPSPPSP 

 storage equation (3.7) 
where PSPtstorage is the stored amount of energy in hour t. If it runs in pump mode (PSPup), 75%
35 of 
the consumed energy will be added to the storage for the next period and if it runs in generation mode 
(PSPdown), the appropriate amount of energy is taken from the storage. The initial storage level for 
each model run is assumed to be zero. The storage and withdrawal processes are furthermore subject 
to capacity restrictions:  
maxPSPPSPPSP tdown
t
up    1st PSP capacity constraint (3.8) 
with PSPmax as the maximum capacity of pump storage plants in Germany. The total sum of storage 
and withdrawal can not exceed the installed pump capacity. The withdrawal is further limited by the 
amount of energy stored, which may be lower than the installed pump capacity: 
t
storage
t
down PPSP    2nd PSP capacity constraint (3.9) 
The model is implemented in GAMS as a combination of a mixed integer problem for the unit 
commitment and an optimization problem with fixed binary plant condition variables for the actual 
dispatch.36 The dual variable on the energy balance constraint is considered to represent the hourly 
market price. 
3.5.2.2 Data 
The underlying generation dataset draws on the same information utilized in the previous analysis (see 
Section 3.5.1.1). The power plant database is extended to account for start-up restrictions. The 
minimum capacity requirements as well as the necessary start-up fuel consumption are differentiated 
according to plant type and taken from DENA (2005, p. 280). Within the model nuclear plants are 
assumed to supply base load. Therefore, they are must-run plants that cannot be shut down, thus their 
condition variable ontp is fixed to one. Lignite, coal, steam and CCGT plants are modeled with specific 
start-up times lp according to Schröter (2004, p. 39). Gas turbines and hydro plants are assumed to be 
able to go online in less than an hour thus equation 3.5 is not binding for them.  
Germany has a large fraction of combined heat and power producing plants (CHP) particularly in the 
industry sector. These plants are treated as must run plants with a specific minimum output level. As 
additional restrictions representing the heat consumption CHP plants must run at least 50% of their 
maximum electrical capacity in winter, 30% in spring and fall, and 20% in summer. A detailed hourly 
heat profile is not used. 
                                                     
35 Following Müller (2001), modern PSPs have an average efficiency between 70 and 80%. 
36 The GAMS code is presented in Appendix II. 
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Fuel prices for coal, oil and natural gas are based on wholesale price levels of reference markets, thus 
transportation costs or transmission fees are not considered.37 The price for steam coal is based on 
prices for internationally traded coal at ARA, daily natural gas prices are taken from the Dutch market 
TTF, and oil prices are daily Brent prices. Fuel costs of nuclear, hydro, and lignite plants are modeled 
similar to the previous analysis. PSPs are modelled as either demand or generators and thus have no 
external marginal costs. The resulting impact on the price level is obtained by optimizing pumped 
storage usage and accounting for the generation costs needed to replenish the storage.  
In addition to fuel costs again an uplift payment for variable operating expenses is used for each plant 
type following EWI (2005) and an emission factor is determined following Gampe (2004). The 
emissions are valued with the allowance price taken from EEX and added to the fuel and operation 
costs. Thus the marginal generation costs ctp of a plant p in any considered hour t consist of the fuel 
costs based on plant efficiency η and fuel price, operating costs, and opportunity costs for emissions 
based on plant-specific CO2 emissions and the allowance price at the EEX:  
 t
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 marginal costs of generation (3.10) 
On the demand side the hourly demand level for Germany is provided by the UCTE (2007). Total 
demand ranges between 75 GW at peak and 35 GW at off-peak times. Imports and exports are 
considered on an hourly basis by reducing or increasing the demand level. The total trading balance of 
Germany based on actual cross-border power flows is obtained from ETSOVista (2007).38 The 
resulting net flow into or out of Germany is considered in the total demand level dt. Thus when energy 
is imported, a portion of Germany’s demand is covered by foreign plants, reducing the necessary 
amount of domestic generation and vice versa. However, the modeled prices represent the upper 
bound in cases of net exports, since plants above market price can be used for exports, and a lower 
bound in cases of net imports since a foreign generator can set the market price in Germany. Wind 
energy input is again subtracted from the demand level and other renewable energy sources are 
neglected. The approximation of hourly wind input via wind speeds could be replaced by the actual 
energy input published by the four German TSOs increasing the accuracy of the estimation. 
3.5.2.3 Basic Results 
The basic model approach uses twelve runs (one for each month) to simulate the wholesale market in 
2006 and find the competitive market outcomes. Figure 3.10 shows the model prices and the observed 
prices ordered from highest to lowest EEX price. The simulated prices and the EEX prices behave 
similarly with a clear segmentation between off- peak and peak prices. However, in off-peak periods, 
EEX prices often drop below marginal generation costs and sometimes even reach zero, whereas the 
                                                     
37 Due to the volatility of wholesale prices particularly for oil and natural gas, generators are expected to sign contracts for 
their fuel supply. The pricing details of these contracts are not publicly available. The wholesale prices are assumed to be 
sufficient to reflect the average price level. However, this can lead to divergences for specific plants. 
38 The values for cross-border flows have been completed using publicly available information from the four TSOs and 
Nordel. 
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model prices reach a level, representing coal and lignite fired base load plants between 30 and 
40 €/MWh. In general, prices below marginal costs are explained by start-up conditions since the 
temporary shut-down of a base load plant can become more expensive than maintaining operations 
without revenues. Because the model is based on perfect knowledge, the price difference may be due 
to asymmetric information (e.g., bidders’ “wrong” expectations about market conditions). Furthermore 
the model includes emission allowance prices as opportunity costs whereas bidders may vary between 
full, partial and no cost past through.  
In the mid-price segment the EEX prices increase from 40 to about 60 €/MWh while the model prices 
exhibit volatility ranging from 28 to 65 €/MWh with a high number of price combinations that diverge 
strongly from each other. This trend continues in the peak price segments. The results clearly show 
that high EEX prices generally do not have an equivalent high competitive price counterpart. EEX 
prices increase towards their yearly peak of more than 2000 €/MWh while model prices remain 
between 40 and 95 €/MWh.  
The average price in 2006 at the EEX is 50.79 €/MWh whereas the model average is about 11% lower 
with 45.28 €/MWh. For the peak segment (weekdays 8am-8 pm), the difference is more striking with a 
model average price of 52.31 €/MWh (about 30% below the observed average of 74.48 €/MWh). For 
off-peak hours including holidays and weekends, the observed prices are lower with an average of 
38.23 €/MWh compared to 41.54 €/MWh in the model. Focusing only on weekdays, this divergence is 
reduced to 1.4 €/MWh or 3%. Using the underlying demand, the total expenses at the EEX price level 
are 3.6 bn € higher than in the model. 
 
Figure 3.9: Price comparison, model results and EEX, 2006 
Source: Weigt and Hirschhausen (2008) 
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Similar to the analysis for 2004 and 2005 the underlying model is subject to simplifications and 
assumptions. To test the robustness of the results first the capacity difference is estimated and 
afterwards two sensitivities are tested.  
To estimate the difference in quantities between the model and the EEX, withheld capacity is 
calculated for weekday hours 8am- 8pm as market power abuse is expected to occur mainly when 
demand is close to the capacity limit. Furthermore, off-peak and weekend hours show a high degree of 
prices below marginal generation costs. To obtain the withheld capacity all available plant capacities 
with marginal costs below the EEX price but not operating in the corresponding modeled solution for 
each hour are summed up. In 2006, the average amount of capacity withheld during peak hours is 
about 8 GW and thus similar to the values obtained for 2004 and the first half of 2005, but it varies 
throughout the year. Figure 3.11 shows that the average values in the first two months of around 
9 GW, the gap then narrows significantly from March until June, even reaching an average of -2 GW 
in April. After July, the capacity withheld again increases, with average values between 8.5 and 
14 GW. The low capacity values for April and May could be a result of the sharp drop in emission 
allowance prices in spring 2006 due to an over allocation of allowances. The situation normalized 
during the summer although allowance prices remained significant lower (Figure 3.11). 
 
Figure 3.10: Capacity withheld during workday peak hours (8am–8pm) 
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Source: Weigt and Hirschhausen (2008) 
 
3.5.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
In addition to the capacity analysis two sensitivities are tested to estimate the robustness of the 
obtained results. First, the fuel price level is varied by increasing prices for gas and oil by 10%. This 
should lead to an increase in peak prices when CCGT, gas turbines and oil- or gas-fired steam plants 
set the market price, while off-peak prices are unaffected. Second, varied power plant availabilities are 
incorporated. Due to a lack of hourly availability values only seasonal factors are used, which may 
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misinterpret the real availability due to high temperatures, low water levels or plant outages.39 The 
basic availability values from Hoster (1996) are altered by reducing the winter availability by 2%, the 
intermediate values by 3% and summer values by 4%. Table 3.2 shows the available capacities in each 
season compared to the corresponding values at monthly peak load of 2004 (VDN, 2005).  
The impact of the changed fuel prices is only evident during peak load situations when the according 
plant capacities are needed. During these times the price level slightly increases. The average market 
price increases to 46.54 €/MWh (about 8% below EEX prices); average peak prices are 2.5 € above 
the base case and thus still 26% below the observed ones. The impact of reduced plant availability is 
more distinctive. During off-peak and mid-load periods, the difference is rather small because the 
remaining capacity is still sufficient to keep a moderate price level. During peak situations the prices 
are above the basic model results, particularly in winter and summer months. This effect can be 
explained by the steep slope of the merit order close to maximum capacity in combination with start-
up conditions that lead to prices above marginal costs. On average a market price of 48.74 €/MWh 
(4% below EEX prices) can be observed. Average peak prices increase to 59.55 €/MWh (20% below 
observed prices). In both sensitivities the off-peak prices are little affected. 
However, even the reduced capacity is still sufficient to satisfy demand, thus no capacity rent for peak 
units can be expected. The average quantity gap in peak hours is reduced to 6.7 GW in the fuel price 
variation scenario and to 5.8 GW in the availability variation scenario. The monthly pattern remains 
similar to the base case with average values above 10 GW in the second half of 2006 for both 
sensitivities.  
Comparing the basic model with the sensitivity analyses and EEX prices shows that the observed price 
duration curve has higher prices in about 4500 h in 2006 (Figure 3.12). On the other hand, EEX prices 
are lower than the modeled prices in 3000 h.40 All model variations have price spikes of more than 
200 €/MWh (in cases of the availability analysis also 500 €/MWh), which are comparable but 
generally still lower than the maximum prices at the EEX. In the mid to peak price region (between 50 
and 100 €/MWh) an interesting results is observable: a general price divergence of about 10 €/WMh is 
obtained for more than 2000 h. This difference is only slightly affected by the changed parameters of 
the sensitivity analyses. Since these differences are observed in price regions that do not indicate 
capacity shortages, the question to raise is whether missing information and model simplification are 
solely responsible for the divergence. 
 
 
 
                                                     
39 Ockenfels (2007a, b) discusses this topic in detail. Other potential model limitations like stochasticity, asymmetric 
information, and opportunity pricing of cross-border transactions and hydro plants are not considered in the sensitivity 
analysis. 
40 These values correspond to the price duration curves and not to actual model/EEX price combinations. 
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Table 3.2: Available capacities, 2006 model 
 Winter Intermediate Summer 
Fossil plants 83 350 MW 77 850 MW 74 170 MW Basic model 
Pump storage 3 900 MW 3 650 MW 4 150 MW 
Fossil plants 81 430 MW 74 960 MW 70 320 MW Reduced capacity 
Pump storage 3 770 MW 3 460 MW 3 900 MW 
Values at peak load  
(VDN, 2005) 
Reliably available 
capacity 
83 130 MW 79 500 MW 74 370 MW 
Source: Weigt and Hirschhausen (2008), based on VDN (2005), VGE (2005, 2006), and Hoster (1996) 
 
Figure 3.11: Price duration curves, 2006 
Source: Weigt and Hirschhausen (2008) 
 
3.5.2.5 Fixed Cost Coverage 
One further point of interest is how competitive market outcomes translate into revenues for fixed cost 
covering. Pricing is based on short-term marginal costs; therefore, companies are expected to cover 
their investment costs when generators with higher costs set the market price or capacity is lower than 
demand, and both situations can result in price spikes that allow companies to “earn” rents above their 
generation costs. As mentioned, the German market is frequently subject to overcapacities. Thus, the 
price level is expected to give no signal for new investments.  
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In order to analyze the investment signals provided by the spot market the annual revenues for each 
fossil fuel plant type are obtained by summing the difference between market price and generation 
costs. Each plant type is considered to be running according to the model outcome thus off-peak units 
have significantly more hours to recover there costs than peak units. The earned revenues do not take 
into account forward trading or other market segments like reserve markets. Thus, the values represent 
spot market based results. As benchmark average investment are calculated assuming average 
overnight costs per MW, an interest rate of 7%, and 40 years’ duration for base and 25 years for peak 
units.  
Table 3.3 shows the calculated rents generators earned according to the model. As the European-wide 
emission allowance trading scheme includes a grandfathering mechanism the revenues from 
opportunity pricing of allowances are windfall profits for the generators. These can also be used to 
cover fixed costs and are supposed to set incentives for investment into cleaner technologies. The 
analysis is made for two revenues for each plant type: one that includes allowance prices as marginal 
generation costs and one that excludes them. Only the values including allowance costs are relevant 
for estimating market competitiveness as firstly opportunity pricing is not an aspect of market power 
and secondly the same price outcome is supposed to occur under full auctioning of allowances. 
The results reveal that under modeled competitive conditions, only nuclear plants can cover their fixed 
costs, under EEX price calculations, both nuclear and coal plants can cover their costs, and in both 
scenarios, peak load plants cannot cover their costs. 41 The results indicate that no additional capacities 
are needed in the postulated overcapacity of the German market. Another issue is the impact of the 
allowance trading mechanism on investment signals. The political intent is to foster investment in 
emission reduction mechanisms or power plants with low emission values like CCGT. However, the 
results to date point to an absence of investment activity. Due to the base load character of most coal 
plants and the grandfathering mechanism giving the largest bulk of allowances for free, the current 
market prices set a high incentive to invest in coal technology rather than gas-fired units. Based on the 
values for 2006, the current system fails to fulfill the expected political objectives. 
However, the results do not permit us to conclude empirical which mechanism (competitive system or 
the EEX market) is adequate for fixed costs covering. Due to the long term investment character of 
power plants, importance of forward contracts, fuel price variations, existence of optional markets like 
reserve markets, and the uncertain further development of the emission allowance system in Europe, 
consistent results regarding the issue of capacity financing can only be answered with long term 
analyses.  
 
 
                                                     
41 The possible rents for peak units may increase since other market segments (e.g., reserve markets) are not considered.  
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Table 3.3: Annually earned revenues for fixed cost covering per installed MW in 2006 
Competitive Model EEX price based 
Plant Type Including 
allowance costs 
Excluding 
allowance cost 
Including 
allowance costs 
Excluding 
allowance cost 
Annuity of 
Investment 
cost42 
Nuclear 
(surplus) 
234 100 € 
(+46 600 €) 
234 100 € 
(+46 600 €) 
271 800 € 
(+84 300 €) 
271 800 € 
(+84 300 €) 
187 500 € 
Lignite 
(surplus) 
64 900 € 
(-47 600 €) 
167 100 € 
(+54 600 €) 
114 500 € 
(+2 000 €) 
216 600 € 
(+104 100 €) 
112 500 € 
Hard coal 
(surplus) 
60 300 € 
(-29 700 €) 
147 700 € 
(+57 700 €) 
110 200 € 
(+20 200 €) 
197 600 € 
(+107 600 € ) 
90 000 € 
Steam 
(surplus) 
600 € 
(-85 200 €) 
2 200 € 
(-83 600 €) 
1 700 € 
(-84 100 €) 
3 300 € 
(-82 500 €) 
85 800 € 
CCGT 
(surplus) 
5 000 € 
(42 200 €) 
11 000 € 
(-36 200 €) 
14 400 € 
(-32 800 €) 
20 400 € 
(-26 800 €) 
47 200 € 
Gas turbine 
(surplus) 
160 € 
(21 300 €) 
320 € 
(-21 100 €) 
70 € 
(-21 400 €) 
230 € 
(21 200 €) 
21 450 € 
Source: Weigt and Hirschhausen (2008) 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this Chapter the competition on liberalized electricity wholesale markets is analyzed using Germany 
as a reference case. By conduction marginal costs calculations the competitive market prices are 
estimated and compared to the observed wholesale prices. For the period from 2004 to 2005 
significant price markups can be observed. Although, the model for this period is rather limited (only 
24 reference days) the obtained results seem to be robust as the estimated capacity error is about 
10 GW on average. For 2006 a full analysis of all 8760 hours is made showing that the competitive 
price level in Germany is about 11% below the EEX prices with significant higher price mark ups 
during peak hours. The results are also robust towards changes in price and availability assumptions of 
the model. The analysis shows that Germany is no exception with respect to market power concerns in 
liberalized electricity markets following the UK and California examples. Possible measurements to 
improve the competitiveness of electricity markets are analyzed in the next Chapter. 
Beside the “pure” competitiveness of the market also the revenue adequacy is addressed. For 2006 
only base load plants are able to recover their investment costs whereas mid and peak units can not. 
This result is in line with the postulated overcapacity of the German electricity market which should 
not provide incentives for further capacity extension. In this context also the misleading impact of 
grandfathering emission allowances is shown. Whereas coal plants are able to improve their 
investment recovery, gas fired plants remain unprofitable and thus contradict the postulated political 
aims to foster clean generation technologies. 
                                                     
42 Nuclear plants are assumed to have overnight cots of 2500 €/kW, lignite 1500 €/kW, coal 1200 €/kW, steam 1000 €/kW, 
CCGT 550 €/kW, and gas turbines 250 €/kW. 
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4 Competition Policy and Strategic Company Behavior: Will 
Divestiture Solve the Problem? 
4.1 Introduction 
As shown in Chapter 3 most liberalized electricity markets are subject to market power concerns due 
to their oligopolistic market structure, possible flaws in the market architecture, and the specific 
characteristics of electricity generation and demand. Around the world several methods have been 
applied to increase the competitiveness of the new electricity markets, and thus to reap the benefits 
from liberalization. These methods range from strict market monitoring to structural measurements. 
What is actually required to obtain a sufficient level of competition in restructured electricity markets 
largely depends on the historical heritage defining the market structure, the technical characteristics of 
the national generation mix, and the interconnections to neighboring markets. Measures successfully 
applied in some markets may not produce the same benefits for other markets.  
In this Chapter pro-active policy measurements to improve the competiveness of electricity wholesale 
markets are presented and the outcome of one measurement – divestiture – is tested using the German 
market as reference case. The next section reviews competition policy in electricity markets (Section 
4.2). A particular focus is on divestitures including a review of international experiences. To test the 
effect of a divestiture measurement in an electricity market a fundamental competitive benchmark 
model as in Chapter 3 is insufficient. To examine the price reducing effect of changing the supply 
structure of a market, the strategic behaviors of market participants must be considered. Thus, in 
Section 4.3 a review and a comparison of two oligopoly model approaches – the classical Cournot 
approach and the SFE approach – are given. Afterwards both methods are applied to test different 
divestiture scenarios for the German market and to assess the potential welfare increasing effect given 
the current market structure (Section 4.4). Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Pro-Active Competition Policy: Methods and Experiences 
The objective of competition policy is to increase the competitiveness of markets through price and/or 
structural instruments or – in the case of natural monopoly industries – through sector-specific 
regulation. Efficient competition is a fundamental aim of a free, market-based economic policy. 
However, the word “competition” is often interpreted by politicians, industrials, and economists 
according to their aims and thus can differ largely. In addition, following Hayek (1945) competition is 
not an end in itself but can be understood as a discovery procedure. The classification of competition 
largely depends on the prevailing circumstances and according to Schmidt (2005) can be defined as 
the pursuit towards a goal of two or more groups where a higher gain for one group normally means a 
lower one for the other(s). In economic terms competition is characterized by: 
 The existence of markets 
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 At least two suppliers or consumers 
 Market participants behave antagonistically. 
In a dynamic context, competition leads to a gradual adaption of companies and consumers which 
increases the welfare of most participants. Schmidtchen (2005) differentiates four possibilities for 
suppliers to obtain a specific value added potential: 
 Cost reduction on the production side (generation, transport) 
 Cost reduction on the supply side (transaction costs) 
 Improved quality and/or price alteration for complementary goods or substitutes 
 Development of new products. 
Competition can generally be considered the welfare optimal market solution to economic problems. 
Nevertheless, competition may not be the “natural” state an unregulated market will obtain. 
Regulatory intervention is often necessary when market failures occur (e.g., external effects, public 
goods, or natural monopolies). This is true for electricity transmission where only one supplier will 
emerge, due to the sub-additive cost function which must be regulated to avoid market power abuse.  
The generation segment on the other hand is generally considered to be competitive, but due to the 
pre-liberalization structures many of the world’s liberalized electricity markets initially showed an 
unsatisfactory degree of competition. To accelerate the transformation to full competition, a pro-active 
competition policy is necessary in many cases. Pro-active competition policy refers to sector- and 
company- specific measurements, unlike a passive competition policy that relies on market design and 
control elements common to anti-trust law. A short overview on competition policy measurements 
applicable for electricity markets is discussed below. The instrument of horizontal divestiture is 
presented in detail in Section 4.2.2, including a theoretical overview and a review on international 
experiences. In addition the topic of virtual divestitures is discussed as an electricity market specific 
instrument. 
4.2.1 Competition Policy Measurements 
Several policy measurements can be applied to overcome exiting obstacles and hasten the 
development of a competitive environment.43 However, the most suitable measurements depend on the 
underlying market structures and regulatory setting; thus no general roadmap of efficient competition 
policy can be designed.44 The following possible measurements are in common use.  
 
Unbundling 
Most electricity markets were characterized by a vertical integration of generation, transmission, 
distribution, and supply during the pre-liberalization period. In a competitive market setting the shared 
ownership of generation and network assets provides incentives to discriminate against competing 
                                                     
43 This Section is based on Hirschhausen and Weigt (2007b). 
44 Joskow (2008) presents international experiences with liberalization in electricity markets and designs a blueprint for an 
efficient liberalization including elements of a pro-active competition policy (see Section 2.2.5). 
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generators and thus maintain higher wholesale prices. To avoid this conflict a separation of generation 
and transport by either ownership or legal unbundling is advisable. There is an ongoing discussion 
whether legal unbundling is sufficient to reduce the potential for discrimination (e.g., see van Koten 
and Ortmann, 2008; and Pollitt, 2008). If the negative effect of a vertically integrated company on 
competitiveness can be offset by the positive effect of integrated generation-transmission extension 
planning is also debatable (e.g., see Cremer et al., 2006). 
 
Release 
Due to the vertical structure of the pre-liberalized electricity markets a large share of transaction was 
accomplished with long-term contracts binding generators and consumers. The contracts can refer to 
energy deliveries and/or network access. The release of long-term contracts can increase the number of 
competing generators, increase the market demand for energy, and reduce network barriers. However, 
fair compensation of the contracted parties must be reached. In case of energy deliveries the revenue 
from an auctioning can be utilized. In case of network access the compensation depends on the 
underlying market design, e.g., in a locationally priced market like PJM compensation in the form of 
financial transmission rights is a feasible option. 
 
Market Entry 
Supporting new entry to the market and to construct new generation is another possibility for 
increasing competition in the medium- and long-terms. However, support requires designing an 
appropriate wholesale market. Non-market-based measurements like investment subsidies, tax 
deductions, and price guarantees can foster entry but can also lead to overinvestment and market 
distortion (e.g., see Stoft, 2002, p. 334ff; and Burns and Riechmann, 2004). 
The increasing importance of environmental issues in electricity markets has led to several instances 
of politically induced interference that increased the uncertainty regarding future returns and reduced 
incentives to invest in specific technologies. The design of emissions trading will have a major impact 
on generation investment decision, (e.g., the question of grandfathering versus auctions). Reliable 
political guidelines therefore are important to reduce barriers to entry.  
Additional issues are the available network access for new generation units and pricing network 
congestion. The most efficient solution would be a locational pricing mechanism that includes 
generation and transmission restrictions as well as losses. This would ensure that new market 
participants obtain a transparent price signal where new generation is valued highest. 
 
Network Management and Extension 
A simple yet effective measurement to increase competitiveness is to increase the available exchange 
capacity to adjoining markets. This is particularly true for Europ;e since the existing cross-border 
capacities were never designed to be the backbone of an integrated European market. Increasing the 
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exchange capacities enlarges the relevant market and may increase the number of competitors and 
reduce market power (e.g., see Küpper et al., 2009). However, to obtain a positive price-reducing 
effect firms on both sides of the interconnection must actually compete (In the early years of 
liberalization in Europe most firms remained active within their regional or national borders.) Beside 
the physical extension of capacity the economic distribution of the available capacity is important if 
competitiveness is the goal. 
 
Supporting Measurements 
A wide array of other policy options is also available. Privatization is often the first option if an 
electricity market is liberalized. Privatization allows a clear separation between private competitive 
and regulated company activities, and leads to efficiency gains compared to the former state- owned or 
controlled activity (see Saal and Parker, 2001; Ng and Seabright, 2001; and Newbery and Pollit, 
1997). Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) show for the US electricity market that the accompanying 
incentive change is a main contributor to the efficiency gain. Whether companies or consumers benefit 
from the increased efficiency is not entirely clear, e.g., Newbery und Pollit (1997) show that firms are 
the main benefactor of the efficiency gain in the British electricity market whereas Littlechild (2006) 
assumes an equal distribution between consumers and companies. 
The overarching market architecture that combines competition policy instruments is another option. 
The main criterion of a functioning wholesale market is its transparency which is necessary for new 
market entrants to reduce entrance barriers and associated risks and additionally enables market 
monitors to detect market power. The wholesale market links to the reserve markets and to the 
transmission sector. In other words, the design of reserve requirements has a direct impact on 
wholesale prices since they reduce the available generation capacities for energy deliveries (e.g., see 
Riedel and Weigt, 2007; and Wieschhaus and Weigt, 2008). In the US most markets rely on real-time 
markets to allow customers to balance supply and demand as long as possible, thus reducing the need 
for reserve capacities. 
The interaction of several competition policy measurement, regulation, and market segments becomes 
very important when the market is liberalized in several steps. Particularly if the consumer segment 
remains regulated, the interactions between a fixed priced supply and a variable wholesale market 
price can lead to problems (see Section 4.2.2.2). 
To reduce the possibility of market power abuse and to detect possible anti-competitive structures a 
market monitor can be established. The threat of detection helps to discipline market participants 
while simultaneously the obtained information helps contributes to improvements in market design. 
Clearly the market monitor must remain independent from all market participants, including the 
system operator. Although the system operator has an information advantage regarding reserve 
markets and network related issues. 
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Related to the task of the market monitor is the necessary merger control to avoid market 
concentration. This can be accomplished by either prohibiting large firms to merge or acquire further 
companies and by requiring specific merger remedies to counteract the competition-reducing effects of 
a merger, e.g., divestiture of specific generation units. A supporting instrument of merger analysis is 
the SSNIP-test45 which specifies the relevant market and enables appropriate modelling approaches to 
test the impact of a merger. Static approaches like simple concentration indices or the HHI-index are 
typically insufficient for electricity markets (see Twomey et al., 2004, for a discussion on market 
power analysis). 
4.2.2 Divestiture 
As discussed divestiture means splitting certain parts of an enterprise or a holding company to increase 
competition in a specific market.46 Divestiture is generally considered a “hard” instrument of 
competition policy, because it directly impacts the management and ownership structure of firms. The 
focus of this section is on horizontal divestiture within the generation segment.47 Horizontal 
divestiture of dominant firms is supposed to lead to a larger number of competing producers and 
therefore to enhance the intensity of competition within a market. The “marginal” effect of divesting 
assets of market-dominant firms is larger for an initial high concentration; the effect diminishes as 
more independent firms operate in the market. There is potential interrelation between horizontal and 
vertical divestiture: horizontal unbundling can remain ineffective if one of the firms remains vertically 
integrated. Vertical separation may therefore be a necessary condition for horizontal unbundling to be 
effective.  
Divestiture improves the allocative efficiency of a market keeping the remaining market 
characteristics constant.48 The larger number of firms leads to price decreases, quantity increases, and 
thus a welfare increase. Divestiture also improves the dynamic efficiency of a sector, i.e. its ability to 
innovate and invest. Increased competition forces companies to more innovation, to modernize 
products and production structures, and to develop other strategies to survive in the market place. The 
decline in investment of the incumbent will be partly offset by investment by new market entrants 
trying to increase their market share and may further reduce the typical overcapacities that cost-
regulated markets face (e.g., see Borrmann and Finsinger, 1999, p 356ff). 
The effect of divestiture on productive efficiency is complex: on one hand, the increased level of 
competition reduces the inefficiency inherent in the management of the former monopolistic firm (so-
called X-inefficiencies, Leibenstein, 1966); on the other, , divestitures may reduce economies of scale 
if the resulting firm size is such that the costs of production are higher than in the previous situation. In 
                                                     
45 Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price. 
46 This section is based on Weigt et al. (2009). 
47 The vertical separation of electricity companies (unbundling) can have quite different effects than horizontal divestiture. 
Further analyses regarding unbundling are provided by Cremer et al., 2006, Pollitt, 2008, and van Koten and Ortmann, 2008. 
48 Allocative efficiency characterizes a situation where the allocation of factors of production and the allocation of goods to 
consumers is structured such that the prices approach marginal costs, and social welfare is maximized (for details see Mas-
Colell et al., 1995). 
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this case, the advantages of a divestiture should be weighed against the potentially adverse effects 
(Viscusi et al., 2005).  
In more detail, a divestiture leads to an increase in the number of firms, which drives up the produced 
quantity and reduces prices. However, the marginal production costs may also be affected: (i) marginal 
costs can remain the same, e.g., due to strong technical restrictions which remain unaffected by the 
size of a firm; (ii) marginal costs can decrease, e.g., due to the pressure of competition; and (iii) 
marginal cost can increase due to lost economies of scale leading to a lower output level of firms at 
higher marginal costs, or lost incentives to increase efficiency or effort levels as the producer surplus 
decreases with competition leading to an upward shift of the production cost curve, or lost bargaining 
power on the input side leading to higher input prices and consequently to an upward shift of the 
production cost curve. In the first two cases (i, ii) the welfare impact is clear. In the third case (iii) the 
situation may be more complex since higher production costs can offset possible welfare gains. Figure 
4.1 highlights this situation with a simple example. Assuming a monopolistic pre-divestiture market 
with constant marginal costs, the market outcome is defined by the monopolist’s marginal revenue 
function. If via a divestiture the monopolistic market is transformed into a competitive market setting 
the market outcome is defined by the intersection of the marginal cost curve and the demand function. 
If the marginal costs increase due to the divestiture49 the change in welfare consists of a producer rent 
loss due to the higher generation costs and a consumer rent increase due to the higher demand and 
lower price level.  
Whether a divestiture is profitable under these circumstances depends on the underlying market 
characteristics. Given the strong technical restrictions on electricity generation the impact of 
divestitures on marginal generation costs and thus the loss of producer rent may be neglectable. 
However, divestitures may not be an appropriate tool to increase the efficiency of lightly concentrated 
markets, given the greater legislative burden of divestitures and the possibility of other competition 
measurements with similar effects. 
The following sections review some of the divestitute experiences in the electricity and energy sectors. 
Regularly, the timing of these divestiture decisions coincides with market restructuring. 
                                                     
49 One can assume a market with identical power plants that are each divested to a different company. Due to the 
monopolist’s dominant position and bargaining power it could obtain a discount on fuel input prices which is offset by the 
divestiture. 
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Figure 4.1: Impacts on consumer and producer surplus due to divestiture 
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Source: Weigt et al. (2009), based on Viscusi et al. (2005) 
 
4.2.2.1 Experiences in the Liberalized British Market50 
The horizontal divestiture of electricity generation capacities in the UK in the mid-1990s is generally 
considered successful. With a certain time lag, the more competitive structure of the wholesale market 
led to decreasing prices. This structural measure laid the foundation for a competitive wholesale 
market. 
Starting with the liberalization process in 1989 the state-owned monopolized electricity sector was 
privatized (see Section 2.2.1.1 for details). The CEGB owning generation and transmission was split 
into three generation companies (National Power, PowerGen, and Nuclear Electric) and one 
transmission company. Due to the state ownership of the monopolized British electricity market this 
process did not require interference by private ownership structures and the initial divestiture of 
generation and network assets can be seen as standard restructuring process. Competition on the 
wholesale market was supposed to be fostered by a mandatory pool where the price was defined via 
supply schedules and forecasted demand. The first years of the liberalized market were marked by 
slightly increasing prices and the construction of new natural gas power plants, the so-called Dash for 
Gas which resulted in several new entrants.  
In 1993, the regulator (OFFER) suspected the dominant companies of manipulating prices, since 
price-cost margins appeared to reflect a decoupling of electricity and fuel prices. OFFER threatened to 
refer the two dominant generators National Power and PowerGen to the Monopolies and Merger 
Commission. To avoid this step both agreed to divest 15% of their capacity and to be subject to a two-
year price regulation. In 1995, 6 GW of coal capacity was sold to the Eastern Group, one of the 
                                                     
50 This case study is based on Newbery (1995, 2000, 2005a, 2007), Evans and Green (2005), Newbery and Pollitt (1997). 
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regional companies. With the privatization of the modern nuclear plants as a separate company, an 
oligopolistic market with four larger and several smaller companies emerged. However, the effects of 
this first divestiture were limited. Prices remained approximately stable, despite a significant drop in 
coal prices and a modest reduction in natural gas prices. The new market structure (a dominant 
oligopoly) was able to keep prices high, despite the newly emerging competition by the Eastern 
Group. Also, one has to acknowledge that the plants that had been divested were mainly base-load, the 
mid-load plants and the peakers remained even less competitive. 
Starting in 1995 a number of mergers and acquisitions took place, among them mergers between 
generating companies and supply companies. Until 2002 the market structure was transformed leaving 
five integrated suppliers.51 In the course of the merger process, National Power and PowerGen had to 
divest another 4 GW of capacity in exchange for the takeover of a REC. For the two incumbents, the 
divestiture can thus be seen as trading horizontal against vertical integration. 
The effects of this second divestiture were significant, as shown by Figure 4.2 (see Newbery, 2007): 
after a brief period of a tacit collusion (1999), electricity prices fell significantly, albeit fuel prices 
stayed constant or rose slightly. By late 2001, market concentration had declined significantly, the 
HHI-Index for coal plants was almost 1000; parallel to this, electricity wholesale prices hit an all-time 
low (~15£/MWh). Prices later increased, primarily due to increased fuel prices. In 2004, no market 
participant owned more than 17% of capacity. But even with re-increasing concentration the market 
has remained competitive since (Zachmann, 2007).52  
 
Figure 4.2: Price development and market concentration in the British electricity market 
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51 Network activities are fully unbundled. 
52 Since 2004 the shares have slightly increased. Most of the market participants are integrated companies owning generation 
and supply. From the initial 14 suppliers at the beginning of liberalization (in England and Scotland) five regional suppliers 
remain. 
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4.2.2.2 The California Crisis53 
The liberalization of the Californian electricity market produced of the largest market crises in recent 
history. The divestiture approach which was applied to increase market competitiveness followed the 
standard recipe of a pro-active competition policy and was principally well-founded. However, 
divestiture was followed by other incoherent measures which led to a collapse of the entire market 
design. 
Before restructuring the California market was characterized by three vertically integrated companies 
securing generation and supply: Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), 
and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E). Electricity prices were among the highest in the US. A 
legislative reform package was approved in 1996 and implementation began in 1998. Network 
operations were transferred to a state-owned, non-profit independent system operator (California 
Independent System Operator, CAISO). Incumbents were obliged to cover their supply completely via 
the California Power Exchange (CalPX), to guarantee high liquidity on the spot market. Consumers 
were free to choose suppliers although a price cap regulation was in place until 2002. 
Vertical separation between electricity generation and transmission assured non-discriminatory access 
to the network. As an independent system operator CAISO was able to establish itself as a nonpartisan 
player in the market. Further upstream, reforms sought to reduce the oligopolistic market situation: the 
three incumbents had to divest 50% of their fossil power plants to competing companies. Thus, 18 GW 
of capacity – about 30% of the whole market – was sold to five independent suppliers.54 By the 
summer of 1999 all incumbents sold more than the requested 50% and five new suppliers – AES, 
Duke, Dynergy, Reliant, Southern (later Mirant) – held nearly equal shares of the divested capacities. 
The divestiture of electricity generation in California achieved the objective of a more competitive 
market structure. The HHI-Index fell from about 2,700 in 1995 to only 960 in 1999. The two dominant 
firms (PG&E, SCE) found themselves with reduced market shares of only 21% and 17% respectively 
(Table 4.1). Market entry of companies from other US states was favored, as well as greenfield 
investments. In addition to reduced concentration, the CalPX was classified as a central pool, thus 
increasing price transparency, forming a benchmark for OTC transactions, and facilitating market 
entry.  
However, the potentially positive effects of divestiture on market prices and consumer benefits could 
not emerge due to the inconsistencies in the reform package, such as a ban of long-term contracts, and 
the price caps for regulated electricity supplies. PG&E and SCE lost the support of Wall Street and 
went into bankruptcy. Trading at CalPX collapsed and the system operator had to impose rolling 
blackouts to avoid the collapse of the entire electricity system. Restructuring was brought to a 
standstill. 
                                                     
53 This case study is based on Blumstein et al. (2002), Bushnell (2005), Joskow and Kahn (2002), Kumkar (2001, 2002), and 
Wolak (2003a). 
54 SCE sold most of its capacity in one and a half months after market opening. PG&E sold part of its plants in July 1998 and 
the remaining ones in April 1999. SDG&E sold its plants in spring 1999. 
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The breakdown makes it impossible to assess the impact of the divestiture on market competiveness. 
The divestiture of electricity generation capacities of the dominant firms followed clear rules, a 
reasonable objective, and can be considered a success. However, the potentially positive effects of this 
policy could not translate into lower prices and consumer benefits due to inconsistencies in the overall 
market design and poor crisis management by the government. Therefore, the objective of divestiture 
was not attained, and it is difficult to single out the effects of divestiture from the other implemented 
policy measures. 
 
Table 4.1: Structure of the California electricity market (1995 and 1999) 
1995 1999 
Company 
Capacity [GW] 
(market share) 
Company 
Capacity [GW] 
(market share) 
PG&E 20,2 (37%) PG&E 11,6 (21%) 
SCE 20,1 (36%) SCE 9,5 (17%) 
SDG&E 3,1 (5%) SDG&E 0,7 (1%) 
Other 13,3 (23%) AES 4,7 (8%) 
  Duke 2,9 (5%) 
  Dynergy 2,9 (5%) 
  Reliant 4,0 (7%) 
  Mirant 3,2 (6%) 
  Other 16,2 (29%) 
Sum: 56,7 Sum: 55,7 
HHI ~ 2.700 HHI ~ 960 
Source: Blumstein et al. (2002), Marnay et al. (1998) 
 
4.2.2.3 Other International Experiences 
Beside the two above mentioned cases divestiture has been used both as an instrument to improve 
competitiveness and as merger remedy to avoid dominant market positions. In Europe a direct 
divestiture was applied in the Italian electricity market dominated by the state utility ENEL which 
owned generation, transmission and distribution assets. After the vertical unbundling the newly 
formed generation-only company ENEL was partially privatized (the state still holds a 60% majority). 
Due to its dominant market position no real competition could emerge in the short term, and in 1999 
ENEL was required to divest part of its capacity to reduce its market share below 50%. The divested 
capacity was split among three independent companies which were sold in 2003 (Ferraria and 
Giuliettib, 2005).  
In the US, TXU Corporation in Texas was subject to divestiture proposals to curb market power and 
establish more competitive electricity markets. The assessment of TXU’s market power potential by 
Potomac Economics Ltd. (2007) examined the deregulated wholesale market during the summer of 
2005 using a pivotal analysis. The analysis concluded that TXU’s offer prices of its on-line capacities 
were not competitive. A simulation was carried out to estimate the impact of its bidding strategy on 
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the balancing market based on the system operator’s scheduling, pricing and dispatch model, TXU’s 
estimated marginal costs, and the actual inputs used to clear the balancing energy market. Based on the 
identification of market power abuse TXU was fined  $210 mn including $70 mn in proposed market 
refunds to wholesale power buyers and $140 mn in penalties. The other action proposed was 
divestiture of some generation to limit future potential for market power abuse (Wall Street Journal, 
2007).  
Divestiture also plays an important role in merger and acquisition cases as part of anti-trust 
instruments. In the US two cases highlight the problems when analyzing mergers and defining proper 
remedies.55 
The proposed merger between Exelon and PSEG shows that merger remedy analysis and results can 
vary among regulatory institutions (Madsen et al. 2005). In February 2005 Exelon and PSEG filed 
four major cases relating to their planned merger at FERC, the US Department of Justice (DOJ), the 
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (NJBPU), and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
(PAPUC). FERC approved the merger subject to the divestiture of 2,500 MW in sales of virtual 
capacities (“long-term contracts”) and another 1,500 MW in actual sales of capacity (FERC, 2005). 
This decision was based upon a company-wide modeling of the market effects. The Antitrust Division 
of the DOJ also investigated and required a divestiture of 5,600 MW (DOJ, 2006). The NJBPU 
investigation looked at the potential impacts for the state of New Jersey, especially the effects on 
reliability, customer service, and assistance for low-income ratepayers. NJBPU requested the 
divestiture of 10,000 MW of generating capacity, and a “rate relief” payment of $600-1,500 per 
customer. Even though the merging parties reached an agreement on divestiture with FERC and the 
DOJ, this final requirement imposed by New Jersey broke the deal. Exelon and PSEG withdrew the 
merger in September 2006.  
San Diego Gas & Electric (part of the ENOVA Group) and Southern California Gas (SoCalGas, part 
of Pacific Enterprises) is an example where market power was constrained in a vertical merger case 
(Bailey, 1999). Both FERC and the California PUC considered the Pacific-Enova merger as a 
“convergence” merger resulting in an integrated energy company capable of supplying both fuel 
(natural gas) and electricity. With market power in natural gas storage and transportation segments the 
new company could drive up wholesale electricity prices for competitors, whereas SDG&E would 
benefit from internal transfer pricing within the merged firm. Both regulators found that the proposed 
merger indeed created the potential for market manipulation. The imposed divestiture measures were 
based upon a detailed market power analysis carried out by FERC. In addition to the mitigation 
measures recommended by FERC, California required SDG&E to divest its generation assets to 
mitigate the potential vertical market power abuse during high demand periods.  
In Europe, to prevent dominant market structures, divestitures have been used to cope with anti-
competitive outcomes of merger cases. Lévêque and Monturus (2007) provide a comprehensive 
                                                     
55 See Hirschhausen, Neumann, and Weigt (2007) for details. 
 71
overview of 241 merger and acquisition deals between European electricity and natural gas companies 
from January 1998 to July 2007. The deals include: the Nordic markets in the case of the Norwegian 
state-owned electricity company Statkraft (Statkraft, 2005a, b), the Finnish Fortum company (FCA, 
2006a, b), and the Danish oil and natural gas incumbent DONG (EC, 2006; EU 2006a), that all 
included divestiture proposals; GdF and Suez (EU, 2006b); proposed divestitures in the Spanish 
merger case of Endesa and Iberdrola (Crampes and Fabra, 2004); and the prohibition of the acquisition 
of Gás de Portugal by Electricidade de Portugal (EC, 2004). 
4.2.2.4 Virtual Divestitures 
Virtual divestitures are becoming increasingly popular as policy instruments. The term refers to a spin-
off of an incumbent’s generation capacities without changing the property rights structure of these 
facilities. Thus, the divestiture is a financial transaction, not a physical one: an owner of virtual power 
plants basically has a contract allowing it to trade a given capacity without actually managing a 
specific power plant. Willems (2006) shows that virtual divestitures represent a bundle of call options 
where the virtual production cost is equal to the strike price of the option. The buyer of the option has 
the right to consume the electricity of its Virtual Power Plants (VPPs).56 Regulatory authorities see an 
advantage of virtual over real divestitures in the possibility to withdraw the measure after a specified 
time, or continue if the desired outcome has not been accomplished.  
Willems (2006) concludes for oligopolistic electricity markets that virtual power plant divestitures 
either increase competition or the contracted volume of incumbents depending on their design: 
financial VPPs (an insurance contract against upward jumps in the spot price) lead to more aggressive 
bidding in the spot market similar to forward sales;57 physical VPPs (an option contract for physical 
delivery of energy) lead to flattening of the slope of the residual demand function of competitors. To 
improve the effect of virtual divestitures the regulatory authority must ensure that divested facilities 
increase competitiveness within the market; that incumbents cannot buy back their sold capacities; and 
that large market participants cannot increase market share beyond certain limits.58  
In the ongoing liberalization process of Europe’s electricity markets, several cases of virtual 
divestitures, the VPPs have substituted for real divestitures to curb market power and increase market 
competitiveness. In the Netherlands, VPPs were proposed in the Nuon merger case. The Dutch 
competition authority NMa opted to prevent the merger if no counteractions were taken to increase 
market competitiveness (van Damme, 2005). It demanded a virtual divestiture of 900 MW plant 
capacities in 90 contracts with duration of five years. After legal actions capacity was reduced to 
200 MW and auctioned in September 2004 in 10 MW blocks.  
                                                     
56 Retailers might buy VPP peaking capacity to counter the effect of market power during those periods. 
57 Following Allaz and Vila  (1993) a higher contracted volume also leads to reduced prices on the spot market; see Section 
4.3.1.1. 
58 Further competition policy measurements that fall short of the given segmentation can still be defined as virtual divestiture, 
e.g., if a transmission company is requested to keep a certain amount of its transmission capacity free for other market 
participants. 
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In Belgium, the electricity market is dominated by Electrabel which owns about 90% of the generation 
assets. In 2003 the Belgian Competition Council mandated that Electrabel was allowed to become the 
default supplier for customers of several inter-municipal distribution companies. As part of this 
decision Electrabel had to virtually divest some generation assets. The auctions were supposed to 
occur on a quarterly basis (Electrabel, 2006). No single buyer was allowed to obtain more than 40% of 
the capacity for sale. Although this threshold appears reasonable in general to prevent the emergence 
of dominant firms, the limited capacity offered in total implies that none of the buyers can achieve 
more than 4% of available capacity in the market. Thus, Electrabel never faced significant 
competition.59  
The French electricity market is dominated by a single firm, EdF. Virtual divestiture of generation 
capacities was required in a recent merger case: the European competition authority required EdF to 
divest part of its generation capacity to acquire a share in Germany’s supplier EnBW (Case 
COMP/M.1853 - EdF/ENBW). Starting in 2001, EdF was required to auction about 6 GW on an 
annual basis for five years. However, even after the divestiture EdF remains dominant with about 85 to 
90% of available capacity. A further concern is that part of the VPP capacity is sold back to EdF 
instead of domestic customers. In 2004, this re-selling reached about 30% of the issued VPP capacity 
(Glachant, 2004). 
Spain is a particularly interesting case, because virtual divestitures are not directly linked to a merger 
case, but rather are an instrument to establish a forward market. In 2006, the Spanish government 
required Endesa and Iberdrola to hold five auctions offering virtual capacity to members of the 
Spanish electricity market (Royal Decree 1634/2006) starting in summer 2007. At the time, Endesa 
owned about 37% of the installed capacity and Iberdola owned about 42%; thus the market was 
dominated by the duopoly. Whether the auctions have a pro-competitive effect on the development of 
a futures market remains to be determined. 
Further virtual divestiture cases have taken place in several European countries, showing that this 
instrument has become a serious option of active competition policy in electricity market 
liberalization:  
 In the Czech Republic the dominant company CEZ held a VPP auction in line with an antitrust 
authority ruling related to the SCE acquisition in 2006 (CEZ, 2006)  
 in 2005 the Italian Authority for Electricity and Gas aimed to promote competition in the 
wholesale power market via virtual divestiture of 3850 MW of Enel (Authority for Electricity 
and Gas, 2006) 
 in Ireland the regulatory authorities agreed to introduce a Virtual Independent Power 
Producers (VIPP) to reduce the dominance of ESB via an auction process to provide 
independent suppliers with contracted capacity in 2005 (CER, 2005). 
                                                     
59 A study for the Competition Council suggests that the divested capacity should be between 2 and 5.6 GW to obtain 
sufficient mitigation effects (Platts, 2003). 
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4.3 Modeling of Strategic Company Behavior: Cournot vs. SFE 
As noted, classical economic tools, such as the HHI, are largely unsuitable for electricity 
markets(Borenstein, et al. 1999). Therefore, for oligopolistic wholesale electricity markets mainly two 
approaches are used: the Cournot model and the SFE model. While standard Cournot models are 
simple to calculate, the results often do not represent reasonable market outcomes. For realistic values 
of demand elasticities, prices are too high and output too low. SFE models (e.g., Klemperer and 
Meyer, 1989) on the other hand are deemed to represent electricity markets more realistically because 
they assume that generators, instead of one single quantity, compete by bidding complete supply 
functions in an oligopolistic market with demand uncertainty. The SFE approach has been used to 
analyze electricity markets since its first application by Green and Newbery (1992) for England and 
Wales. The major drawbacks are that the models are difficult to calculate, often have multiple 
equilibria, often give unstable solutions, and require simplifications with respect to market and cost 
structures.  
The following overview discusses the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches in market analyses 
and a comparison of both models based on Willems et al. (2009) is presented. The two approaches are 
calibrated with an identical dataset taken from the German electricity market, and the results are 
compared with the observed market clearing prices. 
4.3.1 Review on Cournot and SFE Models in Electricity Markets 
To obtain market results that represent strategic behavior the welfare maximizing approach presented 
in Chapter 3 must be replaced by a profit-maximizing assumption. However, beside the same objective 
function Cournot and SFE models differ in their assumption regarding the free choice variables and 
the behavior of the remaining market participants.  
In a Cournot equilibrium the demand function is known by the firm before bidding in every time 
period. Each firm maximizes profits by setting production quantities and sales, knowing that the 
market price is a result of its own output and the output of its competitors. The Cournot approach 
yields a direct outcome in terms of price and quantities for a given demand realization. Cournot 
models generally provide a unique Nash equilibrium. 
In SFE models firms cannot condition their bids on the demand realization since it is assumed that 
demand follows a certain stochastic behavior. Nor are firms allowed to submit different bids for 
different time periods. Thus, each maximizes its (expected) profits by bidding a supply curve, 
assuming that the supply curves of its competitors remain fixed. Hence, the quantity produced by the 
competitors depends on the market price, and indirectly on the output decision of the firm itself. To 
solve the SFE model, it is assumed that the stochastic demand shock and the time period shift the 
demand function horizontally. Under these assumptions the (stochastic) optimization problem that 
each firm must solve can be rewritten as a differential equation. Typically, a range of feasible 
equilibrium supply functions is found when solving one set of differential equationsfor each firm. It 
can be shown that every SFE supply function lies between the Cournot and the Bertrand solutions for 
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any realized demand shock. Delgado and Moreno (2004) show, however, that only the least-
competitive equilibrium is coalition-proof when the number of firms is sufficiently large. A serious 
drawback of SFE models is that they require simplified assumptions of the markets’ supply structure 
to obtain feasible solutions.  
4.3.1.1 Cournot Models in Electricity 
Although Cournot models are ubiquitous, they often overestimate observed market prices and 
underestimate market quantities. Since the model outcome is based only on quantity competition, the 
results are highly sensitive to assumptions about demand elasticity. Given that most electricity markets 
have few oligopolistic firms and low, short-term demand elasticities, markups are accordingly very 
high. Following Allaz and Villa (1993), forward contracts can be used to predict more realistic 
outcomes. Firms can both sell energy in a spot market and a certain amount of their supply in the 
forward market. In a two-stage game, the oligopolists first determine the quantity to be sold in the 
forward market before entering the spot market and playing a Cournot game. Assuming two 
companies (1,2) with a given forward position (g, h) the profit function u(.) on the production stage 
(spot market) is given by: 
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with q representing the total sales on the spot and forward market, and c(.) as production cost function. 
Assuming a linear demand function (p=a-q1-q2) and linear cost function (c=b*q) the resulting 
reaction function q1(q2) is given by (see Allaz and Villa, 1993, p. 4): 
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The reaction function is increasing with the amount of forward sales. The marginal revenue in this 
setting for the first firm is given by )())(( 11121 qqpgqqqp  . Thus the obtained marginal 
revenue is smaller with a forward coverage (g>0) than without. The equilibrium conditions are given 
by: 
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Thus, forward sales (g and h >0) increase the oligopolists’ output given the other company’s decision 
and reduce the spot market price (p), resulting in a more competitive market. Varying the contracting 
factor of a firm generates a “bundle” of feasible Cournot solutions that resemble SFE outcomes.  
The role of forward contracts, when comparing Cournot results with real market outcomes, is 
demonstrated by Bushnell et al. (2008). They look at California, PJM and New England markets, 
comparing price data of the power exchanges with competitive model outcomes, a standard Cournot 
model, and a Cournot model using contract cover as an approximation for vertical arrangements. They 
conclude that neglecting the contract cover yields results that vastly exceed observed market prices. 
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Ellersdorfer (2005) analyzes the competitiveness of the German market using a multi-regional two-
stage Cournot model. He shows the extent to which cross-border network extensions and increased 
forward capacities enhance competition and decrease market power.  
Cournot approaches are often preferred when technical characteristics such as network constraints 
(voltage stability, loop flows) or generation characteristics (start-up costs, ramping constraints, unit 
commitment) must be considered. The impact of congestion on market prices and market power has 
been analyzed in several studies. Smeers and Wei (1997) use variational inequalities to describe the 
Cournot model. Willems (2002) discusses the assumptions necessary to include transmission 
constraints in Cournot models. Neuhoff et al. (2005) summarize different characteristics of Cournot 
network models, and show that although all models predict the same outcomes, they vary with respect 
to assumptions about market design and expectations of generators in cases of competitive markets.  
A more general overview of Cournot models used to analyze market power issues appears in Bushnell 
et al. (1999). Other reviews of electricity market models with respect to network issues are Day et al. 
(2002) and Ventosa et al. (2005) (see also Section 2.3). 
4.3.1.2 SFE Models in Electricity 
In general, SFE models are frequently used in determining market power issues. Bolle (1992) makes a 
theoretical application to electricity markets by analyzing the possibility of tacit collusion when 
bidding in supply functions. He concludes that if firms coordinate on bidding the highest feasible 
supply function, a decrease in market concentration does not necessarily result in convergence of 
aggregated profits to zero. Green and Newbery (1992) present an empirical analysis for England and 
Wales using symmetric players. They compare the duopoly of National Power and PowerGen with a 
hypothetical five-firm oligopoly, concluding that the latter results in a range of supply functions closer 
to marginal costs.  
Baldick and Hogan (2002) design a model of the England and Wales markets that incorporates price 
caps, capacity constraints, and varies the time horizon by which supply functions must remain fixed. 
They show that the latter characteristic has a large impact on market competitiveness. Evans and 
Green (2005) simulate the same market for the period of April 1997 to March 2004 and calculate the 
SFE taking into account the firms’ asymmetricity. They approximate the competitive pressure in the 
market with ‘an equivalent number of symmetric firms’ based on HHI and conclude that the change to 
a decentralized market has no impact on short-term prices while reductions in concentration do have 
impacts. Sioshansi and Oren (2007) study the Texas balancing market using SFE with capacity 
constraints. They find that the larger firms more or less behave according to the SFE for incremental 
bids. They argue that SFE models with capacity constraints are an interesting tool to study balancing 
markets since demand is very inelastic, and hence the supply elasticity of competitors is a major 
component in determining the elasticity of the residual demand of the firms. These SFE models with 
capacity constraints are also useful because they reflect the actual bidding behavior of the firms, i.e. 
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“hockey stick bidding”: firms bid (too) low for low levels of supply and have a steep supply function 
for greater levels of supply.  
Several theoretical contributions have extended Klemperer and Meyer (1989) by incorporating typical 
market characteristics. Holmberg (2007) considers the problem of asymmetric companies by 
simplifying the supply structure to constant marginal costs. He shows that under this setup there is a 
unique SFE that is piece-wise symmetric. Anderson and Hu (2008) propose a numerical approach 
using piece-wise linear supply functions and a discretization of the demand distribution. They show 
that the approach also has good convergence behavior in models with capacity constraints. Holmberg 
(2008) studies capacity constraints on generation units and shows that a unique, symmetric SFE exists 
with symmetric producers, inelastic demand, a price cap, and capacity constraints. Green (1996), 
Rudkevich (2005) and Baldick et al. (2004) develop the theory of linear supply functions. These 
functions are easier to solve, can be used in asymmetric games, and generally give stable and unique 
equilibria, but do not account for capacity constraints. Boisseleau et al. (2004) use a piece-wise linear 
supply function and describe a solution algorithm that obtains an equilibrium even when capacity 
constraints exist.  
4.3.1.3 Comparison of Cournot and SFE Models 
Only a few authors have compared the equilibria in both models. Vives (2007) studies the properties 
of two auction mechanisms: one where firms bid supply functions and one where they bid à la 
Cournot. Firms are assumed to have private information about their costs. Solving for a Bayesian 
equilibrium in linear supply functions, Vives (2007) shows that supply functions aggregate the 
dispersed information of the players, while the Cournot model does not. Hence, Cournot games might 
be socially less efficient, since the dispersed information is not used effectively. Hu et al. (2004) use a 
bi-level game to model markets for delivery of electrical power on looped transmission networks with 
the focus on the function of the ISO. Within this analysis they compare supply function and Cournot 
equilibria and show that in case of transmission congestion, SFE need not be bounded from above by 
Cournot equilibria as is the case for unconstrained networks. They conclude that when congestion is 
present, Cournot games may be more efficient than supply function bidding. 
Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2006) undertake a theoretical analysis of collusion in repeated oligopoly 
games using a supergame model that is designed both for supply function and quantity competition. 
They show that depending on the number of rivals and the slope of the market demand, collusion is 
easier to sustain under supply function rather than under quantity competition. An experimental 
approach by Brandts et al. (2008) includes the impact of forward contracts on electricity market 
outcomes. They show that the theoretical outcomes of SFE models (mainly their feasibility range 
between Cournot and marginal costs) can be reproduced by experimental economics. Further, they 
find that introducing a forward market significantly lowers prices for both types of competition.  
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4.3.2 Methodology of the Cournot and SFE Approaches 
To establish the suitability of both approaches to resemble exiting electricity markets a consistent 
model framework is developed by Willems et al. (2009) to compare the model outcomes with 
observed market prices in Germany.  
The Cournot and SFE supply models are found by simultaneously solving a set of equations 
describing the market equilibrium for different demand realizations k. Market demand Dk is assumed 
to be linear and depends on a demand shock Δk and the price pk:
60 
      demand equation  (4.1) kkk pD  
with k the index of the aggregate demand shock, both due to the stochastic demand component and the 
deterministic time component. For all demand realizations the energy balance must hold, thus demand 
should equal total supply. 
The marginal cost equation relates the output of firm i to the marginal cost given by a continuous 
cubic function:61 
   marginal cost function  (4.2) 
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Following Anderson and Hu (2008), the continuity of the bid supply function is imposed specifying a 
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    pricing equation  (4.4) 
Firms are allowed to sign fixed-capacity contracts fi specified as a quantity (in MW) which is 
independent of the demand shock k. The pricing equation differs for the two models. In the Cournot 
equilibrium, each player assumes the production of the other players as given, and therefore the slope 
of the residual inverse demand function depends only on the slope of the demand function (γ): 
  ikkiik cpfq      Cournot equilibrium condition (4.5) 
                                                     
60 The demand levels are derived by taking the German demand reduced by wind output as price inelastic (see Section 3.5.2.2 
for the underlying dataset) and obtaining a demand elasticity via imports and fringe production.  The fringe elasticity is 
derived via a weighted least squares regression of the fringes production costs. The import elasticity is obtained by a two-
stage least squares estimator to address the endogeneity of the German price with respect to imports (see Willems et al., 
2009) 
61 The marginal cost functions parameters are obtained by minimizing the weighted squared difference of the parameterized 
function and the true cost function subject to the condition that marginal cost should be upward sloping. The stepwise true 
marginal cost curve is based on the dataset described in Section 3.5.2.2. 
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For the SFE model, the slope of the residual demand function depends on the slope of the demand 
function and the slope of the supply functions of the competitors (β j): 
    SFE equilibrium condition (4.6)   
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The Cournot equilibrium is a solution of equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.5) and a market clearing 
condition,and the SFE is a solution of equations (4.1), (4.2),  (4.3), (4.6) and a market clearing 
condition. 
Both models are tested using the same sample dataset based on the German electricity market. E.ON, 
RWE, Vattenfall, and EnBW are assumed to be strategic firms i, and the remaining generators act as 
competitive “fringe”. Generation capacities and costs are based on the same data as the fundamental 
model presented in Chapter 3. The stepwise marginal cost functions of the generators are simplified to 
the cubic function 4.2 without a capacity constraint. 
The dataset is the winter period of 2006 since strategic behavior is more likely to occur when capacity 
is scarce. The four periods considered are: January peak and off-peak hours, and February peak and 
off-peak hours.62 For each period the observed demand, wind production, net import amounts, and 
prices are used to estimate the corresponding demand function for Germany. The day ahead price at 
the EEX is the reference price index. 63 
4.3.3 Comparison 
Given the observed price-quantity pairs during the sample period both models are calibrated to 
reproduce them as closely as possible by changing the contract coverage fi. The Cournot model 
produces a single equilibrium given the demand realization and the contract cover. The SFE model 
produces a bundle of equilibria for a given contract cover. Which equilibrium firms choose depends on 
how the firms coordinate. A common assumption is that firms coordinate on the least-competitive SFE 
equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium where prices are highest (e.g., see Green and Newbery, 1992, and 
Delgado and Moreno, 2004). A non-linear least squares regression is conducted to compare the 
models’ prices with the observed market prices.. 
Figure 4.3 shows the Cournot solution and the “bundle” of SFE solutions for the optimal contract 
positions found in the regression compared to the observed hourly price-quantity outcomes at the EEX 
spot market and the LOWESS regression of those observations.64 The demand function represents the 
highest possible peak demand level. Cournot firms sign contracts for 49.8% of their installed 
generation capacity, and SFE firms contract for 27.4% (based on the SFE solution with the highest 
price neglecting the remainder of the bundle). In the mid-load range both models produce the same 
outcome. However, during peak and off-peak load, the SFE solution is above the Cournot outcome. In 
                                                     
62 Hours between 8am and 8pm are considered peak hours; the others are off-peak. 
63 A more detailed representation of the model formulations and dataset is provided in Willems et al. (2009). 
64 LOWESS stands for locally weighted scatterplot smoothing and represents one possible method to obtain a regression if no 
function behaviour is to be specified. 
 79
general the Cournot solution follows a more linear trend whereas the SFE solution is convex. Both 
supply curves are above the competitive supply function representing the marginal cost curve of 
generation which emphasizes the impact of firms’ strategic behaviors on price mark-ups. 
To test which approach performs better under varying assumptions a series of robustness tests checks 
whether the relative performance of the Cournot and the SFE model depend on the particular 
assumptions taken. Tested are different contract coverages during peak and off-peak periods, varying 
marginal generation costs on a monthly basis, different import elasticities for the four peak and off-
peak periods, an elastic and a fixed fringe output, and load-following contracts in the Cournot 
simulations. 
Applying the models to each of the four periods respectively, Willems et al. (2009) observe that the 
contract coverage is higher during off-peak periods. However, the Cournot model still yields a higher 
optimal contract cover. Furthermore, the off-peak outcome of the oligopolistic models is only slightly 
better than the marginal cost curve. However, during peak hours, the marginal cost curve is a bad 
predictor of market results, indicating that during peak hours it is more important to consider firms’ 
strategic behaviors.  
Comparing both fringe assumptions, the optimal model is probably one where the inelastic fringe is 
used during peak hours – the production capacity is binding – and the elastic fringe is used during off-
peak hours – the production capacity is not binding. In that case a similar amount of contracts will be 
signed during peak and off-peak periods, implying that during off-peak hours, a larger fraction of total 
demand is covered by contracts, because the contracted amount is defined via the installed capacity. 
The regression analysis of the impact of load-following contracts for the Cournot approach shows that 
the optimal amount of these contracts is equal to 0%, an indication that the model can be finely 
calibrated during both peak and off-peak by relying only on fixed contracts. 65 
 
                                                     
65 Load-following contracts can be understood as a representation of vertically integrated generators that aim to satisfy the 
demand of their customers.  
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Figure 4.3: Unique Cournot outcome and bundle of SFE outcomes at the calibrated optimal 
contract cover 
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Source: Willems et al. (2009) 
 
4.3.4 Suitability of Cournot and SFE for Divestiture Analyses 
The results indicate that both approaches can be adjusted to represent oligopolistic electricity markets. 
The Cournot approach can be fine-tuned to the observed market outcomes by assuming a relatively 
high level of fixed-capacity contracts. For the SFE model, the best fit is found when firms sign fewer 
contracts. The SFE model does not significantly outperform the Cournot model and both models are 
suitable for analyzing competition policy. 
Both models produce a slightly different supply curve shape and thus the price results for specific 
demand quantities can vary. An assessment of divestiture’s benefits based on price differences and 
welfare effects consequently will vary accordingly. Furthermore, a change in the underlying market 
structure (i.e. number of firms) may have a different impact on the model outcome for both 
approaches. The following section describes the use of both approaches to assess the impact of 
divestiture scenarios for Germany and provide a plausible range of expected post-divestiture market 
outcomes. 
 
4.4 Impact of Reduced Market Concentration on Electricity Prices in Germany 
As shown in Section 0 divestiture is an appropriate tool of a pro-active competition policy and has 
been applied several times to improve the competiveness of electricity markets or to compensate 
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possible dominant market positions in merger cases. Nevertheless, from a political and legal point of 
view divestitures are considered a “hard” instrument compared to other possible measurements, i.e. 
market monitoring or fostering of market entry. In Germany the possibility of divestiture due to 
market power concerns is not in the competition law but has been proposed by the Hessian Ministry of 
Economics (2007). Schwarz and Lang (2007) study this proposal and compare a regulatory solution, 
introduction of market coupling, cross-border capacity extensions, and divestiture to mitigate market 
power in the German market. Regarding the divestiture option they conclude that the British 
experiences show the potential of divestiture in fostering competition but in light of the expected 
market coupling they assume that divestiture of German suppliers is unnecessary.  
Given this setting it is important to obtain a robust forecast of the impact of a divestiture to analyze the 
potential benefits. As highlighted in Section 4.3 the possibility to adjust strategic market models to 
observed market outcomes via contract coverage provides a decent bottom-up approach to obtain a 
reasonable forecast. Following, this methodology is applied to assess the possible price and welfare 
effects of divestiture within the German market framework. The model structure presented in Section 
4.3.2 is applied to obtain a contract cover calibration for the market outcome in 2006. Subsequently, 
different divestiture cases are modeled assuming that the contract coverage remains fixed. The 
outcomes allow a classification of the possible benefits from a divestiture and in addition provide a 
comparison of different divestiture methodologies. 
4.4.1 Modeling Divesture 
Modeling approaches to assess the impact of divestitures ex-ante are relatively scare. Green and 
Newbery (1992) are among the first to use SFE for electricity market analysis. They compare the 
duopoly of National Power and PowerGen in the British market with a hypothetical five-firm 
oligopoly, concluding that the latter results in a range of supply functions closer to marginal costs. Day 
and Bunn (2001) apply a computational modeling approach to the second round of capacity divestiture 
in the liberalized electricity market of England and Wales in 1999. They conclude that although the 
divestiture was substantial it may still be insufficient to pave the way to a fully competitive market. 
Ishii and Yan (2006) analyze the impact of divestitures on new power plant investments in US 
electricity markets. Based on empirical data on the investment decisions of 20 major IPPs between 
1996 and 2000 they develop a net present value model to calculate the incentives for plant investment 
in the absence of divestiture. They conclude that the new capacity “crowded out” by divestitures is on 
average only 177 MW. However, the divested assets encouraged participation of new market entrants 
that may not have occurred otherwise.  
Since divestitures are often requirements in merger cases Vasconcelos (2007), among others has 
examined the connection between efficiency gains due to mergers and structural remedies by the 
antitrust authority in a Cournot setting. They find that divestiture creates new merger possibilities, the 
authority tends to over-fix the amount of divestiture (which discourages further mergers), and that 
divestitures have a positive impact on consumer surplus. Moselle et al. (2006) analyze the Dutch 
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electricity market using a Cournot model that includes a competitive fringe and forward contracts to 
test the divestiture requirement in the Nuon-Essent merger case. They results show that although the 
commissions guidelines are already fulfilled with a divestiture of 1,900 MW, a total of 4,200 MW is 
necessary the merged firm is to remain pivotal. London Economics (2004) analyze the Belgian 
electricity market and the role of Electrabel as the dominant incumbent. Depending on the underlying 
assumptions on interconnection capacities they find that four players are needed to provide a 
competitive market. They also analyze the virtual divestiture of Electrabel and conclude that four to 
seven times the current divested capacities would be needed to achieve a more competitive market. 
Lévêque (2007) analyzes a study by the EC (2005) evaluating 96 merger cases between 1996 and 
2000, and emphasizes that:strategic behavior of the merged firms and insufficient trustees can hinder 
the effectiveness of remedies; the merging firm can sell assets of inadequate scope due to asymmetric 
information; and a close observation of the development of the market’s competitiveness after a 
merger is important. Christiansen (2005) analyses the interaction between regulation and merger 
control in the liberalized European electricity sector, in particular the effectiveness of divestiture 
remedies. Based on two case studies he shows that a stricter merger control is necessary. 
4.4.2 Methodology and Calibration 
A pre-divestiture benchmark is needed prior to testing the impact of divestitures on the German 
electricity market.  Therefore, the model structure presented in Willems et al. (2009) is extended 
beyond the first two months of 2006 to cover the complete year. The analysis looks at peak hours only, 
because strategic company behavior is more likely to occur in hours with high demand and tighter 
capacity situations, and secondly, the model structure with approximated cost functions and simplified 
market interactions is not well-suited to capture the unit commitment process determining pricing in 
off-peak periods.66 
The residual German demand D during peak hours is assumed to be price inelastic, varying through 
time t, and with a random component ε: 
      German peak demand in t  (4.7) tttD  
Oligopolists face an elastic residual demand due to the fringe supply and imports from neighboring 
countries. Imports QI are determined by the difference of the price pG in Germany and the neighboring 
regions pj by regressing:
67 
 It
z
ztz
n
ntnGtIIt ppQ      Import regression  (4.8) 
                                                     
66 Due to ramping constraints, start-up restrictions, and start-up costs market prices during off-peak periods can fall below 
marginal generation costs (see Abrell et al., 2008). 
67  δz is a vector of time dummies (day of week) for all hours t in the peak period. A two-stage least squares estimator is used 
to address the endogeneity of the German price pG with respect to imports. As instruments the total demand level in Germany 
and German wind production is used. 
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Hourly price data is taken from energy exchanges in the Netherlands, France, Austria, Poland, 
Sweden, East Denmark and West Denmark. Imports QI  are obtained from ETSOVista (2007). One 
import elasticity γI for the entire peak period in 2006 is calculated. 
The fringe supply is assumed to be price taking based on the underlying marginal cost structure. 
Following Willems et al. (2009), during peak periods a fixed fringe output may present a better 
approximation since a cost function approach neglects the capacity constraints of fringe suppliers. 
Therefore, the available fringe generation capacity αF (based on VGE, 2006 and decreased by seasonal 
availability factors) is subtracted from the residual German demand. The residual demand function for 
the oligopolists DO  rewrites to:  
     Oligopoly demand  (4.9) tGtIFtt
O
t pD  
Equation (4.7) is transformed into a demand function with a specified set of demand realizations  
(equation (4.1), for details see Willems et al., 2009). The intercept of the demand level is chosen such 
that when the shock is zero, either 95% of the observations in the German market are below the 
demand function, or a maximum price of 200 €/MWh is obtained.
k
68  
The marginal generation costs of each oligopolist are based on each player’s generation portfolio VGE 
(2006). Plant capacities are decreased by seasonal availability factors following Hoster (1996). 
Marginal costs are estimated for each month respectively based on the plants’ efficiency and fuel 
prices resembling average monthly cross-border prices for gas, oil and coal from Bafa (2006). The 
step-wise marginal cost functions of the generators are simplified to a cubic function (equation (4.2)) 
where the parameters of the function are found by minimizing the weighted squared difference of the 
parameterized function and the true cost function subject to the condition that the marginal cost should 
be upward sloping (see Willems et al., 2009, section 4.2). 
Given the underlying dataset the Cournot and SFE models are simulated varying the contract coverage 
fi from 0% up to 100%.
69 The resulting supply curves are then analyzed to obtain the optimal contract 
cover f using the observed price-demand results at the EEX spot market as a benchmark: 
     Squared error mimization (4.10)  2mod )(min fPP tobst
f
 
                                                     
with Pobs the observed prices at the EEX and Pmod(f) the modeled prices given the contract cover f. 
Given this setting the optimal contract cover for each month and the year can be obtained (Table 4.2). 
The Cournot model has on average about 20 percentage points of higher coverage than the SFE model. 
The values in the second half of 2006 are lower for both models which may be a result of the slightly 
lower electricity prices (see Figure 3.2) at the same time that fuel prices remained relatively stable. For 
the remainder of the divestiture analyses only the yearly values are used.  
 
68 The second condition became necessary because in July 2006 a large amount of peak hours were exceptionally high, 
resulting in unrealistic imports as the import estimation neglects transmission capacities. 
69 The models are solved in GAMS with a MATLAB interface to call up the GAMS code for different months and different 
contract covers f. The GAMS code appearsin Appendix III. 
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Table 4.2: Optimal contract covers, pre-divestiture calibration, 2006 
 Cournot SFE  Cournot SFE 
January 39% 18% July 27% 0% 
February 36% 15% August 37% 20% 
March 46% 32% September 32% 10% 
April 48% 44% October 33% 9% 
May 40% 24% November 32% 10% 
June 46% 35% December 31% 5% 
2006 37% 18% 
Source: Own calculation 
 
4.4.3 Scenarios and Results 
4.4.3.1 Divestiture Scenarios 
Given the pre-divesture results of 2006 two divestiture cases are modeled to obtain theoretical 
reference values for the year given the changed market structure. The first divestiture case (6 Firm 
Case) resembles breaking the dominant duopoly of EON and RWE into four separate companies 
which each own one half of the pre-divested company respectively. This divestiture could either be 
realized by forcing EON and RWE to split their assets into separate companies (similar to 
unbundling), or to sell the separated companies to investors (i.e. foreign companies or financial 
investors). The resulting market structure would be a six-firm oligopoly in which each firm owns 
about 10 GW of generation capacity and thus no one has more than 15% market share.  
For the second divestiture case (4 Firm Case) the duopoly of EON and RWE is also broken by forcing 
them to divest half of their capacities. However, the divested assets are sold to several companies and 
interested parties such that no buyer can obtain significant market share. Thus, the divested plants 
become part of the competitive fringe and are no longer strategic companies. The resulting market 
structure would be a four-firm oligopoly as in the pre-divestiture case but the concentration ratio 
would decrease from about 80% to about 50% with no firm having a capacity share above 15%.  
The 6 Firm Case does not require a change in the modeling methodology since only the underlying 
dataset is adjusted and the number of strategic firms is increased. For the 4 Firm Case the two new 
companies resulting from the divestiture of EON and RWE need to be modeled as price takers. This is 
accomplished by introducing a binary dummy variable comp that takes the value 0 if the firm acts as a 
price taker and 1 otherwise. The equilibrium conditions are reformulated accordingly. In the case of a 
competitive firm the conditions guarantee that marginal costs are equal to the market clearing price: 
  ikkiik cp
fq
comp 



   Adjusted Cournot equilibrium condition (4.11) 
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  Adjusted SFE equilibrium condition (4.12) 
The supply curves of the divested firms are obtained by splitting the plant portfolio of EON and RWE 
into two identical subsets which are then transformed into cubic cost functions following the 
methodology described in Section 4.4.2. This symmetric divestiture guarantees that the resulting firm 
cost curves add up to the pre-divestiture oligopoly cost curve. 
For both cases the monthly bidding curves are estimated using the calibrated contract cover to obtain 
monthly prices, welfare, and profit estimates. 
4.4.3.2 Price and Welfare Results 
Since the divestitures will increase the number of firms and reduce the market share of the strategic 
companies prices will decrease and welfare will increase. Thus the interesting question is the extent of 
the changes. With four oligopolists the German electricity market has a relatively “low” market 
concentration given the European context. A further concentration reduction may only result in few 
price effects, particularly if the divested assets end up with other strategic firms. The simulated results 
do not confirm this hypothesis. For both models the divestiture of EON and RWE significantly 
reduces the bidden supply curves (Figure 4.4). In particular the highest bidding range is lower while 
the changes are less pronounced for lower demand levels. In the 4 Firm Case the divestiture even 
brings the bid curve close to the market’s marginal costs curve. 
Overall the average peak prices can be reduced by 8 to 10 €/MWh in the 6 Firm Case and by more 
than 16 €/MWh in the 4 Firm Case (Table 4.3). This price reduction provides consumers with a 
significant larger surplus ranging from and additional 3 bn € per year in the 6 Firm Case and more 
than 5 bn € per year in the 4 Firm Case. On the other hand producer rent significantly decreases by 
more than 1 and 2 bn € respectively (Table 4.3). Thus the overall welfare balance of the divestiture 
cases is positive.70 
 
Table 4.3: Price and welfare results for peak hours compared to pre-divestiture, 2006, excluding 
fringe 
Pre-Divestiture 6 Firm Case 4 Firm Case  
Cournot SFE Cournot SFE Cournot SFE 
Average peak price 
[€/MWh] 63.6 62.9 -8.3 -9.8 -16.1 -16.9 
Welfare 
[bn €/a] 44.67 44.75 +1.51 +1.80 +2.87 +2.96 
Consumer surplus 
[bn €/a] 37.79 37.98 +2.78 +3.29 +5.45 +5.55 
Producer surplus 
[bn €/a] 6.88 6.77 -1.26 -1.49 -2.57 -2.60 
Source: Own calculation 
                                                     
70 A detailed overview of the price and welfare results appears in Appendix IV. 
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Figure 4.4: Cournot and SFE supply curves, January 2006 
Cournot SFE
 
Source: Own calculation 
 
4.4.3.3 Discussion 
A comparison of the pre- and post-divestiture market results shows clear price and welfare effects of 
the proposed divestiture cases. With more than 3% welfare increase the impact of a changed market 
structure is not negligible. As the initial set of divested power plants is equal in both divestiture cases 
the differences are solely contributed to the ownership assumptions taken. Thus an enforcement of 
strict buying rules that prevent large players from increasing market shares via the divested assets 
significantly increases the benefits reaped from the divestiture. 
Examining firms’ profits shows that in the pre-divestiture situation the oligopolists earn about  
70-90% more than under pure competitive conditions (see Appendix IV). This excess revenue can be 
greatly reduced via the divestitures. In the 6 Firm Case revenues drop by 15-30% and thus reduce the 
markup on competitive levels. The two non-divested firms face slightly higher reductions than the two 
large incumbents, showing that the two smaller oligopolists profit from the strategic behavior of the 
two large dominant incumbents in the pre-divestiture market. They are able to benefit from the higher 
price level without withholding too much capacity. In the 4 Firm Case the profit of the divested assets 
from EON and RWE that are sold to fringe companies are slightly lower than the remaining assets that 
are modeled as strategic companies. This is in line with the expectations. However, the overall price 
level is close to the competitive benchmark and thus the effect is rather small. The profit markups are 
between 10-15% for all four remaining oligopolists and 7-10% for the divested fringe assets. 
Comparing the two applied models shows that they both produce similar results and thus do not 
provide a large range of possible outcomes. The SFE approach has a slightly higher price reducing and 
welfare enhancing effect due to the steeper slope of the bidding curve close to the capacity/demand 
limit of the market. Thus, although the obtainable peak-price level is higher in the SFE model the 
average price is lower. 
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The obtained results are subject to assumptions that may bias the conclusions drawn. First, the contract 
coverage obtained during the calibration may not be the one applied in the post-divestiture market. A 
reduced market share may motivate firms to sign fewer contracts to increase gaming in the spot 
market. The higher competitive pressure may also motivate firms to sign more contracts to secure their 
revenues. Second, the continues cost function assumption neglects capacity constraints that may lead 
to higher prices. This is also true for imports because the constant import elasticity may overestimate 
competition from abroad. Finally, the characteristics of real world electricity markets can lead to 
situations that a model cannot capture, e.g., strategic behavior by small firms at peak times with scarce 
capacity reserves. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed competition policy and divestiture in electricity markets. Following an 
overview of competition policy divestiture was considered as a possible remedy to overcome market 
power problems. Based on the case of Germany it was shown that a reduced market concentration can 
provide significant welfare benefits. Applying Cournot and SFE models two divestiture cases were 
analyzed that both led to a large peak-price reduction and welfare gains. The results show that in the 
case of Germany divested assets should be sold to independent and small firms to prevent the 
emergence of further strategic players. An increase of consumer surplus of more than 5 bn € per year, 
and a peak price reduction of more than 16 €/MWh could be achieved in this setting. 
Even though the chapter emphasizes that divesture can increase the competitiveness of oligopolistic 
electricity markets the question remains whether it is the most suitable instrument. Divestiture is 
generally considered a “hard” instrument of competition policy and thus significant opposition may 
arise from concerned companies that delay implementation. An acceptable alternative may be 
provided by virtual divestures with a limited duration. Whether other measurements such as the 
increase in cross-border transmission capacity and the further integration of congestion management 
schemes can provide a similar or higher benefit requires further research. In addition a translation of 
the result for the German case to other markets is not advisable given the large structural divergence 
among European electricity markets. 
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5 Network Investments, Regulation and Incentives 
5.1 Introduction 
Electricity generation is generally considered a competitive activity. Thus beside market power 
surveillance, no further regulatory activities are necessary; the transmission and distribution of 
electricity remains regulated even in liberalized markets. This is due to the natural monopoly character 
of these activities. Two directions are of particular concern and need to be addressed with different 
regulatory methods. The fist is the short run operation of electricity networks including network access 
for generators and consumers, congestion management, and auxiliary service markets. In recent years 
locational marginal pricing (LMP) in an ISO setting has emerged as common solution in US markets. 
In Europe a common trend has not yet emerged.  
The second direction is the long run market development with a particular focus on the problem of 
sufficient network investments to secure supply and avoid inefficient congestion. The question 
whether investments in transmission capacities can be a competitive activity or need a regulated 
planning approach is still subject to discussion. Recent years have not shown a satisfactory solution to 
this problem. In U.S. networks congestion costs have increased considerably, particularly in the 
Midwest (Dyer, 2003) and in the PJM, Southern Connecticut, and New England markets. In 2006 the 
US Department of Energy identified two critical congestion areas (Atlantic coastal area and Southern 
California) and four congestion areas of concern (New England, the Phoenix – Tucson area, the Seattle 
- Portland area, and the San Francisco Bay area). In addition transmission investment in the US has 
declined in recent years (Joskow, 2005b). The US regulator, FERC, has suggested policies based on 
the use of merchant mechanisms, but little effort has been exerted to apply performance-based 
regulatory mechanisms. Implementation of regulatory measures is further complicated by the duality 
of attributions at the federal and state levels (see Section 2.2.3).  
In Europe, due to the liberalization processes initiated in the late 1990s, existing national electricity 
networks with limited cross-border capacities now form the backbone of the emerging European-wide 
internal market. However, the grid remains segmented into several regional and national sub-
networks, with the result that little or no competition exists between countries. Diverging policy 
approaches complicate the development of a functioning market and harmonization of congestion 
management has been one central focus for the EU in recent years (EC, 2007c). Furthermore, Europe’s 
expected capacity increase in renewables (primarily offshore and onshore wind) will require 
significant transmission investment. Although several studies have proposed ambitious extension 
schedules for the existing grid (e.g. DENA, 2005), an economical-technical approach that can cope 
with the need for expansion while simultaneously accounting for welfare effects has not yet been 
designed and implemented neither in the US nor in Europe.  
In this Chapter the question how to incentivize the transmission company to invest into the network 
and reduce congestion and increase welfare addressed. I start with a literature overview on network 
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investment in electricity markets with a focus on merchant and regulatory approaches (Section 5.2). 
Afterwards the characteristics of network expansion in meshed electricity networks is presented by 
conducting a simulation of the impact of loop flows on extension costs (Section 5.3). Finally, a price-
cap mechanism is introduced which is based upon the redefinition of the output of transmission in 
terms of point-to-point transactions or financial transmission rights (FTRs), and the rebalancing of the 
variable and fixed parts of two-part tariffs (Section 5.4). I show that this mechanism is suitable for 
actual transmission expansion projects in real-world grids.  
 
5.2 Natural Monopolies and Network Extension in Electricity Markets 
Léautier and Thelen (2007) provide a review on the question of optimal network expansion in 
liberalized electricity markets. Beside the issue of transmission costs and vertical unbundling the 
applied methods can be differentiated into the market based approaches and regulatory approaches. 
For the market based approach the investor has to be incentivized to undertake investments by profit 
opportunities. This approach is also known as a “merchant mechanism” or “merchant transmission” 
investment because the participation of economic agents is voluntary and solely driven by revenue 
opportunities. The main problem is that line extensions or upgrades result in network externalities that 
affect other market participants and thus have to be taken into account. For the regulatory approach 
investments are considered to be planned centrally by a welfare maximizing regulator or a regulatory 
approach incentivizing the transmission company (Transco) to extend the network accordingly. 
Beside the question how to handle network investments the interaction between generation and 
transmission extensions is a further concern. Pérez-Arriaga and Olmos (2006) look at the compatibility 
of investment signals in transmission and generation, Rious et al. (2008) analyze whether a two-part 
tariff is able to incorporate short- and long-run issues in order to manage electricity networks 
efficiently, and Sauma and Oren (2006) compare a three-period proactive network planning (PNP) 
model to a combined generation-transmission operation and investment planning as well as to a 
transmission only planning, they conclude that PNP can correct some of the shortcomings of the 
transmission only approach.  
5.2.1 Merchant Transmission Investment 
Joskow and Tirole (2005) conduct an in depth analysis of merchant investment under different market 
imperfections. They differentiate two types of network extension: deepening investments and 
expansion investments. The former are considered to be only possible by the incumbents due to 
incentive problems with decentralized ownership and information asymmetries. Thus only 
independent network extension (construction of separate new lines) can be subject to merchant 
approaches. Given a congested two node network the marginal increase of capacity will provide the 
investor with a dividend equal to the shadow price of the transmission constraint if he is rewarded by a 
financial transmission right (Figure 5.1). Extension will take place until the costs for new capacity 
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equals the shadow price of congestion. In contracts an incumbent will weight the investment costs 
with the reduction of congestion rent from its inframarginal units (see Joskow and Tirole, 2005, p. 
241ff). Hogan (1992) and Bushnell and Stoft (1996) show that under simplifying assumptions all 
profitable transmission investments are also efficient. Joskow and Tirole (2005) state that this 
optimality of market mechanisms is based on strong assumptions which if relaxed can contradict the 
outcome. They show that market power, lumpy investments, FTR allocation, and the actual definition 
of transmission capacity all impact the outcome and conclude that the merchant model ignores 
important restrictions of electricity markets which a regulatory approach can cope with and thus a sole 
reliance on merchant investment seems unlikely. 
Brunekreeft and Newbery (2006) analyze the regulatory issues connected to merchant investments in 
the European legal framework. Although the EU regulation on cross-border exchange (No. 1228/2003) 
allows merchant investment to be exempt from regulated third party access it still requires a must-
offer provision of capacity for the owner of the new connection and a use-it-or-lose-it provision for the 
holders of capacity rights. They conclude that the regulatory instrument of must-offer provision has 
positive short-term welfare effects but may lead to underinvestment in network assets. Hence, the 
authors do not recommend applying must-offer provisions. Baldick (2007) proposes a property rights 
model based on so called border flow rights to support financial hedging of merchant investment. The 
rights resolve the property-rights issues for existing and new transmission capacity arising from new 
investments. Further studies (e.g. Salazar et al., 2007; Saphores et al., 2004) address the issue of 
decisions under uncertainty in a merchant investment setting. 
 
Figure 5.1: Congestion and merchant investment 
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5.2.2 Regulatory Transmission Investment 
The objective of the regulatory approach is to maximize the social welfare within the electricity 
system. The regulatory approach involves a commercial transmission company (Transco) that is 
 91
regulated through price or revenue regulation to provide long-term investment incentives while 
avoiding congestion. Léautier and Thelen (2007) distinguish two families of regulatory contracts: 
ince its implementation in 
Furthermore, a 
                                                     
Bayesian and Non-Bayesian contracts.  
Bayesian regulatory approaches aim to reduce the transmission costs and simultaneously obtain 
optimal expansion quantities while the regulator knows a correct distribution of the monopolists cost 
function. Laffont and Tirole (1993) show that the regulatory task in this setting can be split up into two 
separate ones dealing with the above mentioned aims, respectively. Léautier (2000) analyzes a 
Bayesian approach under the congestion management scheme in England and Wales. He shows that 
the “uplift” measure does in fact measure the social cost of congestion and thus a network company 
exposed to pay the uplift will extend the grid in a socially optimal way.71 S
1996 congestion in the British transmission grid has reduced considerably.  
Non-Bayesian contracts assume that the regulator does not know the cost function details of the 
regulated firm (Vogelsang, 2005). Therefore, most approaches rely on a price cap formulation that 
either produces the optimal outcome by applying optimal weights or shows a gradually convergence 
towards the social optimum by applying Laspeyres weights (Léautier and Thelen, 2007). Nasser 
(1997) designs a transfer mechanism providing the firm with the current congestion rent reduced by a 
rent constructed from current price levels and previous periods capacities. Another Non-Bayesian 
regulatory variation is the two-part tariff cap proposed by Vogelsang (2001). The first tariff part 
consists of the congestion rent in the system and the second part is a fixed component. By rebalancing 
the fixed and variable portions of the tariff the Transco can be incentivized to invest as reduced 
congestion revenues can be offset by increased fixed revenues. Vogelsang shows that under well-
behaved cost and demand functions, and appropriate weights (such as Laspeyres weights) the 
mechanisms grants convergence to equilibrium conditions. However, Vogelsang’s assumed cost and 
demand properties may actually not hold in a real network context with loop-flows. 
conventional linear definition of the transmission output is in fact difficult to maintain. 
An extension of the Vogeslang (2001) mechanism is proposed by Hogan et al. (2007) who apply the 
approach in an environment of price-taking generators and loads taking into account meshed networks. 
Transmission output is redefined in terms of incremental long term FTRs in order to apply the 
incentive mechanism to a meshed network. The Transco maximizes profits intertemporally subject to a 
price cap constraint on its two-part tariff, and the choice variables are the fixed and the variable fees. 
The fixed part of the tariff can be considered as a complementary charge. The variable part of the tariff 
is the price of the FTR output, and is then based on nodal prices. Fixed costs are allocated so that the 
variable charges are able to reflect nodal prices. Thus, variations in fixed charges over time partially 
counteract the variability of nodal prices, giving some price insurance to the market participants. 
However, they do not consider an alteration of the loop flow characteristics by the network extensions 
71 The uplift is defined as the sum of the difference between generation costs and the unconstrained market price for all units 
that are re-dispatched due to network restrictions (see Léautier, 2000). 
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which is only valid for small scale extensions. In this Chapter the approach by Vogeslang (2001) and 
Hogan et al. (2007) is extended to include a full representation of extensions in meshed electricity 
etworks. 
 
ity. However, when the network 
ey also translate in a similar global cost behavior. This section draws on Rosellón 
and Weigt (2008). 
 depends on the grid conditions 
 conclude that 
significant differences only occur on lines with high reactive and low real power flows. 
n
5.3 Meshed Networks and Non-Well-Behaved Cost Functions 
Electricity markets differ from most other commodity markets as electricity can not be stored and thus 
generation and demand always have to equal one another. Furthermore, as all nodes in a system are 
connected via a network following physical laws, a local change in demand or generation impacts the 
whole system. This interconnection yields problems when assessing the cost of additional transmission 
capacity. As shown in Section 5.2.1 an additional unit of capacity in a two node setting reduces the 
price difference and increases the traded quantity between both nodes. The additional benefit from 
new capacity steadily decreases with each marginal increase of capac
is extended beyond two nodes this general conclusion may not hold.  
In this Section network extension costs are estimated using two simplified network topologies 
including loop flows. The global extension costs function is derived by obtaining the least costs 
network extension for a given transmission demand. Three different assumptions on the behavior of 
extension costs on a single line are tested (constant, increasing, or decreasing returns to scale) to 
examine whether th
5.3.1 Model 
To analyze the cost behavior of extending meshed networks the output of electricity transmission is 
defined as point-to-point transactions. In directed networks like natural gas, oil, or logistic problem 
sets, an additional unit of output normally can be associated with a well defined cost parameter or 
function. By contrast in electricity networks additional output heavily
and can not be considered separately from the general output setting. 
To derive a cost function for electricity transmission the properties of power flows in meshed 
networks have to be examined. Therefore the DCLF as proposed by Schweppe et al. (1988) is used. 
The DCLF focuses on real power flows and neglects reactive power flows within a network. Although 
a simplification, the approach still yields reasonable results with respect to locational price signals and 
grid utilization. Overbye et al. (2004) compare the DCLF with a full AC model and
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The complete approximation of the DCLF from the physical fundamentals of transmission lines is 
presented e.g. in Stigler and Todem (2005). The principal of a DCLF is that flows pf on a line depend 
on the voltage angle difference Θ ij and the line series susceptance Bij between the two nodes i and j:
72 
     power flow between i and j   (5.1) ijijij Bpf 
The power flow on one line furthermore has an impact on the energy balance of its connected nodes. 
For each node i in a system the net injection qi has to equal the sum of power flows on connected 
lines: 
      energy balance at i    (5.2) 
j
iji pfq
If more energy is to be delivered to or from node i all power flows on lines connected to that node are 
affected and in turn all nodes connected to those lines are affected as well, continuing throughout the 
network. Therefore, the resulting power flow pattern in an electricity network is always depending on 
all system conditions. 
To asses the costs related to electricity transmission, transactions qij between two nodes i and j are 
defined as the relevant output.73 These point to point transactions or financial transmission rights 
(FTRs) are determined as a specific load value e.g. in ‘MW’ that has to be transmitted between two 
nodes. There is no fixed line utilization associated to a FTR. Market participants can bid for specific 
FTRs and the system operator allocates those accordingly, maximizing the revenue from the FTRs 
given the available transmission capacity of the network. FTRs are assumed to be obligations thus the 
associated energy transfer can be taken for granted. 
The transmission costs function c(.) of network extension is defined as the least costs combination of 
line capacities k necessary to satisfy Qij (the matrix consisting of a specific set of FTR combinations 
qij): 
     transmission cost function   (5.3) )(min)(
,
ij
ji
ij
k
ij kfQc
i

Each line capacity kij is associated to a specific cost value via an extension function f(.). 
The minimization is subject to technical restrictions representing the power flow characteristics of 
electricity networks: 
                                                     
72 The reactance X represents the opposition of a line towards alternating current, based on the inductance and/or capacitance 
of the line. Together with the resistance R, they define the impedance of a line and thus determine the amount of power 
flowing over this line given the net injections. The line series susceptance Bij is then derived via: 22
ijij
ij
ij RX
X
B

  
Generally, the resistance is assumed to be significantly smaller than the reactance  (X >> R), and thus we do not consider it 
further in this analysis simplifying the susceptance to: 
ij
ij X
B
1
  
The voltage angle difference Θ ij is a relative measure. By fixing one voltage angle at one node (the slack bus) to 0 a reference 
is obtained against which all angles of all other nodes are computed. 
73 qi and qij are connected via:  
j
iji
j
ji
j
ij pfqqq  
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  ijkpf ijij     line capacity constraint    (5.4) 
  ipfqq
j
ij
j
ji
j
ij    energy balance constraint   (5.5) 
First, power flows pfij on the lines have to remain within the capacity limits kij defined by the system 
operator by designing the grid (equation 5.4). And second, at each node i the sum of outgoing FTRs 
(qij) and ingoing FTRs (qji) has to equal the sum of power flows on connected lines pfij (equation 5.5).  
In other words the model defines for a given set of injections and withdrawals (Qij) the cost minimal 
line capacities kij (a green field approach) which in turn define the line characteristics Bij and thus the 
power flows pfij in the whole system. The models is incorporate into GAMS as a non-linear 
minimization problem, with the overall grid extension costs as an objective function and looped over a 
specific set of FTRs.  
5.3.2 Data 
The model is tested using a numeric dataset representing idealized market characteristics. The initial 
grid topology comprises a three-node network with two generation nodes and one demand node 
representing the simplest loop flowed network structure, and an extended six node network again with 
two generation and one demand node (Figure 5.2). FTRs are defined from the generation to the 
demand node respectively and are varied between 1 MW and 10 MW, respectively, to estimate the 
resulting global cost function.  
With respect to the network extension behavior two cases are analyzed: 
 First, only the capacity of a line can be changed whereas the lines reactance remains 
unchanged. Thus, an extension only impacts the transmission capacity of the system but does 
not alter the power flow pattern. This approach is a theoretical one, as in reality pure capacity 
increases are only possible for small scale extensions. The purpose of this method is to asses 
the impact of loop flows on transmission costs without the interfering influence of power flow 
changes.  
 Second, line extensions are combined with a change of the lines reactance and thus added 
capacity changes the power flow pattern of the whole system. This approach resembles the 
real world problem that a new or upgraded line impacts the whole electricity system and leads 
to externalities for other market participants.  
Three different forms of line extension costs fij(kij) are tested corresponding to constant, decreasing 
and increasing returns to scale:74 
 Linear function:   ijijij kbf   
 Logarithmic function:   ijijijij kbaf  ln  
                                                     
74 Although increasing returns to scale are rather unlikely in electricity networks (see e.g. Richert and Brakelmann, 2004; and 
DENA, 2005) they are included for the sake of completeness. 
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 Quadratic function:   2ijijij kbf 
The values of a and b are varied for different cases. All three extension functions represent a 
continuous approach which is an approximation of the lumpy investment pattern of electricity 
networks. For all scenarios the topology of the network is fixed thus neither new connections can be 
built nor can exiting connections be abolished. 
When only the line capacities are extended the presented extension cost functions are sufficient to 
derive numerical solution. In case of a connection between extensions and line reactances the law of 
parallel circuits75 is applied to derive a functional connection between capacity extensions and line 
characteristics Bij(kij). Thus, doubling of capacity results in a bisection of a line reactance. Whereas 
the first approach does not need specific start values for line capacities the latter approach needs initial 
network characteristics to obtain result. The scenarios are tested using a series of numerical analyses 
varying the underlying parameter. An overview about the basic dataset is provided in Table 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.2: Network topologies 
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75 In a parallel circuit the total resistance of the system is defined by 
i i
total R
R
1
1 .  
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Table 5.1: Scenario overview for cost function calculation 
 Fixed line reactances Variable line reactances 
Three-node network 
FTR range [MW] 
FTR 1 to 3: 1 to 5 
FTR 2 to 3: 1 to 10 
Line extension functional 
parameters 
Base values: aij = bij = 1 Base values: aij = bij = 1 
Starting capacity values [MW] kij = 0 Base values: kij = 2 
Six node network 
FTR range [MW] FTR 1 to 6: 1 to 5 
FTR 5 to 6: 1 to 10 
Line extension functional 
parameters 
Base values: aij = bij = 1 Base values: aij = bij = 1 
Starting capacity values [MW] kij = 0 Base values: kij = 2 
Source: Own calculation 
 
5.3.3 Scenarios and Results 
5.3.3.1 Fixed Line Reactances 
The first part of the cost function analysis only considers the capacity extension while the grid’s 
topology is fixed in terms of line reactances and available connections. Varying the FTRs has an 
exogenously determined impact on the power flow pattern. Hence, the model only calculates the 
minimum capacity amount needed to exactly fulfill this pattern.  
In the three node system line 1 (between nodes 1 and 2) is subject to power flows in opposite 
directions depending on the value of the two FTRs. Given a fixed level of one FTR, an increase in the 
second FTR will first lead to a decrease in the flow on line 1 towards zero until both FTRs have the 
same value. Afterwards, the flow will again increase, although in the opposite direction. The resulting 
capacity cost for increasing the FTR value will show a “kink” at the level of the fixed FTR. The left 
hand side of Figure 5.2 shows this for all three analyzed cases: At a level of 2.5 MW the flows on line 
1 will cancel out and the slope of the cost functions will not be continuous at that point. The effect is 
less pronounced in the quadratic case as the slope of the line extension function around zero is almost 
horizontal with gradual changes contrary to the linear or logarithmic case. Furthermore, the resulting 
global cost function for increasing two FTRs simultaneously shows that the costs when moving from 
one FTR combination to another can even slightly decrease and the kink of line 1 moves gradually 
with the increasing FTRs, which is best visualized in the logarithmic (Figure 5.3, right side).76 This 
result is specific to the decreasing-returns extension function, since the cost always increases with 
increasing FTR values for both the linear and quadratic functions. When the line extension costs 
parameters a and b are altered such that the loop flowed line 1 is more expensive to update than the 
other lines, the effect becomes more distinct.  
                                                     
76 Linear and quadratic cases are presented in Appendix V. 
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Extending the model to the six nodes setting subjects five lines to counter-flows according to the FTR 
combinations. Since lines 2, 5 and 6 are symmetric, their counter-flows will “kink” at the same level. 
The resulting cost function can have up to three kinks. For the 2.5 MW case we only observe two 
kinks (Figure 5.4, left side), one at 1.25 MW (canceling out the flows on line 7) and the second at 5 
MW (canceling out the flows on lines 2, 5, and 6). The last kink occurs at a FTR value of 20 MW, 
which is outside the observation range. The resulting global cost function shows all three kinks, which 
again are best visualized in the logarithmic case (Figure 5.4, right side).Comparing the six- and the 
three-node networks, the quadratic extension function still results in an always-increasing feasibility 
range while the logarithmic function can have decreasing global cost ranges according to the FTR 
combination. Even the linear extension function can have decreasing elements in the global costs 
function if the loop flowed lines are more expensive to extend than the other lines.  
In other words, by extending a specific FTR, the simultaneous increase of further FTRs can reduce the 
overall costs in meshed networks. However, this will not always be achieved because the necessary 
counter-flow generating FTRs may not be needed and the positive effect of the additional net 
injections will not be obtained. The results for the simple networks show that even under the 
restriction that line reactances remain unchanged the costs for a marginal unit of transmission capacity 
are subject to the overall grid conditions making general revenue conclusions infeasible.  
 
Figure 5.3: Global cost function, three-node network, base case 
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Figure 5.4: Global cost function, six-node network, base case 
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Source: Own calculation, based on Rosellón and Weigt (2008) 
 
5.3.3.2 Variable Line Reactances 
In reality, there are limitations to extending a line capacity without altering its technical 
characteristics. Normally, a capacity extension is linked to a change in the reactance of the line.77 
Therefore, for the second scenario, capacity extensions are coupled to line reactances via the law of 
parallel circuits. As starting values of the lines’ capacities are necessary, a direct comparison to the 
first scenario that uses fixed-line reactances is not possible.  
Using the three-node case and a starting capacity of 2 MW on each line, the resulting cost functions do 
not necessarily have a kink when one FTR is fixed. In addition, all lines start with zero extension costs 
since the first portion of the FTR increase can be accomplished with the existing grid. In the 2.5 MW 
case (Figure 5.5, left side) no kinks can be observed because line 1 is not extended for the three-node 
case. Increasing the capacity of line 3 will lead to a larger power-flow on that line relative to the path 
over node 1 utilizing line 1 and 2. This allows the full utilization of the starting capacity values of 
those lines (2 MW). Therefore, the cost function only resembles the extension cost of increasing 
capacity on line 3 which consequently is a continuous function. 
The resulting cost function can still have kinks but these do not necessarily relate to a specific loop-
flowed line. Discontinuities can now also be caused by changing grid conditions as the same FTR 
combination can be obtained by several different extension measures e.g. increasing two line 
capacities by modest amounts or increasing only one line significantly. This impact is particularly 
important for the logarithmic case. 
                                                     
77 The reactance represents the opposition of a line towards alternating current, based on the inductance and/or capacitance of 
the line. Together with the resistance they define the impedance of a line and thus determine the amount of power flow over 
this line given the net injections. Generally the resistance is assumed to be significantly smaller than the reactance and thus is 
not further regarded in this analysis.  
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The global cost function for extending both FTRs no longer shows a clear correlation with the number 
of loop-flowed lines as in the first scenario. Moreover, all line extension functions show decreasing 
elements for certain FTR combinations like the logarithmic function (Figure 5.5, right side).78 
However, this range has no resemblance to the kink observed in the fixed reactance case which was 
solely attributable to the unavoidable counter-flow on line 1. In this case the decreasing cost range is 
attributed to the absence of a counter-flow in the very first case (FTR from 1 to 3 is “0”). The power-
flow within the system therefore is only defined by the FTR from 2 to 3 and consequently the flow on 
line 1 is higher than in all other cases, making an extension of this line necessary (or a much larger 
extension of line 3). Increasing the FTR from 1 to 3 produces a counter-flow on line 1 and allows 
better utilization of the existing capacity. This effect makes the overall extension less costly (negative 
marginal costs). As the simulation needs starting values for line capacities, an alternative approach 
with reduced capacities has been calculated. However, when decreasing the starting capacity from 
2 MW to 1 MW the resulting cost functions show a similar behavior. The functions slightly shift to the 
left and the outcomes of higher FTR levels vary accordingly. 
Increasing the parameters of the cost function of the loop-flowed line does not alter the results. Thus, 
in the optimal solution of the three-node network an extension of line 1 is avoided entirely. But when 
the cost parameter of another line is altered, the outcome changes, although the general functional 
form remains similar. The logarithmic extension function yields different results as the trade-off 
between extensions of one or two lines becomes more evident (i.e. large extensions are relatively less 
expensive).  
Next, the model is extended to six nodes and nine lines to estimate the impact of more loop-flowed 
lines on the cost functions. Similar to the 3-node setting by extending the most-utilized lines the 
power-flow share on these lines increases, which avoids further extension of other lines. However, 
contrary to the 3-node case more than one line needs to be extended along the FTR range. Thus, kinks 
can occur when the extension includes more lines or when it switches the extended line. For the 
logarithmic case also more capacity is added on a line than is actually utilized, due to the decreasing 
marginal extension cost. Since the marginal extension cost in the logarithmic case is the highest for 
initial extension and decreases with capacity, it is less costly to extend a line that may not be fully 
utilized if other initial capacity extension can be avoided. This is the case in the first kink at 3.55 MW 
(Figure 5.6, left side). This situation may also switch back – making another line the less costly 
alternative to be extended – if the costs for excess capacity are no longer counteracted by a beneficial 
power-flow distribution. This is the case for the second kink at 5.2 MW where the former extended 
line 8 is no longer extended, and the full additional capacity shifts to line 9, which alters the power-
flow pattern. 
As in the three-node simulations, the obtained global cost functions do not reveal an obvious 
correlation to the number of loop-flowed lines. The results for linear and quadratic extension functions 
                                                     
78 Linear and quadratic cases are presented in Appendix V. 
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show generally increasing cost function with a relatively smooth outline; however the logarithmic 
extension function results in a global cost function with significant slope changes (Figure 5.6, right 
side). Furthermore, a consistent solution in the logarithmic case could not be obtained in all model 
runs, resulting in cost spikes which occurred in three scenario runs. Reducing the starting capacity of 
the lines to 1 MW does not significantly change the results of the linear and quadratic extension 
functions. The global cost function in the logarithmic case also resembles the same form but the slope 
changes are less pronounced. Likewise, a shifting of the line parameters for loop-flowed and non loop-
flowed lines does not alter the general results although the absolute values differ. 
 
Figure 5.5: Global cost function, three-node network, base case, variable line reactances 
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Figure 5.6: Global cost function, six-node network, base case, variable line reactances 
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5.3.3.3 Discussion 
Comparing the results with the fixed network case shows that the introduction of variable line 
reactances significantly changes the possible outcomes. In particular, for linear or quadratic extension 
functions, the introduction of a link between capacity and reactance appears to reduce the impact of 
loop-flows in terms of significant kinks. 
The results of the cost function analyses reveal the difficulties that electricity networks present when 
applying standard approaches. Even for a simple extension, loop-flows within the system can lead to 
mathematically problematic global cost function behaviors and thus make an estimation of the revenue 
possibilities for merchant or regulated network investors infeasible in a general setting. The link 
between capacity extension and line reactances (and thus the flow patterns) produces complex results 
that are highly sensitive to the underlying grid structure. None of the three tested extension functions 
can fully reproduce realistic extension structures since these are subject to lumpiness and external 
influences (e.g. geographical conditions) that can cause dysfunctional behaviors with sudden slope 
changes. The assumption of linear extension costs is acceptable when considering line length; however 
with respect to capacity increase, a lumpy function with constant costs for corresponding voltage 
levels and circuit number is required.  
For modeling purposes, the logarithmic behavior produces a high degree of nonlinearities with non-
smooth behavior, and demands more intense calculations and solver capabilities. Quadratic functions 
show a generally continuous behavior that makes them suitable for modeling purposes but are the 
most unrealistic assumption. Linear extension functions fall between the logarithmic and quadratic 
cases. However, the piecewise, linear nature of the resulting global costs function makes the derivation 
of global optima feasible. In combination with the advantages of retaining linear functions, this is 
preferred for modeling purposes. It is also compatible with the realistic extension costs neglecting 
lumpiness. Nevertheless, an analysis of investment incentives in electricity transmission has to rely on 
numerical analysis trying to capture the physical nature of the network. Otherwise the conclusions 
may be infeasible for specific systems and cases.  
 
5.4 An Incentivized Two Part Tariff Applied to Transmission Companies 
As general theoretical approaches can not be derived without taking the underlying network into 
account following a numerical model approach is presented that implements an investment incentive 
mechanism for Transcos. Building on Vogelsang (2001) and Hogan et al. (2007) the incentive 
regulatory logic is implemented via a profit maximizing Transco subject to a regulatory price cap. The 
Transco’s profit consist of a variable component representing the congestion rent in the system and a 
fixed component to recover investment costs. Both components are subject to a price cap. By 
rebalancing the two parts the Transco has the possibility to recover extension costs when decreasing 
the congestion rent due to newly built transmission capacity. 
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The problem is implemented as a MPEC. It is decomposed into upper-level and lower-level programs 
that are solved simultaneously. The upper-level problem is the Transco´s profit maximization subject 
to a price-cap regulatory constraint; the lower-level problem consists of an ISO that finds optimal 
loads and nodal prices through a power-flow welfare-maximizing model within a network-constrained 
wholesale electricity market. The approach presented in Hogan et al. (2007) is designed to solve the 
cost minimizing network capacity approach and derive an extension cost function that depends on the 
price for transmission. The Transco thus chooses the FTR price (variable part), and the fixed part of its 
two-part tariff. As shown in Section 5.3 the global costs function of network extension shows a high 
degree of non-convexities that may lead to problems when deriving numerical results. Therefore, the 
choice variables in this mechanism are the line capacities and the fixed fee which avoids the derivation 
of the global cost function. This approach is theoretically equivalent, since the network capacity is a 
function of the FTR prices.  
The incentive mechanism is applied to simple transmission structures based on a three-node network 
to determine the impact of loop flows on transmission investment decisions. Through the use of 
chained-Laspeyres weights the regulatory mechanism inter-temporally promotes an investment pattern 
that relieves congestion, increases consumer surplus, augments the Transco´s profits, and induces 
convergence of nodal prices to marginal costs. A series of robustness tests is conducted to assess the 
impact of varying assumptions on the results. Afterwards the incentive mechanism is applied to a more 
realistic representation of an existing network to test whether the theoretical conclusions obtained are 
appropriate using a simplified grid with 15 nodes and 28 lines in North West Europe that connects 
Germany, the Benelux countries, and France.  
5.4.1 Model Formulation 
For the model the output of a Transco is defined in terms of FTRs which makes it applicable in most 
LMP based markets in the US. Accordingly, the mechanism has the following sequence of actions: 
1. Given an existing grid with historic market price information the regulator sets up the two-part 
pricing constraint. 
2. Based on the available market information (demand, generation, network topology, etc.) the 
Transco identifies the lines to expand. 
3. The Transco auctions the available transmission capacity as point-to-point FTRs to market 
participants. 
4. The ISO manages actual dispatch. According to locational marginal prices it collects the 
payoffs from loads and pays the generators. The difference of both values represents the 
congestion rent of the system that is redistributed to the FTR holders. 
5. The Transco sets the fixed fee according to the regulatory price cap. 
The upper-level problem of the MPEC consists of the profit maximization of the Transco subject to 
the regulatory constraint. The objective function of the Transco is its profit and its choice variables the 
lines capacities k and the fixed fee F: 
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The first term of this function represents the collected congestion rent defined as point-to-point FTRs 
qij between two nodes i and j multiplied by the FTR auction price τij.
79 The second term represents the 
transmission revenue from the fixed fee F collected by the Transco from N consumers. The Transco is 
free to choose the fixed fee as long as the regulatory price constraint (see equation 5.7 below) is met. 
The second term represents the costs the Transco bears when extending the capacity kij between two 
nodes according to the extension cost function c(.). A total time framework of T periods is considered 
and perfect information is assumed neglecting uncertainty about demand and generation. If a positive 
interest rate r > 0 were to be considered, each monetary part of the profit function would be multiplied 
by . tr  )1(
The FTR prices and the demand for FTRs are a function of the available capacity of the network. 
Thus, the Transco’s choice variables are the line capacities kij and the fixed fee F. Hogan et al. (2007) 
assume that the network capacity and the FTR demand are functions of the FTR price τ, and thus their 
choice variables are the two parts of the Transco’s tariff.80  
In each period, the Transco is subject to a regulatory price cap: 
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The prices and quantities of each period are linked with a weight mechanism w (e.g., Paasche or 
Laspeyres weights), and subject to a cap defined by the regulator and considering inflation RPI and 
efficiency factors X. A grid expansion would generally be aimed at reducing the congestion rent of the 
system, and would then decrease the Transco’s profit from the FTR auction. Given the regulatory 
mechanism, the Transco can counter the decrease of auction revenues by increasing its fixed fee. By 
this mechanism, the Transco is incentivized to expand the grid even if the collected congestion rent 
decreases. As long as the rebalancing of the variable and the fixed fee compensates possible revenue 
losses from reduced congestion the Transco will extend the grid, up to a point where the per-unit 
marginal cost of new transportation capacity equals the expected congestion cost of not adding an 
additional unit of capacity (Crew et al., 1995, and Vogelsang, 2001). 
If the demand and optimized cost functions are differentiable, and ignoring the inflation and efficiency 
factors, the first-order optimality conditions of maximizing (5.6) subject to (5.7) are the following: 
                                                     
79 Following Vogelsang (2001) who employs total transmission output, the total available FTRs in each period t is auctioned. 
Hogan et al. (2007) use incremental FTRs following the practice in actual markets that hold FTR auctions (such as PJM). 
Hence, their output Δqij refers to the additional or incremental FTRs between i and j sold between periods t and t-1. 
80 In such a model, the minimum cost for each possible FTR price (and consequently for each possible FTR quantity) is 
obtained in a lower-level power-flow problem and, as a consequence the optimal grid size k is derived. This minimum cost 
function is later plugged into an upper-level problem where the Transco maximizes its profits subject to a regulatory 
constraint similar to the constraint in Vogelsang (2001), see section 5.3. 
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t          first-order conditions  (5.8) 
Vogelsang (2001) and Hogan et al. (2007) analyze this key relationship to explore the incentive 
properties of the regulatory price cap constraint. Hogan et al. (2007) point out the limited information 
that can be derived. Due to the looped-flow nature of power flows in meshed networks, FTR-based 
demand and cost functions are only piecewise differentiable, and in general not separable. However, 
the local properties may in many circumstances be those of well-behaved functions.  
One problem in deriving an MPEC mathematical formulation for the mechanism is the uncertainty 
about the FTR auction outcome. Thus, the FTR auction income is redefined as the congestion rent 
collected by the ISO given the market-clearing prices. If the considered set of FTRs is simultaneously 
feasible and the system constraints are convex, the FTRs satisfy the revenue adequacy condition.81 
That is, equilibrium payments collected by the ISO through economic dispatch will be greater than or 
equal to payments required under the FTR obligations. Given the assumption of perfect information, 
this approach allows to abstract from the explicit modeling of an auction mechanism. Therefore the 
distribution of FTRs to specific market participants is not an output of the model. The profit objective 
function of the Transco is then rewritten as: 
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The first part of the Transco’s profit rewrites the outcomes of the lower-level problem i.e. payoffs 
from loads d and payments to generators g. The prices pi are the resulting market-clearing prices at 
each node i. FTR prices and locational prices are related via τij = pj - pi. In choosing the line capacities 
kij the Transco will determine resulting market prices and quantities and thus the collected congestion 
rent. The price cap is rewritten accordingly, replacing the FTR auction revenue with the collected 
congestion rent: 
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adjusted regulatory cap (5.10) 
The lower level problem defines the wholesale market outcome taking into account power flows, line 
restrictions, and generation capacity limits: 
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  generation constraint at node i   (5.12) i,tgg
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81 This has been shown for lossless networks by Hogan (1992), analyzed for quadratic losses by Bushnell and Stoft (1996), 
and generalized to smooth nonlinear constraints by Hogan (2000) and Hogan (2002a,b).  
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The wholesale market is managed by an myopic ISO maximizing social welfare W for each period, 
respectively. Demand d and generation g are located at specific nodes i within a meshed network. 
Welfare is derived by obtaining the gross consumer surplus and subtracting the total generation costs. 
The demand behavior p(.) is approximated via a linear demand function specific for each node i and 
marginal generation costs mci are taken as constant. 
The welfare maximization is subject to technical constraints: First, actual generation gi cannot exceed 
the available generation capacities gi
max (equation 5.12); second, the power flow pfij on a line 
connecting i and j cannot exceed the available transmission capacity kij defined by the Transco 
(equation 5.13); third, the energy balance constraint ensures that demand at each node is satisfied by 
either local generation or net injections qi (equation 5.14).  
Again the DC-Load-Flow approach is used to derive power flows following Schweppe et al. (1988) 
and Stigler and Todem (2005). When the capacity kij of a line is increased, the reactance Xij  of that 
line will change as well and therefore the overall power flow pattern in the network is affected (see 
Section 5.3). According to the law of parallel circuits adding a second line on a connection and thus 
doubling the capacity will halve the lines’ reactance. Assuming that the lines have a starting capacity 
and reactance the functional connection can be expressed as: 
  0
0
ijt
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ijt
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k
X   line reactance and capacity  (5.15) 
Starting values k0 and X0 are given by the existing grid’s topology. 
In order to include the wholesale market in the profit maximization of the Transco, the power flow 
calculation and equation 5.15 are incorporated in the lower-level problem (equations 5.11 to 5.14). 
The derivation of the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions of the expanded lower level problem is 
reformulated as a mixed complementarity problem. These first-order conditions are in turn included as 
constraints into the Transco’s maximization besides the price-cap constraint. The problem is 
incorporated as MPEC into GAMS. The Transco’s choice of available capacity kij has therefore a 
direct impact on the resulting market prices and thus on its variable income component. The locational 
prices pi are derived as duals of the energy balance constraint.
82 
5.4.2 Three-node case 
First the incentive approach is tested using a three-node network. Beside a base case representation 
several robustness test are undertaken to figure out the impact of different market characteristics on the 
                                                     
82 The GAMS code is presented in Appendix VI. 
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Transco’s investment behavior. Finally the welfare properties of the approach are compared to a 
benevolent planer scenario. 
5.4.2.1 Basic Model Outcome 
The underlying three-node network topology is the same as in section 5.3 (Figure 5.2). The topology is 
assumed to be given and fixed, thus only existing lines can be upgraded. Generation at nodes 1 and 2 
is assumed to be unrestricted and no generation capacity is available at node 3. For simplicity the 
marginal costs of generation are fixed to zero. Each node i has a linear demand function p(di). The 
locational price at nodes 1 and 2 will be at marginal cost level and the price at node 3 will include 
possible congestion charges because no local generation capacities are available.  
The initial line characteristics represent a congested system. The available transmission capacity is 
such that node 3 faces a higher price than nodes 1 and 2. The system is assumed to be symmetric with 
respect to capacities and line reactances. According to its objective function (equation 5.9) the Transco 
is free to choose the line capacities kij.. Extension costs are specified via a linear cost function c(.) 
using a constant extension cost factor ecf:  
  1 tijtijtij kkecfc    extension cost function   (5.16) 
As the Transco can only extend line capacity it follows that .
1 tij
t
ij kk 83 
Table 5.2 summarizes the initial network characteristics (these are later relaxed to analyze the impact 
on the Transco’s extension behavior). The time framework is 10 periods. Regarding the price cap a 
classic chained Laspeyres approach is assumed, weighing the current period’s prices with the previous 
period’s quantities ignoring inflation or efficiency targets: 
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Laspeyres cap   (5.17) 
The number of consumers N is considered to be constant over all periods and normalized to 1, and the 
initial fixed fee is equal to 0. 
Given these conditions the approach shows an investment pattern that reduces the price at node 3 over 
time close to the marginal costs of generation (Figure 5.7). The obtained final price pattern represents 
the point where the per-unit marginal cost of new transportation capacity equals the expected 
congestion cost of not adding an additional unit of capacity. Given the initial grid conditions, 
providing an additional MW unit at node 3 decreases the nodal congestion price difference by 1 €. 
Thus, after the capacity expansion there will be an increased demand satisfied (in one MW) but at a 
reduced price (in one 1 €). To this new income the Transco still subtracts the extension costs (of 1 € 
                                                     
83 The possibility of reducing capacity with the given formulation presents two problems. First, reduction of capacity would 
also be costly; thus at 0 the function would have a kink. Second, following equation 5.15 the line’s reactance increases with 
each reduction converging to infinity if the line is completely taken out (capacity kij set to 0). This may result in infeasible 
solutions due to numerical limitations of the modelling software. 
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per MW). The new profit is however further positively counterbalanced by the Transco via the fixed 
fee F. This rebalancing behavior is precisely the one that promotes successive grid extensions through 
time. 
Compared to the initial congested grid conditions the consumer rent increases by about 35% in period 
10 due to the reduced prices and increased demand. Likewise, the Transco’s profit increases due to the 
balancing of congestion revenues and the fixed fee. If the Transco does not expand the grid, its profits 
would be 30% lower. 
Due to the symmetry of the network characteristics the extension pattern is not a fully unique solution. 
The loop-flowed line 1 is never subject to expansions84 and the Transco increases the capacities of line 
2 and 3 each period by decreasing amounts. Although the total amount of expanded capacity in each 
period is unique, its distribution to either line 2 or 3 is not unique and can vary with each model run. 
This occurs because the cost factors and initial line parameters are similar for both lines, and have 
symmetric generation structures at nodes 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 5.7: Price and fixed fee development for the base case 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
Period
P
ri
ce
 [
€ 
p
er
 M
W
h
]
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
F
ix
ed
 F
ee
 [
€]
price node 3 fixed fee
 
Source: Own calculation, based on Rosellón and Weigt (2008) 
 
 
                                                     
84 Rebalancing the injections at nodes 1 and 2 produces counter flows that keep the power flow on line 1 stable, this implies 
that there is no need to expand. 
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Table 5.2: Initial network characteristics 
 line1 line2 line3   n1 n2 n3 
Extension cost ecf = 1  Demand p(di) = 10 - di 
Initial capacity 2 MW  Generation costs mci = 0 n.a. 
Initial reactance 1 
Source: Own calculation 
 
5.4.2.2 Tests for Robustness  
To analyze the impact of the underlying assumptions on the model outcome the base case parameters 
are adjusted sequentially: 
Initial line capacities: In the base case a congested system with 2 MW of capacity on each line is 
assumed. If the initial capacity is decreased or increased by the same amount on each line the general 
results do not change. The price and extension patterns resemble the base case, although with different 
absolute levels. If the symmetry assumption is relaxed and the initial capacity of either line 2 or 3 
compared to the other lines is increased, the obtained price pattern resembles the base case outcome 
although the absolute values are lower as the initial congestion is reduced. The largest expansion 
occurs on the line with the lower initial capacity. 
Initial line reactance: The reactances define how the power flow “splits” on each line. Increasing the 
reactance of one line compared to the rest of the grid reduces the power flow share on that line and 
increases the flow on the others. However, changing individual line reactances does not alter the basic 
results compared to the base case with respect to prices.  
Line extension costs: In the base case all lines have similar expansion cost factors ecf, also meaning 
that line lengths are equal. Increasing the ecf for either line 2 or 3 does not alter the price pattern 
compared to the base case, because the entire grid expansion is focused on the cheaper line. Increasing 
the reactance of the more expensive line to resemble the length increase has no impact on the observed 
outcome. 
These results suggest that altering the network assumptions under the given simplified grid topology 
has no major impact. The observed gradual grid expansion remains stable reducing congestion within 
the system and thus the price at node 3 leading to an increase in consumer rents and the Transco’s 
profit.  
In addition to the initial value of line parameters, changes in the assumptions about generation, 
demand, and the length of the observation period may have an impact on the model outcome: 
Generation costs: Given that most electricity markets face a variety of generation technologies, the 
Transco must consider the price structure since it has a large impact on the resulting power flows. 
Increasing the generation costs at node 2 in the model leads to a new price pattern (now node 2 faces a 
price different from zero). The possibility to satisfy the demand at node 2 with cheaper generation 
from node 1 by increasing the grid’s capacity means a higher transmission volume. A large fraction of 
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local generation at node 2 will be replaced by injections from the grid which in turn increases the 
Transco’s profits. The results confirm these assumptions. A significantly larger capacity extension 
amount and higher profits for the Transco are observed. Prices at nodes 2 and 3 gradually decrease 
whereas prices at node 3 behave identically to the base case. 
Generation capacities: Plant availability also plays an important role. If cheaper generation is already 
at its maximum capacity limit, additional transmission capacity may not increase the transmission 
volume. To model this scenario the capacity of the cheap generation at node 1 is reduced to 15 MW 
while keeping the more expensive generation at node 2 unrestricted. Although the initial market 
outcome is the same as in the upper-level case it is not expected that the Transco will increase the 
network capacity significantly since only a limited amount of additional transmission will occur, thus 
resulting in a lower profit. The results confirm the assumptions; the prices at nodes 2 and 3 drop but 
remain higher than in the cases without generation capacity restrictions, and the profit is lower as the 
transported energy decreases. The price at node 1 increases as the network is extended, bringing all 
prices together. 
Demand behavior: The initial demand function represents a relatively elastic consumer behavior. In 
the short term the demand for electricity is inelastic, and thus congestion can lead to significantly 
higher prices without altering the transported energy in large amounts. Therefore the demand function 
is changed to p(di) = 1000 - 10di, while the remaining parameters are kept as in the base case. The 
results show that although the absolute values are significantly higher, consumers still have an 
equivalent price decrease. Thus the increased congestion rent due to the more inelastic demand does 
not change the incentives for the Transco to relieve congestion. 
Number of periods: The limited time frame of the model as well as missing depreciation of future 
payments can bias the outcome. Extending the time frame to 100 periods shows a much slower price 
decrease than in the 10-period case. However, this result is caused by the missing depreciation as 
current and future payments are weighted equally by the Transco. Introducing depreciation into the 
model reduces the impact of the considered number of periods. The higher the depreciation the more 
rapid the investment since future earnings are weighted less by the Transco. 
5.4.2.3 Welfare Properties 
To determine whether the results produced by the model also imply desirable welfare increases it is 
compared to a model where a benevolent welfare-maximizing ISO administers the line capacities as 
choice variables. In this model, the Transco is omitted from the formulation and the basic market 
clearing equations are extended. Thus network extensions become part of the welfare objective 
function: 
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Two robustness tests are presented in detail: asymmetric generation costs with limited generation 
capacities and asymmetric generation costs with unlimited generation capacities. The remaining 
results show a similar general behavior although with different absolute values.85 Table 5.3 
summarizes the outcomes comparing the base case of no grid extension, the case of capacity extension 
under the regulatory approach, and the case of a benevolent ISO. The non-extension case represents 
the initial network conditions; thus congestion and prices are the highest. In the case of the regulatory 
mechanism, an increase in consumer surplus and in the Transco’s profit, and a decrease of the 
congestion rents and nodal prices is observed. The results of the regulatory approach are relatively 
close to a pure welfare-maximizing outcome and suggest a convergence over time towards the welfare 
optimum. Furthermore, the case with limited generation capacities shows a common outcome in the 
case of congested markets: if congestion is relieved, prices converge to a common level and thus areas 
with initially low prices may afterwards face higher prices due to increased export. This may be of 
particular concern when implementing the approach in existing markets. 
Given the simplified topology of a three-node network the approach has robust welfare-enhancing 
properties. Although the absolute values of prices, rents, and capacities change by varying the 
assumptions, the Transco is incentivized to expand the grid in a way that market prices converge 
towards the welfare optimum. 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison of regulatory approach with welfare maximization (values refer to the 
last period: t10) 
Asymmetric generation costs, limited 
generation capacities 
Asymmetric generation costs, unlimited 
generation capacities 
 
No grid 
extension 
Regulatory 
Approach 
Welfare 
maximization 
No grid 
extension 
Regulatory 
approach 
Welfare 
maximization
Consumer rent 98.50 € 142.93 € 148.01 € 98.50 € 118.85 € 120.61 € 
Producer rent 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 4.35 € 13.46 € 15.00 € 
Congestion rent 22.00 € 6.93 € 1.98 € 22.00 € 4.10 € 1.98 € 
Total welfare 120.5 € 149.9 € 150.0 € 124.9 € 136.4 € 137.6 € 
Extension sum - 4.59 € 4.90 € - 15.28 € 15.80 € 
Capacity: line 1 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 9.75 MW 9.90 MW 
Capacity: line 2 2.00 MW 5.90 MW 6.00 MW 2.00 MW 9.53 MW 9.90 MW 
Capacity: line 3 2.00 MW 2.70 MW 2.90 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 
Price: node 1 0.00 € 0.90 € 1.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 
Price: node 2 1.00 € 1.00 € 1.00 € 1.00 € 0.25 € 0.10 € 
Price: node 3 6.00 € 1.41 € 1.10 € 6.00 € 0.47 € 0.10 € 
Source: Own calculation 
                                                     
85 A list of results is presented in Appendix VII. 
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5.4.3 Application to a Real-world Network 
5.4.3.1 Model and Data 
Following the insights obtained in the previous sections are tested by applying the approach to a more 
realistic representation of an existing electricity network with a diversified generation park. Figure 5.8 
illustrates the simplified grid of North West Europe connecting Germany (D), the Benelux, and France 
(F) based on Neuhoff et al. (2005). The model consists of 15 nodes and 28 lines. The nodes connecting 
France and Germany with their neighbors are auxiliary nodes without associated demand or 
generation. The lines connecting the German and French nodes with these auxiliary nodes are assumed 
to have unlimited capacities. Thus intra-country congestion in those two countries is not considered in 
detail. Each country node has given generation capacities (VGE, 2006) and a reference demand 
(UCTE, 2007). There are eight generation technologies, with identical cost structures in all countries 
for each type. With the exception of hydro power, renewable generation is not considered within the 
model. Table 5.4 gives an overview of the types, installed capacities, and marginal generation costs. A 
linear demand behavior at the nodes is derived from the average load level for the node, a reference 
price of 30 €/MWh, and an assumed price elasticity of 0.25 at that reference point. 
The model formulation used for the application to the European network is similar to the previous 
three-node approach. The time frame is extended to 20 periods and includes a depreciation factor with 
an interest rate of 8%.86 Inflation or an efficiency factor within the Transco’s price cap are not 
included. The derived market results for one time period represent one hour; thus the Transco’s 
revenue is multiplied by 8,760 for each period to resemble yearly incomes. Due to the average nature 
of both the load level and the generation structure, this approach omits the variable nature of real-
world electricity systems. Line expansion costs are assumed to behave linearly. Following Richert and 
Brakelmann (2004) and DENA (2005), the extension value is around 100 € per km per MW.87 The 
Transco can only expand already existing lines.  
The starting conditions in the market are classified by a high price level in the Netherlands (Krim, 
Maas, Zwol), a divided price structure in Belgium (Gram, Merc), modest prices in Germany, and low 
prices in France. Thus, congestion occurs between Belgium and France as well as between Germany 
and the Netherlands. 
                                                     
86 20 years are supposed to represent the depreciation time of assets in electricity markets and 8% represent an investment 
with rather low risk. 
87 This value is derived from upgrade costs for additional lines of the same voltage level, and upgrades from 220 kV to 
380 kV. The lumpy character of network investments is omitted. 
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Figure 5.8: Simplified grid of North West Europe 
 
Source: Neuhoff et al. (2005) 
Table 5.4: Plant characteristics 
Plant type 
Installed 
capacity 
Marginal 
generation 
cost 
Plant type 
Installed 
capacity 
Marginal 
generation 
cost 
Nuclear 83 500 GW 10 €/MWh Steam 28 000 GW 45 €/MWh 
Lignite 21 000 GW 15 €/MWh Gas turbine 5 500 GW 60 €/MWh 
Coal 51 250 GW 18 €/MWh Hydro 17 000 GW 0 €/MWh 
CCGT 18 500 GW 35 €/MWh Pumped 
storage 
13 000 GW 28 €/MWh 
Source: VGE (2006), own calculations 
5.4.3.2 Results 
To classify the obtained results they are compared to a case without grid extension (the starting 
conditions) and a benevolent ISO. Figure 5.9 shows the price developments at the country nodes over 
the considered periods. Given an initially high price divergence in the market they gradually converge 
to a common price level resembling the marginal cost of the last running unit. However, the price 
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convergence already occurs within the first 10 periods. In the second half of the considered time frame 
the prices change only marginally, and additional expansions are relatively small. 
Comparing the welfare components shows a convergence of the regulatory approach towards the 
welfare optimum (Table 5.5). However, even though the overall welfare increases, consumer surplus 
decreases, due to the increased prices that French consumers must pay. In the initial grid case, 
congestion separates the French market from the remainder of the grid. Thus, the prices go down to 
marginal costs of local nuclear units resulting in the lowest price in the market. If the grid is expanded, 
more of the available French nuclear power is utilized to satisfy demand at other nodes, and the price 
in France increases, thus reducing consumer surplus. This reduction cannot be offset by the lower 
prices in the Benelux because the demand in France is higher than the total demand in the Benelux. 
However, the decrease in consumer rent is compensated by a significant increase in producer rent. The 
largest fraction of the additional company profit will benefit France since the nuclear generation is 
now priced above their marginal costs. 
The grid expansion totals about 300 mn € within the 20 periods (Table 5.5), a relatively small amount 
given the market’s total welfare of 10 bn € per year. This is mainly due to the assumption that the grid 
upgrades that do occur will be less expensive than entirely new connections. However, the total new 
installed capacity increases significantly, doubling the initial available grid capacity. The Transco’s 
profit over all 20 periods is about 25% higher under the regulatory approach than if it would not have 
extended the grid at all and just collected the initial congestion rent in all periods.  
 
Figure 5.9: Price development in the European model 
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Table 5.5: Comparison of regulatory approach with welfare maximization (values refer to the 
last period: t20) 
 
No grid extension 
Regulatory 
Approach 
Welfare 
Maximization 
Consumer rent [Mio€/h] 10.37 10.31 10.30 
Producer rent [Mio€/h] 0.65 0.99 1.02 
Congestion rent [T€/h] 107.8 20.20 7.13 
Total welfare [Mio€/h] 11.13 11.32 11.33 
Total extension sum [Mio€] - 285.27 305.26 
Total grid capacity [GW] 33.4 60.9 62.64 
Average price [€/MWh] 28,4 18,5 18,1 
Source: own calculations 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the problem of securing investment into transmission capacity is investigated applying 
numerical modelling techniques to cope with the loop flow characteristic of meshed electricity 
networks. Whereas optimal regulatory or market based approaches for investment are common 
knowledge in economic theory the main problem of electricity markets is their combination of 
negative and positive external effect in transmission and the physical nature of electricity transport 
which complicates a clear cost allocation. The specific nature of transmission investments is analyzed 
by applying a cost minimizing approach given an external transport demand. The results show that 
electricity markets are subject to non-linear correlations between investment costs and transmission 
capacity. In particular even in simple network setting it is possible that an increasing transport demand 
can be satisfied more cheaply than a smaller demand. However, this correlation is not stable and 
depends on the specific network characteristics.  
A possible solution to the investment problem is presented by implementing a regulatory mechanism 
as an MPEC problem with a profit-maximizing Transco subject to a price cap and a competitive 
wholesale market based on nodal pricing and FTRs. The results show that the Transco expands the 
network and that prices converge towards marginal costs over the periods. The mechanism holds 
promise for real-world practice. Implementation could be carried out relatively easily and at low cost, 
providing considerable increases in social welfare, congestion relief, and profits for firms. Electricity 
markets with different institutional settings would only need reliable information on nodal prices. 
Additional research should demonstrate the robustness of the obtained results including the extension 
of the model structure to consider myopic behavior, varying weights in the price-cap constraint, 
employing variable pricing mechanisms (particularly zonal pricing), and examining the impacts of 
additional Transcos within a single network.  
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6 Summary, Conclusion, and Further Research 
 
"Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful" 
credited to George E. P. Box 
 
This thesis focuses on modeling competition and investment in liberalized electricity markets. In this 
concluding Chapter I summarize the main finding, discuss some policy implications and sketch out 
topics for further research. 
 
6.1 Summary and Conclusion 
In this thesis three model approaches have been developed to analyze specific issues in liberalized 
electricity markets. As every scientist relying on models I can indeed claim that all the presented 
models are “wrong”. Of course, they are formulated correctly, and also the solving process is (in the 
limits of numerical modeling) correct. However, the aim to represent real electricity markets can never 
be reached as simplifications are necessary to remain a solvable model structure. 
In Chapter 3 an optimization model is developed to obtain a competitive price benchmark for the 
German electricity wholesale market between 2004 and 2006 to estimate markups due to market 
power abuse. The 2004 and 2005 analysis is subject to simplifications due to the limited available 
data. The analysis is based on 24 days and neglects important market features like unit commitment 
restrictions. For the 2006 analysis the applied model captures unit commitment processes and the 
underlying dataset allows a detailed representation of the generation and demand side for each of the 
8760 hours during the year. Nevertheless, important features like uncertainty and daily variations of 
fuel prices and plant availabilities are not included. Thus the obtained benchmark prices are only a 
“good” estimate of what one could expect in a perfect competitive market environment on average and 
may provide misleading conclusions when looking at a specific hour. 
So is the carried out analysis useful? Several robustness test highlight that the observed and simulated 
market outcomes diverge by large degrees in quantity terms. On average the capacity gap is larger than 
10 GW which represents about 15% of the peak demand levels. Furthermore, the analyses show that 
high price levels above marginal generation costs often occur during mid-load levels (a general price 
divergence of about 10 €/WMh is obtained for more than 2000 h). Thus, although the underlying 
models are not capable to fully reproduce a competitive market environment, the obtained price 
patterns hint on divergences during market periods that are not primarily considered to be subject of 
market power abuse and may require further investigation from regulatory side. In addition the 
analysis also highlights the current market situation with significant overcapacities making further 
investments into generation unprofitable.  
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The two strategic models applied in Chapter 4 to investigate divestiture scenarios in the German 
market are also “wrong” by definition. Due to the restrictive nature of the SFE approach the applied 
costs structure via a cubic cost function can not capture the complexity of real world electricity 
markets. In addition, the assumed linear demand behavior, unrestricted import availability and stylized 
competitive fringe behavior adds to the error. And consequently the Cournot approach suffers the 
same drawbacks as it applies the same simplifications for the sake of comparability. So again, are the 
simulations at least useful? The are several important insights gained. First, the impact of a divestiture 
in the German electricity market seems to be quite large with an estimated welfare increase up to 3 bn 
€ per year. Although this number is subject to the before mentioned restrictions it shows a high 
potential of this pro-active competition policy tool which justifies its principal threat of application 
even in the German market setting. Second, the comparison of a divestiture to establish a wider six 
firm oligopoly with a pure sell out to small competitive companies hints at the potential gains a well 
founded divestiture policy can provide. Given that in both cases the same assets are divested the 
divergence of price and welfare results is significant favoring the sales to smaller firms. And finally, 
the analysis also shows that both strategic model approaches perform equally once calibrated to the 
underlying dataset. 
And last but not least also the model approach presented in Chapter 5 to analyze the regulatory 
incentive scheme for transmission companies is no more than a stylized representation of the real 
world. The application of a regulated two part tariff system to allow for a rescheduling of congestion 
rent and fixed cost recovery represents a complicated class of mathematical models (a MPEC) and 
thus is not yet applicable for large datasets. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to highly simplified 
market structures. In addition, the three-node example and the cost function simulations are not 
designed to represent a real market environment but to highlight the complexities of electricity 
transmission and resulting problems. So finally, how useful can such a simplified simulation prove? 
The effort shown in this thesis was the first necessary step to allow further research regarding practical 
implementation and interaction in a more flexible environment. Up to now, the regulatory approach 
initiated by Vogelsang (2001) has only been analyzed theoretically or without the full underlying 
complexity of electric power flows (Hogan et al. 2007). The results of my simulation show that the 
approach can prove welfare improvements given the characteristics of electricity networks and thus a 
major obstacle has been overcome. Whether the approach still represents a proper solution once 
additional real world market complexities like different ownership structures and interfering 
generation investments are included is subject to further research. But if these first stylized test would 
have shown the incapability of the approach any further analyses would be obsolete. 
 
6.2 Further Research 
There are a couple of related issues that have not been covered in this thesis. As is evident from 
Chapter 2 liberalized electricity markets provide a wide array of research questions that can be 
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assessed by modeling techniques ranging from ex-post market analyzes to theoretic market design 
questions. Regarding the competitiveness of wholesale electricity markets and possible policy 
measurements the basic research framework is well developed. The main point to pursuit is the 
development and implementation of a proper market design and a consequent market monitoring to 
prevent possible market power abuse. Thus future research will focus on governmental and regulatory 
support to enhance the exiting market frameworks. Regarding network investments and regulation the 
debate about a proper mechanism is still ongoing (see Chapter 5). The US markets are discussing 
about potential beneficiary-pay approaches whereas the European markets are still strolling with a 
proper cross-border coordination. 
Beside those two directions related to the work presented in this thesis following two further topics are 
shortly discussed in more detail: the integration of wind energy in electricity networks and the 
interaction of generation and network investments.  
6.2.1 Wind Integration 
Within the last years wind energy has become one of the fastest growing renewable energy 
technologies. However, the intermitted nature of the wind output is a challenge for electricity market 
design, system operation, and network extension. The Chair of Energy Economics and Public Sector 
Management (EE2) has developed a model of the European electricity market(s) based on a DCLF, 
called ELMOD to address these topic and conduct a series of research papers.88 
Leuthold et al. (2005) analyze the implication of additional wind supply into the German high-voltage 
grid showing that a nodal pricing scheme provides a welfare increases between 0.6% and 1.3% or 
about 350 Mio € per year compared to the reference uniform prices German market system.  
Weigt et al. (2006) extends this analysis and models the effects of nodal pricing in combination with 
increased wind energy on the North-Western European grid. They point out that even under status quo 
conditions, the price situation in Benelux is affected by high wind input in Germany.  
The need for grid investments due to wind extension and cross-border bottlenecks is not only a 
German problem but the whole UCTE grid will have to be extended if the European Union wants to 
fulfill its aim of firstly obtaining a single integrated market and secondly integrate a large share of 
distributed renewable energy sources. Leuthold et al. (2009) focus on large-scale wind integration in a 
European context with a particular focus on efficient grid extension measurements. They develop a 
grid-extension algorithm to extend the grid incrementally until an economically optimal grid status is 
identified that is capable of carrying the additional wind. They show that extending the network at 
existing bottlenecks – mainly cross-border connections – should be encouraged by regulatory 
authorities. With a more moderate wind expansion of 114.5 GW till 2020, the optimal grid 
investments are even smaller due to resulting counter flows. However, if the additional wind capacity 
                                                     
88 A detailed description of ELMOD is provided in Leuthold et al. (2008). 
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becomes too great (181 GW), the needed grid extensions will increase compared to the actual 
situation. 
The nest research steps are to analyze the interaction of fossil back-up and wind generation on the 
market side (prices and volatility) and on the investment side, as well as the coordination of large scale 
intermitted energy sources across Europe and beyond (e.g. solar energy from Africa) with demand 
centers and pump storage facilities via a high voltage direct current system. 
6.2.2 Substitutability between Generation and Transmission Investment 
Another research topic to be addressed is the interaction between generation and network investments 
and the necessary market design to avoid double investments. Whereas in the pre-liberalization years 
this process was carried out by vertical integrated companies the liberalized markets will yet have to 
proof that they can handle this task. This topic combines several research areas including the concern 
of generation investment planning, network modeling, and network investments and regulation.  
A first step has been made by Dietrich et al. (2009). They model investment behavior of power plants 
in the German market up to the year 2012 based on realistic data of planned generation investments 
and analyze where in the current scheme new investment in generation is most likely to take place and 
compare these results to an optimal investment pattern taking into account network capacities. The 
analysis is carried out for different assumptions regarding market representation including a national 
focus on Germany, a market coupling setting, and a fully integrated European market. The results 
indicate that new generation capacities are not needed in Germany but in the Benelux area. Their paper 
demonstrates that great benefits for consumers and producers can be created when physical network 
restriction are taken into account within a real integrated market. The approach takes the network as 
given. The next step would be to combine network and generation investment within a market 
framework. The crucial issue is the timing of investments as additional power plants may render a new 
line unprofitable and vice versa.  
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Appendix I: Price Curves 2004-2005 (Chapter 3) 
 
Figure X: Observed and modeled prices January – April 2004 
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Figure XI: Observed and modeled prices May– August 2004 
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Figure XII: Observed and modeled prices September– December 2004 
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Figure XIII: Observed and modeled prices January – April 2005 
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Figure XIV: Observed and modeled prices May– August 2004 
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Figure XV: Observed and modeled prices May– August 2004 
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Appendix II: GAMS Code Market Power Model for 2006 
(Chapter 3) 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                declaration of sets                           * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Sets 
p                plant number 
nuc(p)           nuclear plants 
lig(p)           lignite plants 
coal(p)          coal plants 
steam(p)         oil and gas steam plants 
ccgt(p)          ccgt plants 
gt(p)            gas turbines 
hydro(p)         hydro plants 
pump(p)          pump storage plants 
kwk(p)           combined heat and power plants 
oil(p)           oil fired plants (regardless if ccgt or steam or gt) 
gas(p)           gas fired plants (regardless if ccgt or steam or gt) 
t                time 
tfirst(t)        first time period 
; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                declaration of scalars                        * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Scalars 
kwkfactor        load factor of chp plants 
; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                declaration of parameters                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Parameters 
marginalcosts(p,t)      generation costs of plants 
fuelcosts(p,t)          generation costs without emissions 
gmax(p)                 maximum capacity 
gmin(p)                 minimum capacity 
eff(p)                  efficiency of a plant 
price(p,t)              price of the fuel used by p in t 
co2(p)                  co2 emissions of a plant 
co2price(t)             co2 emission allowance price in t 
pumpmax                 sum of all pump storage plants 
demand(t)               demand in Germany 
season                  seasonality 
startup(p,t)            start up costs per MWh depending on fuel price in t 
opcosts                 operation costs 
eex(t)                  EEX prices in t 
; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                Variables                                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Variables 
costs           overall generation expanses 
; 
 
Positive Variables 
startupcosts 
gen(p,t)        generation of plant p at time t 
PSPdown(t)      Pump storage generation 
PSPup(t)        Pump storage "pump it up" 
PSP             Pump Storage level 
; 
 
Binary Variable 
status(p,t)     plant condition (1=on 0=off) 
; 
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*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                Equations                                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
EQUATIONS 
 
objective                total cost function 
linobjective             total costs excluding startup costs 
energybalance            demand = generation 
genmax                   upper limit for generation 
genmin                   lower limit for generation 
startupc                 calculation of startup costs 
PSPcapacity              pump storage level 
PSPcapacitystart         pump storage starts with an empty storage 
PSPupdown                1st capacity constraint for PSP 
PSPupdown2               2nd capacity constraint for PSP 
shutdown_li_1h           startup constraints for lignite 
shutdown_li_2h 
shutdown_li_3h 
shutdown_li_4h 
shutdown_li_5h 
shutdown_li_6h 
shutdown_li_7h 
shutdown_co_1h           startup constraints for coal 
shutdown_co_2h 
shutdown_co_3h 
shutdown_steam_1h        startup constraints for steam 
shutdown_steam_2h 
shutdown_cc_1h           startup constraints for ccgt 
; 
 
 
 
objective..       costs =e=  
   sum((p,t)$gmax(p), marginalcosts(p,t)*gen(p,t))/1000000 
                       + sum((p,t)$startup(p,t), startupcosts(p,t))/1000000 
; 
linobjective..    costs =e= sum((p,t)$gmax(p), marginalcosts(p,t)*gen(p,t))/1000000 
; 
energybalance(t)..   demand(t) + PSPup(t) =e= sum(p,gen(p,t)) + PSPdown(t) 
; 
genmax(p,t)..        gen(p,t) =l= status(p,t)*gmax(p) 
; 
genmin(p,t)$gmin(p).. gen(p,t) =g= status(p,t)*gmin(p) 
; 
 
startupc(p,t+1)$startup(p,t)..   startupcosts(p,t+1) =e=  
        sqr(status(p,t)- status(p,t+1))* startup(p,t+1) * gen(p,t+1) 
; 
 
*PSP system 
PSPcapacity(t+1)..               PSP(t+1) =e= PSP(t) + 0.75*PSPup(t) - PSPdown(t) 
; 
PSPcapacitystart(tfirst)..       PSP(tfirst) =e= 0 
; 
PSPupdown(t)..                   PSPup(t) + PSPdown(t) =l= pumpmax 
; 
PSPupdown2(t)..                  PSPdown(t) =l= PSP(t) 
; 
 
*Startups 
shutdown_li_1h(lig,t)..   status(lig,t-1)- status(lig,t) =l= 1-status(lig,t+1); 
shutdown_li_2h(lig,t)..     status(lig,t-1)- status(lig,t) =l= 1-status(lig,t+2); 
shutdown_li_3h(lig,t)..     status(lig,t-1)- status(lig,t) =l= 1-status(lig,t+3); 
shutdown_li_4h(lig,t)..     status(lig,t-1)- status(lig,t) =l= 1-status(lig,t+4); 
shutdown_li_5h(lig,t)..    status(lig,t-1)- status(lig,t) =l= 1-status(lig,t+5); 
shutdown_li_6h(lig,t)..     status(lig,t-1)- status(lig,t) =l= 1-status(lig,t+6); 
shutdown_li_7h(lig,t)..     status(lig,t-1)- status(lig,t) =l= 1-status(lig,t+7); 
 
shutdown_co_1h(coal,t)..  status(coal,t-1)- status(coal,t) =l= 1-status(coal,t+1); 
shutdown_co_2h(coal,t)..  status(coal,t-1)- status(coal,t) =l= 1-status(coal,t+2); 
shutdown_co_3h(coal,t)..  status(coal,t-1)- status(coal,t) =l= 1-status(coal,t+3); 
 
shutdown_steam_1h(steam,t)..  status(steam,t-1)- status(steam,t) =l= 1-status(steam,t+1); 
shutdown_steam_2h(steam,t)..  status(steam,t-1)- status(steam,t) =l= 1-status(steam,t+2); 
 
shutdown_cc_1h(ccgt,t)..      status(ccgt,t-1)- status(ccgt,t) =l= 1-status(ccgt,t+1); 
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*-----
Model Plantfixer 
-------------------- MIP run --------------------------------------------* 
/ 
linobjective 
energybalance 
genmax 
genmin 
PSPcapacity 
PSPcapacitystart 
PSPupdown 
PSPupdown2 
shutdown_li_1h 
shutdown_li_2h 
shutdown_li_3h 
shutdown_li_4h 
shutdown_li_5h 
shutdown_li_6h 
shutdown_li_7h 
shutdown_co_1h 
shutdown_co_2h 
shutdown_co_3h 
shutdown_steam_1h 
shutdown_steam_2h 
shutdown_cc_1h 
/; 
 
solve Plantfixer using mip minimizing costs; 
 
 
*---------
parameter 
---------------- NLP run --------------------------------------------* 
statfix(p,t)   fixing the status of a plant after mip solve 
; 
 
statfix(p,t)=status.l(p,t); 
status.fx(p,t)=statfix(p,t); 
 
Model NLP_run 
/ 
objective 
energybalance 
genmax 
genmin 
startupc 
PSPcapacity 
PSPcapacitystart 
PSPupdown 
PSPupdown2 
shutdown_li_1h 
shutdown_li_2h 
shutdown_li_3h 
shutdown_li_4h 
shutdown_li_5h 
shutdown_li_6h 
shutdown_li_7h 
shutdown_co_1h 
shutdown_co_2h 
shutdown_co_3h 
shutdown_steam_1h 
shutdown_steam_2h 
shutdown_cc_1h 
/; 
 
solve NLP_run using rminlp minimizing costs; 
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Appendix III: GAMS Code Cournot and SFE Model (Chapter 4) 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                declaration of sets                           * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
sets 
 
i                    max number of firms 
j(i)                 considered firms in this run 
k                     demand shock steps 
kfirst(k)             first step 
klast (k)             last step 
coef                 Coefficient for polynomials 
otherfirms(i,ii)      all firms excluding firm i 
; 
alias (ii,i); 
alias (j,jj); 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                declaration of scalars                        * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Scalar 
 
gamma                 slope of demand function 
alpha_high           highest intercept of demand function 
epsilon              distance between demand shocks on one axis 
; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                declaration of parameters                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Parameters 
 
gbeta(i,coef)         cost Parameters of the firms (cubic coest function) 
fgrade(coef)          cost function polynomials 
dummy(i)              competitive firm dummy [1 competitive 0 strategic] 
fixed_contract(i)     contract coverage in terms of max capacity 
eps_flex(k)            variable epsilon for each shock k 
; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                Variables                                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
variable 
 
f                 objective dummy 
p(k)              price with shock k 
D(k)              total demand with shock k 
c(i,k)            marginal costs at the quantity q 
ksi(i,k)          slope difference variable 
; 
 
positive variables 
 
beta(i,k)         slope of supply curve at shock k 
q(i,k)            quantity by firm i at shock k 
; 
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*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                Equations                                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
EQUATIONS 
 
objective                objective dummy minimizing slope and epsilon differences 
MarketClearing           sum of supply equals demand 
Demand                   demand level for shock k 
MC                       marginal costs at the quantity q(i k) 
Supply                   Anderson approach for continuity 
FOC_SFE                  Equilibrium condition for SFE model 
FOC_COMP                 Equilibrium condition for competitive benchmark 
FOC_COUR                 Equilibrium condition for Cournot model 
; 
 
 
 
objective..           f =e= 100*sum(kfirst(k),D(k))- 100*sum(klast(k),D(k)) 
                           + sum((j,k),sqr(ksi(j,k)-.5)) 
                           + sum(k,sqr(eps_flex(k)-epsilon * (ord(k)-1)))/(epsilon*epsilon); 
 
Demand(k)..           D(k) =e= alpha_high - gamma*p(k) - eps_flex(k); 
 
MarketClearing(k)..   sum(j,q(j,k)) =e= D(k); 
 
MC(j,k)..             c(j,k) =e= sum(coef, gbeta(j,coef)*power (q(j,k),fgrade(coef))); 
 
Supply(j,k+1).. q(j,k+1)-q(j,k) =e=   
   (p(k+1) - p(k))*((1-ksi(j,k))*beta(j,k)+ksi(j,k)*beta(j,k+1)); 
 
FOC_SFE(j,k)..  (q(j,k)- fixed_contract(j))*dummy(j)  
   - (p(k)-c(j,k))*(sum(otherfirms(j,jj),beta(jj,k)) + gamma )=e= 0 ; 
 
FOC_COMP(j,k)..      (p(k)-c(j,k))=e= 0 ; 
 
FOC_COUR(j,k)..      (q(j,k)- fixed_contract(j))*dummy(j) - (p(k)-c(j,k))* gamma  =e= 0 ; 
 
 
 
 
*------------------------- model defintions -----------------------------------* 
 
model anderson     / objective,MarketClearing,Demand,MC,Supply,FOC_SFE /; 
model competition  / objective,MarketClearing,Demand,MC,Supply,FOC_COMP/; 
model cournot      / objective,MarketClearing,Demand,MC,Supply,FOC_COUR/; 
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Appendix IV: Price Curves and Welfare Results, Divestiture 
(Chapter 4) 
 
Table VI: Base case and asymmetric capacities 
Pre-Divestiture 6 Firm Case 4 Firm Case  Competitive 
Benchmark Cournot SFE Cournot SFE Cournot SFE 
Average peak price 
[€/MWh] 44.6 63.6 62.9 55.3 53.1 47.5 46.7 
Welfare 
[mn €/h] 12.94 12.02 12.04 12.42 12.53 12.79 12.84 
Consumer surplus 
[mn €/h] 11.92 10.17 10.22 10.91 11.10 1.08 1.09 
Profit EON 
[T€/h] 342 586 579 246 232 193 187 
Profit RWE 
[T€/h] 298 560 536 232 216 174 167 
Profit Vattenfall 
[T€/h] 199 378 381 293 277 229 220 
Profit EnBW 
[T€/h] 187 327 326 262 248 209 203 
Profit EON divested 
[T€/h] - - - 246 232 188 184 
Profit RWE divested 
[T€/h] - - - 232 216 165 162 
 
 
 
 150
Figure XVI: Cournot and SFE supply curves, January 2006 
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Figure XVII: Cournot and SFE supply curves, February 2006 
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Figure XVIII: Cournot and SFE supply curves, March 2006 
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Figure XIX: Cournot and SFE supply curves, April 2006 
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Figure XX: Cournot and SFE supply curves, May 2006 
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Figure XXI: Cournot and SFE supply curves, June 2006 
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Figure XXII: Cournot and SFE supply curves, July 2006 
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Figure XXIII: Cournot and SFE supply curves, August 2006 
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Figure XXIV: Cournot and SFE supply curves, September 2006 
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Figure XXV: Cournot and SFE supply curves, October 2006 
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Figure XXVI: Cournot and SFE supply curves, November 2006 
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Figure XXVII: Cournot and SFE supply curves, December 2006 
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Appendix V: Numerical Results of Cost Function Analysis 
(Chapter 5) 
 
Figure XXVIII: Global cost function, three-node network, base case, fixed line reactances 
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Figure XXIX: Global cost function, six-node network, base case, fixed line reactances 
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Figure XXX: Global cost function, three-node network, base case, variable line reactances 
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Figure XXXI: Global cost function, six-node network, base case, variable line reactances 
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Appendix VI: GAMS Code MPEC Approach (Chapter 5) 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                declaration of sets                           * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Sets 
l                lines 
n                nodes 
t                period 
tfirst(t)        first time period 
; 
Alias (n,nn); 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                declaration of parameters                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Parameter 
Incidence(l,n)              indicating starting- and end-node of a line l 
slack(n)                    slack bus (voltage angel fixed at 0 for this node) 
cap_0(l)                    starting capacity on line l 
ecf(l)                      cost function: extension cost factor 
marginalcosts(n,t)          marginal generation costs 
max_gen(n)                  maximum generation capacity at n 
intercept(n)                demand function: highest price at y-axis 
slope(n)                    demand function: slope 
; 
* note that for this code the lines reactance X is assumed to be 1 for each line 
 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                Variables                                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
Variables 
return           Tranco profit 
delta            voltage angle difference 
price            price at a node n 
lambdadelta      dual variable on the slack bus constraint 
; 
 
Positive Variables 
extension(l,t)        extension in period t in times of original capacity (e.g. 2 times cap0) 
cap(l,t)              existing capacity in t (original capacity + all further extensions) 
generation(n,t)       generation at a node 
demand(n,t)           demand at a node 
capacityrent(n,t)     shadow price of generation capacity 
flowpos(l,t)          shadow price of line capacity positive flow direction 
flowneg(l,t)          shadow price of line capacity negative flow direction 
fix_part              fixed part of Trancos transmission tariff 
; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*                                Equations                                     * 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
 
EQUATIONS 
 
profit           objective of the Transco (congestion rent + fixed part - extension costs) 
price_cap        regulatory constraint on variable and fixed part 
line_caps        actual line capacity in a period based on previous capacity and extension 
line_caps_one    starting line capacities 
 
* MCP market clearing (welfare maximizing ISO) 
* note that in order to obtain starting values a welfare maximizing network extending Transco 
* run is modelled in addition in which “extension(l,t)” is a variable within the welfare 
* maximization 
 
FOC_g            First-Order-Condition of variable generation 
FOC_ext             First-Order-Condition of variable ext for a welfare maximizing Transco 
   for pre-run 
FOC_delta             First-Order-Condition of variable delta for a welfare maximizing Transco 
   for pre-run 
FOC_delta_MPEC        First-Order-Condition of variable delta 
FOC_q                 First-Order-Condition of variable demand 
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Slackbus              setting voltage angel difference at slack bus to 0 
gen_capacity          upper limit for generation 
Energybalance         demand = generation for a welfare maximizing Transco for pre-run 
Energybalance_MPEC  demand = generation 
Lineflow_pos           upper limit for line flows for a welfare maximizing Transco for pre-run 
Lineflow_neg           lower limit for line flows for a welfare maximizing Transco for pre-run 
Lineflow_pos_MPEC     upper limit for line flows 
Lineflow_neg_MPEC     lower limit for line flows 
; 
 
 
*TRANSCO profit maximization under regulatory cap 
profit..   return =e= sum(t, 
   sum(n, price(n,t)*demand(n,t)) - sum(n, price(n,t)*generation(n,t))) 
   + sum(t,fix_part(t)) 
   - sum((l,t), ecf(l)* cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)) 
; 
 
price_cap(t+1)..   sum(n, price(n,t+1)*demand(n,t)) - sum(n, price(n,t+1)*generation(n,t)) 
                    + fix_part(t+1) 
              =l= 
             sum(n, price(n,t)*demand(n,t)) - sum(n, price(n,t)*generation(n,t)) 
               + fix_part(t) 
; 
 
 
*Calculation of line capacities in each period t 
line_caps(l,t+1)..         cap(l,t+1) =e= cap_0(l)*extension(l,t) + cap(l,t) 
; 
 
line_caps_one(l,tfirst)..  cap(l,tfirst) =e= cap_0(l) 
; 
 
 
*MCP formulation of the market clearing for the MPEC run 
 
FOC_g(n,t)..                marginalcosts(n,t) + capacityrent(n,t) - price(n,t) =g= 0 
; 
 
FOC_q(n,t)..               -(intercept(n) + slope(n)*demand(n,t)) + price(n,t) =g= 0 
; 
 
FOC_delta_MPEC(n,t)..  
  SUM(l, 1/( cap_0(l)/(cap(l,t) +  
  cap_0(l)*extension(l,t))) * Incidence(l,n)*(-flowpos(l,t)+flowneg(l,t))) 
  - sum(nn, price(nn,t)*SUM(l, Incidence(l,nn) *  
  (1/( cap_0(l)/(cap(l,t) + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)))  * Incidence(l,n) ))) 
  + lambdadelta(n,t)*slack(n) 
               =g= 0 
; 
 
Slackbus(n,t)..             slack(n)*delta(n,t) =e= 0 
; 
 
gen_capacity(n,t)..         max_gen(n)- generation(n,t) =g= 0 
; 
 
Energybalance_MPEC(n,t)..   generation(n,t) - demand(n,t) 
                            -  SUM(l, Incidence(l,n) * SUM((nn), 1/( cap_0(l)/(cap(l,t)  
    + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t))) * Incidence(l,nn) * Delta(nn,t))) 
                            =e= 0 
; 
Lineflow_pos_MPEC(l,t)..    
  (cap(l,t) + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t))  
  – SUM(n, 1/( cap_0(l)/(cap(l,t) + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)))   
  * Incidence(l,n) * Delta(n,t)) =g= 0 
; 
Lineflow_neg_MPEC(l,t)..    
  (cap(l,t) + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t))  
  + SUM(n, 1/( cap_0(l)/(cap(l,t) + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)))   
  * Incidence(l,n) * Delta(n,t)) =g= 0 
; 
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*MCP formulation of a welfare maximizing pre-solve to obtain starting values for each period 
FOC_ext(l,t)..              
  ecf(l)* cap_0(l) 
   - flowpos(l,t)*(cap_0(l)- SUM(n, -sqr(cap_0(l))*1/sqr(cap_0(l)  
  + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)) * Incidence(l,n) * Delta(n,t))) 
         - flowneg(l,t)*(cap_0(l)+ SUM(n, -sqr(cap_0(l))*1/sqr(cap_0(l)  
  + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t))  * Incidence(l,n) * Delta(n,t))) 
               =e= 0 
; 
 
FOC_delta(n,t)..            
  SUM(l, 1/( cap_0(l)/(cap_0(l) + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)))  
  * Incidence(l,n)*(-flowpos(l,t)+flowneg(l,t)))                           
  sum(nn, price(nn,t)*SUM(l, Incidence(l,nn)  
  * (1/( cap_0(l)/(cap_0(l) + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)))   
  * Incidence(l,n) ))) + lambdadelta(n,t)*slack(n)   
  =g= 0 
; 
 
Energybalance(n,t)..        
  generation(n,t) - demand(n,t)  
  -  SUM(l, Incidence(l,n) * SUM((nn),(1/( cap_0(l)/(cap_0(l)  
  + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t))) * Incidence(l,nn)) * Delta(nn,t)))  
  =e= 0 
; 
 
Lineflow_pos(l,t)..         
  (cap_0(l)+cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)) -   SUM(n, 1/( cap_0(l)/(cap_0(l)  
  + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t))) * Incidence(l,n) * Delta(n,t)) =g= 0 
; 
 
Lineflow_neg(l,t)..         
  (cap_0(l)+cap_0(l)*extension(l,t)) +   SUM(n, 1/( cap_0(l)/(cap_0(l)  
  + cap_0(l)*extension(l,t))) * Incidence(l,n) * Delta(n,t)) =g= 0 
; 
 
*------------------------- MCP pre-run ----------------------------------------* 
 
model MCP 
/ 
FOC_g.generation 
FOC_ext.extension 
FOC_delta.delta 
FOC_q.demand 
Slackbus.lambdadelta 
gen_capacity.capacityrent 
Energybalance.price 
Lineflow_pos.flowpos 
Lineflow_neg.flowneg 
/ 
; 
 
solve MCP using mcp; 
 
*------------------------- MPEC main run ---------------------------------------* 
 
model MPEC 
/ 
profit 
price_cap 
line_caps 
line_caps_one 
FOC_g.generation 
FOC_delta_MPEC.delta 
FOC_q.demand 
Slackbus.lambdadelta 
gen_capacity.capacityrent 
Energybalance_MPEC.price 
Lineflow_pos_MPEC.flowpos 
Lineflow_neg_MPEC.flowneg 
/ 
; 
 
solve MPEC maximizing return using mpec; 
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Appendix VII: Numerical Results of Robustness Tests (Chapter 5) 
 
Table VII: Base case and asymmetric capacities 
Base case Asymmetric transmission capacities (line2)  
No grid 
extension 
Regulatory 
approach 
Welfare 
maximization 
No grid 
extension 
Regulatory 
approach 
Welfare 
maximization 
Consumer rent 108.00 € 145.44 € 149.01 € 118.00 € 146.21 149.01 € 
Producer rent 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 
Congestion rent 24.00 € 4.45 € 0.99 € 24.00 € 3.71 € 0.99 € 
Total welfare 132.00 € 149.89 € 150.00 € 142.00 € 149.92 € 150.00 € 
Extension sum - 5.53 € 5.90 € - 3.61 3.90 € 
Capacity: line 1 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 
Capacity: line 2 2.00 MW 6.56 MW 2.00 MW 4.00 MW 5.58 MW 4.00 MW 
Capacity: line 3 2.00 MW 2.98 MW 7.90 MW 2.00 MW 4.03 MW 5.90 MW 
Price: node 1 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 
Price: node 2 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 
Price: node 3 6.00 € 0.47 € 0.10 € 4.00 € 0.39 € 0.10 € 
 
Table VIII: Asymmetric reactances and asymmetric line extension costs 
Asymmetric lien reactances (line2) Asymmetric extension costs and reactances (line2)  
No grid 
extension 
No grid 
extension 
No grid 
extension 
No grid 
extension 
Regulatory 
approach 
Welfare 
maximization 
Consumer rent 108.00 € 108.00 € 108.00 € 108.00 € 146.21 149.01 € 
Producer rent 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 
Congestion rent 24.00 € 24.00 € 24.00 € 24.00 € 3.71 € 0.99 € 
Total welfare 132.00 € 132.00 € 132.00 € 132.00 € 149.92 € 150.00 € 
Extension sum - - - - 3.61 3.90 € 
Capacity: line 1 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 
Capacity: line 2 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 5.58 MW 4.00 MW 
Capacity: line 3 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 2.00 MW 4.03 MW 5.90 MW 
Price: node 1 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 
Price: node 2 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 0.00 € 
Price: node 3 6.00 € 6.00 € 6.00 € 6.00 € 0.39 € 0.10 € 
 
 
